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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CODY JAMES FORTIN, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 43334 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE PATRICK H. OWEN 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
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Date: 8/12/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 08:21 AM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 3 Case: CV-PC-2013-08285 Current Judge: Patrick H. Owen 
Cody J Fortin, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Cody J Fortin, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
5/7/2013 NCPC CCNELSRF New Case Filed - Post Conviction Relief District Court Clerk 
CHGA CCNELSRF Judge Change: Administrative Patrick H. Owen 
PETN CCNELSRF Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief Patrick H. Owen 
AFFD CCNELSRF Affidavit in Support of Petition and Affidavit for Patrick H. Owen 
Post Conviction Relief 
MOTN CCNELSRF Verified Motion for Waiver of Costs Patrick H. Owen 
MOTN CCNELSRF Motion for Appointment of Counsel Patrick H. Owen 
MOTN CCNELSRF Motion for the Release of PSI Patrick H. Owen 
MOTN CCNELSRF Motion for Judicial Notice Patrick H. Owen 
CERT CCNELSRF Certificate Of Mailing Patrick H. Owen 
5/8/2013 PROS PRFISCKD Prosecutor assigned Jonathan M Medema Patrick H. Owen 
5/24/2013 ANSW CCREIDMA Answer - Jonathan M Medema 5623 forSt of Patrick H. Owen 
Idaho 
MOTN CCREIDMA Motion To Take Judicial Notice Patrick H. Owen 
MOTN CCREIDMA Motion for Summary Disposition Patrick H. Owen 
MISC CCREIDMA Brief In Support of Motion For Summary Patrick H. Owen 
Disposition 
NOTC CCREIDMA Notice of Hearing (Fortin) Patrick H. Owen 
6/6/2013 MOTN CCNELSRF Motion for Extension of Time To Respond to Patrick H. Owen 
Summary Judgment and to Vacate the June 8th 
2013 Hearing on the Same States Motion 
AFSM CCNELSRF Affidavit In Support Of Motion for Extension of Patrick H. Owen 
Time To Respond to Summary Judgment and to 
Vacate the June 8th 2013 Hearing on the Same 
States Motion 
MEMO CCNELSRF Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Patrick H. Owen 
of a Motion for Extension of Time To Respond to 
Summary Judgment and to Vacate the June 8th 
2013 Hearing on the Same States Motion 
6/10/2013 ORDR DCJOHNSI Order Granting Motion for Appointment of Counse Patrick H. Owen 
6/25/2013 HRSC CCHEATJL Notice Of Hearing Scheduled (Motion Patrick H. Owen 
07/30/2013 03:00 PM) Motion For Summary 
Dismissal 
7/2/2013 MEMO CCHUNTAM Memorandum Decision and Order re: Patrick H. Owen 
Appointment of Counsel, Waiver of Filing Fees, 
Release of the Pre-Sentence Report, and Judicial 
Notice of Underlying Flies 
7/19/2013 MOTN CCHOLMEE Motion for Stay of Proceedings and For Leave to Patrick H. Owen 
Amend Petition 
MOTN CCJOHNLE Motion to Release PSI Patrick H. Owen 
7/29/2013 NOHG CCVIDASL Notice Of Hearing Patrick H. Owen 
HRSC CCVIDASL Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/17/2013 03:00 Patrick H. Owen 
PM) Motion for Summary Dismissal and Motion 
to Take Judicial Notice 
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Date: 8/12/2015 
Time: 08:21 AM 
Page 2 of 3 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-PC-2013-08285 Current Judge: Patrick H. Owen 
Cody J Fortin, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: TCWEGEKE 
Cody J Fortin, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code : User Judge 
7/30/2013 HRVC CCHUNTAM Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Patrick H. Owen 
07/30/2013 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion 
For Summary Dismissal 
8/23/2013 ORDR DCJOHNSI Order Releasing PSI Patrick H. Owen 
ORDR DCJOHNSI Order Granting Stay and for Leave to Amend Patrick H. Owen 
Petition 
9/16/2013 HRVC CCHUNTAM Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Patrick H. Owen 
09/17/2013 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion 
for Summary Dismissal and Motion to Take 
Judicial Notice 
12/17/2013 NOTC CCJOHNLE Notice of Scheduling Conference Under IRCP Patrick H. Owen 
16(a) and 16(b) 
6/17/2014 NOTC DCJOHNSI Notice of Status Conf Patrick H. Owen 
HRSC DCJOHNSI Hearing Scheduled (Status 06/25/2014 03:00 Patrick H. Owen 
PM) 
6/23/2014 CONT DCJOHNSI Continued (Status 07/09/2014 03:00 PM) Patrick H. Owen 
7/9/2014 DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Status scheduled on Patrick H. Owen 
07/09/2014 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: redlich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated:50 
11/3/2014 NOHG CCSCOTDL Notice Of Hearing (Status Conference)(11-19-14 Patrick H. Owen 
@3PM) 
HRSC CCSCOTDL Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Patrick H. Owen 
11/19/2014 03:00 PM) 
11/19/2014 DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Patrick H. Owen 
on 11/19/2014 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: redlich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated:50 
HRSC DCJOHNSI Hearing Scheduled (Review Hearing Patrick H. Owen 
01/21/2015 03:00 PM) 
1/21/2015 DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Review Hearing scheduled on Patrick H. Owen 
01/21/2015 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: redlich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
' 
estimated:50 
2/9/2015 NOTH CCRADTER Notice Of Hearing Patrick H. Owen 
HRSC CCRADTER Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Patrick H. Owen 
Judgment 03/17/2015 03:00 PM) 
2/10/2015 MEMO CCHEATJL Memorandum In Response To State's Motion For Patrick H. Owen 
Summary Judgment 
2/26/2015 MEMO CCMARTJD Reply Memorandum Regarding Motion for Patrick H. Owen 
Summary Disposition 
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Date: 8/12/2015 Fourth Judicial Distri~t Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 08:21 AM ROA Report 
Page 3 of 3 Case: CV-PC-2013-08285 Current Judge: Patrick H. Owen 
Cody J Fortin, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Cody J Fortin, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code . User Judge 
3/17/2015 DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Patrick H. Owen 
scheduled on 03/17/2015 03:00 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: redlich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated:50 
5/12/2015 MEMO DCJOHNSI Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Patrick H. Owen 
Motion for Summary Disposition 
6/12/2015 JDMT DCJOHNSI Judgment Patrick H. Owen 
CDIS DCJOHNSI Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho, Patrick H. Owen 
Other Party; Fortin, Cody J, Subject. Filing date: 
6/12/2015 
STAT DCJOHNSI STATUS CHANGED: Closed Patrick H. Owen 
6/15/2015 NOTA CCATKIFT NOTICE OF APPEAL Patrick H. Owen 
6/18/2015 ORDR DCJOHNSI Order Appointing SAPD Patrick H. Owen 
8/11/2015 NOTC TCWEGEKE Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court No. Patrick H. Owen 
43334 ' 
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CODY J. FORTIN # 72953 
I.C.C. K Pod 216-B 
Post Office Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Petitioner pro se 
:.·~::;:z.:~M._ ......_,_ .. -
MAY O 7 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, C1erk 
ly ri.tc Nf!UmN 
~l!fY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 8 It 
r\J p- c 13182 " 
CODY J. FORTIN, ) \.I 
Petitioner, 
-vs-
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) Civil Case No.--------








PETITION' FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF 
_______________ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
The County of ADA ) 
COMES NOW, CODY J. FORTIN, petitioner prose, in the above entitled cause; and, 
who, respectfully presents this application for post conviction relief, based upon the law and 
facts of the case, those grounds and causes more fully explained herein and after, as well as 
the petitioner's affidavit in support hereof; said affidavit being attached hereto, and by this 
reference, incorporated herein as though quoted in its respective entirety: 
I. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
A. Here, the applicant brings before the Court a collateral attack upon the findings of 
guilt by a jury of his peers, subsequent sentencing, and those errors committed at the direct 
appellate stage; alleging, that each is the direct result of ineffective assistance of counsel(s), 
and, which individually and/or collectively require relief. 
INITIAL APPLICATION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 1 of 8. 
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B. Moreover, Notice is hereby provided to the Court and opposing parties, pursuant to 
I.C. 119-4903, that the applicant lacks both the complete record and legal expertise needed 
to properly prepare and present all the applicable issues or to attach the relevant portions of 
the case record. 
For these reasons alone, notice is being given that further amendment and discovery 
will no doubt be required. 
II. 
JURISDICTION 
A. Petitioner is currently incarcerated within the Idaho Department of Corrections 
(IDOC), and housed at the Idaho Correctional Center (ICC), South of Boise, pursuant to a 
finding of guilty on charges of Aggravated Battery with the use of a deadly weapon in the 
commission of crime, where he is serving a unified term of twenty five years (25), with a 
minimum period of confinement of twelve (12) years, consecutive to a term of five (5) years 
fixed, with fifteen (15) indeterminate on charges of Assault and Battery on Certain Personnel, 
enhanced for the Use of Deadly Weapon handed down in a companion case. 
Those findings of guilt and sentencing complained of herein were imposed by the 
Honorable Duff D. McKee and Honorable Patrick Owen, in criminal case CR-FE-2009-19383, 
in a Judgment of Conviction and Commitment filed on August 6th 2010, in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court, County of Ada, State of Idaho. 
B. This petition challenges the constitutionality of those same convictions and sentences, 
charging that there exists evidence of material facts and law, not previously presented nor 
heard, which have abrogated the rights of the applicant guaranteed under the applicable 
portions of the United States and Idaho State Constitutions, and thus require the reversal of 
the petitioner's convictions or, at the very least, resentencing. 
C. Accordingly, jurisdiction is proper in this matter pursuant to Idaho Code 19-4901 et 
seq., and Rule 57 of the Idaho Criminal Rules. Furthermore, venue in these proceedings is 
appropriately before this Court, since the crime( s) alleged occurred within Ada County. 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
A. On October 13th 2009 while attending a party at a private residence the petitioner and 
another individual, named Darryl Shayler, 1 begin arguing, which eventually led to a physical 
confrontation. Sometime during that initial mutual combat Darryl received what appeared to 
be knife inflected wounds in the neck and shoulder. No one testified to seeing the petitioner 
actually inflect those wounds including Shayler. Within minutes a second confrontation took 
place outside the home, where Shayler alleged Fortin cut him across face and left the scene. 
The following day the petitioner was arrested in his girlfriend's driveway by 
uniformed and plainclothes detectives on charges of Aggravated Battery and Use of Deadly 
Weapon, on Shayler. Reports of the exact events that transpired before the petitioner was 
taken into custody on October 14th 2009 vary depending upon the teller of the tale. For the 
moment it is sufficient to say that an information was eventually handed down charging 
Fortin with assault with a dangerous weapon (a knife) on the prior day, and, assault on a 
police officer, with a dangerous weapon (the vehicle) on October 14th 2009. 
B. At his video arraignment, bond and a date for the preliminary hearing were set, and, 
the office of the Ada County Public Defender was appointed to represent the petitioner. 
Within days, appointed counsel approached Fortin with a deal offered by the 
prosecutor, the terms of which were as follows: In consideration for pleas of guilty to assault 
on the civilian and eluding a police officer, Fortin would be sentenced on those crimes to five 
(5) fixed, fifteen (15) indeterminate and zero (0) fixed, five (5) years indeterminate 
respectively; and, the state would drop both weapon enhancements and the assault on the 
police officer. 
C. Fortin's parents retained a private attorney on his behalf and matters changed: An 
amended complaint was filed, further amended and the charges and trials for the events of 
October 13th and 14th separated at the request of Fortin's new counsel and against his 
expressed wishes. 
INITIAL APPLICATION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIBF - Page 3 of 8. 
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D. Following a series of motions and hearings held on these matters, Fortin proceeded to 
trial on the separated charges and was found guilty by jury in what was now being designated 
as CR-FE-09-19383. A timely appeal was filed in that matter by conflict counsel, Greg 
Silvey, and an unpublished decision was handed down under Idaho Court of Appeals Docket 
No. 38069 on April 30, 2012 affirming the conviction; subsequently a petition for review was 
denied and a final remittitur issued May 22, 2012. 
Here, ends the initial statement of the case and the course of the prior proceedings. 
IV. 
INITIAL CAUSES OF ACTION 
A. WHETHER THE INDIVIDUAL AND/OR CUMULATIVE ACTIONS AND INACTIONS 
OF THE PETITIONER'S ATTORNEYS AT THE INVESTIGATIVE, ENTRY OF PLEA, TRIAL, 
SENTENCING AND DIRECT APPEAL STAGES OF THE UNDERLYING PROCEEDINGS 
OONSTITUTE INSUFFICIENT, UNSUFFICIENT, AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL(S) RESULTING IN THE ABROGATION OF THE PETITIONER'S RIGHTS UNDER 
THE FIFTH, SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 
OONSTITUTION, AS WELL AS THOSE SAME GUARANTEES GRANTED UNDER ARTICLE 
I, SECTION 13 AND OTHER PORTIONS OF THE IDAHO STATE OONSTITUTION??? 
1. The individual and/or collective failures, actions and inactions of Fortin's retained 
private trial attorney and appointed direct appeal counsel( s) - Charles Crafts and Greg Silvey, 
respectively - at the investigative, entry of plea, trial, sentencing and direct appeal stages of 
criminal case CR-FE-2009-19383 have denied the petitioner his state and federal 
constitutional rights to sufficient and effective assistance of counsel( s) at each of the 
foregoing stages of these proceedings for those reasons following, inter a1ia: 
2. At the time of trial counsel's paid retention a plea bargain was on the table which 
would have resulted in a maximum term of imprisonment of fifteen ( 15) years on two felony 
convictions with concurrently imposed sentences in consideration for pleas of guilty. 
Counsel's advice to separate the charges and proceed to trial on each, instead, was clearly a 
matter of substandard performance. Particularly, considering Trial counsel failed to inform 
his client that the separation of the charges and his subsequent entries of pleas would subject 
INITIAL APPLICATION FOR. POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 4 of 8. 
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him to a sentencing where any argument for concurrent terms under the doctrine of a 
common course of conduct and scheme would be strictly discretionary on the part of the 
court, and were not a part of any plea bargain.that separation was against the express wishes 
of the petitioner.2 Prejudice is convincingly apparent in the result: Fortin, instead, received 
consecutive terms of five years (5) fixed, with fifteen (15) indeterminate and twelve (12) 
years fixed followed by thirteen (13) years indeterminate. A decision to accept the plea 
bargain would have guaranteed less time and fewer convictions; while simply not separating 
the trials would have avoided a consecutive sentencing scheme. 
The only person who benefited from the foregoing decisions to proceed and separate 
the trials was counsel. 
3. During the investigative and trial stages the petitioner alleges the following individual 
and cummulative errors were perpretrated by this same attorney: 
a. Counsel's failure to file a motion in limine regarding Forin's alleged gang 
affiliation, or in the alternative to move for an immediate mistrial, resulted in the jury 
hearing the petitioner was a gang member and having to depend upon a judicial instruction to 
unring that bell. This decision was neither tactical nor strategic, but rather a failure to 
properly investigate or to object. 
b. Trial counsel's failure to conduct a pretrial interview and to subpoena as a 
defense witness, Casey Smith, resulted in the trial judge's refusal to allow counsel to recall 
this witness, where her earlier testimony could have been impeached by her statements to 
police closer to the time of the incident, was prejudicial and a result of neither strategic or 
tactical choice, but substandard performance with a prejudicial result. 
c. When counsel failed to object to the admission of flight evidence during trial 
predicated upon relevance as criticized by the Unpublished Opinion of the Idaho Court of 
Appeals.3 
d. This same counsel should have objected to the wording of the verdict form 
provided to the jury during deliberations; a form whose format destroyed the defendant's 
INITIAL APPLICATION FOR. POST OONVICTION RELffiF - Page 5 of 8. 
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presumption of innocence by listing seven possibilities of guilt before the entitled first 
consideration of not guilty. In its presented form that "instruction" to the jury denied the 
defendant his equal protection and due process rights by removing the presumption of 
innocence from the minds of jury prior to and during deliberations. 
e. Despite being requested to file a Rule 35 and agreeing to do so retained 
counsel failed to submit that filing or to inform his client he didn't intend to keep this 
commitment. 
4. It was substandard performance and prejudicial when appellate counsel failed to 
federalize any issues raised on direct appeal, even though counsel was noticed by his client of 
the omission ( See: Appendice "A "included herewith); as well as the fact that same attorney 
failed to object to record that contains a complete reiteration of the Friday, February 4, 2011 
restitution hearing that credits the spoken language to the opposite party speaking. Said 
otherwise, all of the prosecutors remarks are credited to defense counsel and vice versa. 4 
1 Darryl Shayler Is spelled Darryl Shaylor in some documents and Shayler in others. 
2 See: Fortin's Affidavit in Support of Post Conviction Relief, • 7-9, included herewith 
and incorporated hereby, in this regard. 
3 See: State of Idaho v. Fortin, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 454 Page 3 footnote 1. 
See: Appendice "A" included herewith and herein, in this regard. 
4 T. Transcript Feb. 4, 2011 Page 8 beginning at line and continuing thereafter. 




A. Make no mistake this is a case that centers around "he said, she said" evidence. Small 
differences in testimony and other evidence would have huge consequences in the result: 
Regardless: 
B. The foregoing material facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant appointment 
of counsel, judicial notice of the entire underlying record(s), and an evidentiary hearing on 
these and any additional issues brought to light following the court's appointed counsel or the 
petitioner being granted possession of the record. Specific relief is sought as follows: 
VII 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the petitioner respectfully moves this Court to enter an Order 
providing the following: 
1. ACCEPTANCE OF JURISDICTION and VENUE in these proceedings, with normal 
advancement upon the Court's calendar: 
2. THAT JUDICIAL NOTICE is to be taken of the entire underlying record(s), pursuant 
to LR.E. 201, in district court number CR-FE-2009-19383, Court of Appeals Docket No. 
38069, as well as those same records found in companion case CR-2009-0019475, and: 
3. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, pursuant to I.C. 19-4904 and 19-852; 
4. THAT DIRECTS the Clerk to serve the respondent a conformed copy of this filing, 
pursuant to LC. 19-4902; thus REQUIRING the respondent to provide an Answer, as well as 
those relevant portions of the record within thirty (30) days of receipt thereof, pursuant to 
LC. 19-4906(a). 
5. THAT, following the passing of an adequate amount of time for the parties to 
prepare, an evidentiary hearing occur; and, 
6. THAT, in the event, that the preponderance of evidence submitted eventually 
demonstrates that the petitioner has suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel under the 
INITIAL APPLICATION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 7 of 8. 
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law and in view of the facts submitted, that petitioner's findings of guilty be set aside and/or 
the subsequent sentences be modified and/or set aside: and/or, 
7. AND, for any additional relief the Court may deem necessary or proper under these 
circumstances. 
DATED this 3 day of MAY 2013. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~IN 
Petitioner pro se 
VIII. 
VERIFICATION 
I, DO HEREBY CERTIFY and AFFIRM that I am the petitioner in the foregoing 
application for post conviction relief, and; that I have read the contents thereof in their 
entirety, and, that the facts contained therein are true and correct to the best of my 
knowledge and belief in all regards. 
DATED this 3- day of MAY 2013. 
/ 
Petitioner-Affiant pro se 
~J 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me, a Notary Public, this J day o 
~-- - . . , ' --~~~:::---i 
' 
JAMES G. OUINN 
; NOTARY PUBLIC 
·' STATE OF 11.lAHO 
*** SEAL *** L 
Commission Expires: t,1 lQI 13! 
INITIAL APPLICATION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 8 of 8. 
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• 
December ist 2011 
CODY J. FORTIN # 72953 
I.C.C. K Pod 211-A 
Post Office Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
MR. GREG SILVEY 
Attorney at Law 
Post Office Box 565 
Star, Idaho 83669 
• 
COPY !!! 
RE: State of Idaho v. Cody J. Fortin, Docket No. 38069: 
Initial Appellant's Brief and Other Matters. 
Dear Mr. Silvey: 
I very much appreciate the work you put into my initial brief on direct appeal and include my 
thanks for the copy you forwarded. 
For some time now I've attempted to contact you through your office, unsuccessfully. While 
I understand your time is limited, would you be good enough to answer my single concern at 
this point in the proceedings: Do you feel comfortable that none of the issues presented on 
my direct appeal warrant have been federalized to protect my possible eventual appeal to the 
United States federal courts? 
Please be kind enough to provide me a copy of the State's response; and, should you elect to 
file a reply brief, a copy of that filing. Do you anticipate oral argument in these matters? 
Pending your response, I wish you well and the best over the coming Holidays. 
Sincerely,-# 




CODY J. FORTIN# 72953 
I.C.C. K Pod 216-B 
Post Office Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Petitioner pro se 
• 
N~. 't ~::J 
AJ.1 ( Jr f'it.~1. ___ _ 
MAY D 7 2013 
CHAISTOPHER D. RICH, C1erk 
1y rue Nl!L!ON 
EM!PUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY J. FORTIN, 
Petitioner, 
-vs-










) _______________ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
The County of ADA ) 
C. u eas N r. \t P C IV e O. (!{/ _-=:c--:~...,,-,,.-:--,,-~~ 
District Court No. CR-FE-2009-19383 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF 
,._ ;-. r. n 
' ~ i'. '. ..... ; 
{--_.,_..--. --1 
'· . ' 
\..._/ ~ ~.~ \,,,:: ~..; 'S; ·,:_ - -~. ··' 
CODY J. FORTIN, after first being duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says: 
1. AFFIANT is the petitioner pro se in the above encaptioned matter, and brings this 
application for post conviction relief in good faith, absent any purpose to delay or annoy: 
2. AFFIANT has only a limited education, is financially indigent, and has no knowledge 
of case law and legal procedure; as a point of fact, all of these filings have been prepared by 
a former inmate law clerk, who may or may not be able to continue to aide YOUR AFFIANT 
since the rules that govern such assistance are growing increasingly more restrictive: 
3. AFFIANT has never seen nor possessed the entire case file or fully examined a 
complete copy of the underlying record and discovery in these matters: 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIBF - Page 1 of 3. 
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4. THAT the Idaho Correctional Center's legal resource office, where the petitioner is 
housed, has no state or federal reporter series, and contains only the most basic of pre-
printed forms, some of which including those for post conviction relief are legally inadequate: 
5. AFFIANT was adjudged indigent at the on-set and appellate stages of the underlying 
proceedings. 
6. YOUR AFFIANT has read in it's entirety the petition in these matters, and, should 
YOUR AFFIANT be called upon to provide testimony in these proceedings, AFFIANT could 
and would testify that the facts represented therein are a true representation of the events as 
they occurred throughout the underlying proceedings, as well as the following specific 
material facts: that 
7. AFFIANT was counseled convincingly by his trial attorney, Charles Craft, that he 
could prevail at a trial by jury; and, had that counseling not occurred, YOUR AFFIANT 
would have elected to accept the state's plea bargain offer that included, inter alia, dismissal 
of one felony charge and two weapon enhancements, plus a numerically lower and concurrent 
sentencing recommendation: 
8. YOUR AFFIANT, upon being informed that his family retained attorney, Charles 
Crafts, intended to bifurcate his charges into two (2) separate trials advised that same 
counsel that he was opposed to such a decision, only to be told that this was a decision 
reserved for one's attorney and that it was in YOUR AFFIANT'S best interest to do so. At 
no time was AFFIANT told of the inherent dangers of such a choice - i.e. consecutive v. 
current sentences. 
9. AFFIANT and his Family requested that counsel file a motion for reduction in 
sentence, which despite being assured would occur, never happened. Nor was the petitioner 
or his Family advised it would not be done prior to the expiration of time to do so. 
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10. FURTHER sayeth YOUR AFFIANT naught. 
DATED this J day of MAY 2013. 
CODY J. FORTIN 
Petitioner-Affiant pro se 
"('c( 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me, a Notary Public, this] day of MAY 2013. 
11-~· ~AME~SG O~IUINN --t,J'Ji1(1 la 01. cQ ~ 
~
"'. NOTARYPIJBLICOTARY PUBYc- IDAHO 
~ STATE OF IOAHO 
';I: 
*** SEAL *** 
Commission Expires: ~j JO/ Jl; 
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OODY J. FORTIN # 72953 
I.C.C. K POD 216-B 
Post Office Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Petitioner pro se 
MAY D 7 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
ly f"llG N/R.~ON 
l!lt!F'lITY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY J. FORTIN, 
Petitioner, 
-vs-










) _______________ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF ADA) 
Civil Case No .. --------District Court No. CR-FE-2009-19383 
A VERIFIED MOTION FOR WAIVER 
OF COSTS AND IN FORMA PAUPERIS 
STATUS ON APPLICATION FOR POST 
CONVICTION PROCEEDING 
OOMES NOW, CODY J. FORTIN, petitioner pro se, in the underlying matter of a 
petition for post conviction relief; and, who, pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the Affidavit in Support hereof and within; the facts contained within the Affidavit in Support 
of Post Conviction Relief, included herewith; and, the accompanying Motion for Appointment 
of Counsel, respectfully moves this Honorable Court to grant the petitioner the waiver of any 
associated costs in these proceedings, as well as in form.a pauperis status on the petitioner's 
motion for appointment of counsel submitted contemporaneously: 
VERIFICATION FOR INDIGENT STATUS AND WAIVER OF OOSTS 
CODY J. FORTIN, after first being duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says: 
1. YOUR AFFIANT is the applicant in the above entitled petition and presents the 
following sworn testimony in support of his request for court appointed counsel and the 
waiver of costs in this matter: 
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2. AFFIANT is a pro se petitioner who has been continuously incarcerated since October 
of 2009 and, who, when originally charged in these proceedings was adjudged indigent: 
3. YOUR AFFIANT will not be able to pay the costs involved in this proceeding, nor to 
obtain the necessary funds to retain a private attorney: 
4. AFFIANT brings this request and underlying filing in good faith, absent any purpose 
to hinder, annoy or delay: 
5. YOUR AFFIANT has no real or personal property beyond that of those few personal 
possessions allowed within the prison, and possesses no bank or savings accounts, stocks, 
bonds, nor receives any annuities from any outside sources. 
6. AFFIANT neither owns nor possesses any automobiles, motorcycles or other 
recreational vehicles: 
7. AFFIANT is not presently employed within the prison system and YOUR AFFIANT's 
only other source of funds is the occasional gift from friends and family; moreover, the 
current balance in YOUR AFFIANT's inmate trust account (a certified copy of which is 
attached hereto) - immediately prior to filing these documents isf l(co:::A. 
8. FURTHER, sayeth YOUR AFFIANT naught. 
DATED this _2_ day of MAY 2013. 
£:-ODY fFORTIN 
Affiant pro se 
,J 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me, a Notary, on thisl__ day of MAY 2013. 
~$~ 
*** SEAL ** ~-, 
i· . ' 
JAMES G. QUINN 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IOAHO 
0TARYPUBL1C- State of IDAHO 
Commission Expires:!J_/ 10 I J3; 
VERIFIED MOTION FOR WAIVER OF COSTS AND IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS - 2 of 2. 
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e 
= IDOC TRUST=========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES 
Doc No: 72953 Name: FORTIN, CODY JAMES 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
Transaction Dates: 05/03/2012-05/03/2013 
e 
05/03/2013 = 
ICC/UNIT H PRES FACIL 
TIER-2 CELL-16 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
24.53 3902.03 4038.09 160.59 
================================TRANSACTIONS================================ 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
05/04/2012 HQ0583680-009 011-RCPT MO/CC 
05/08/2012 IC0584066-443 099-COMM SPL 
05/09/2012 IC0584250-015 078-MET MAIL 
05/09/2012 IC0584283-005 070-PHOTO COPY 
05/10/2012 HQ0584404-003 061-CK INMATE 
05/10/2012 IC0584436-019 078-MET MAIL 
05/15/2012 IC0584746-551 099-COMM SPL 
05/22/2012 IC0585585-452 099-COMM SPL 
05/25/2012 IC0586203-321 099-COMM SPL 
06/05/2012 IC0587706-444 099-COMM SPL 
06/06/2012 HQ0587873-026 022-PHONE TIME 
06/08/2012 HQ0588372-010 011-RCPT MO/CC 
06/12/2012 IC0588710-509 099-COMM SPL 
06/14/2012 HQ0588957-003 012-RCPT CHECK 
06/14/2012 HQ0588989-002 061-CK INMATE 
06/14/2012 IC0589036-011 078-MET MAIL 
06/15/2012 IC0589197-011 045- CARLS JR 
06/19/2012 IC0589346-467 099-COMM SPL 
06/26/2012 IC0590076-378 099-COMM SPL 
06/26/2012 HQ0590161-017 022-PHONE TIME 
06/28/2012 HQ0590284-006 011-RCPT MO/CC 
06/28/2012 HQ0590307-018 011-RCPT MO/CC 
07/02/2012 HQ0590590-011 011-RCPT MO/CC 
07/03/2012 IC0590613-384 099-COMM SPL 
07/03/2012 HQ0590670-012 011-RCPT MO/CC 
07/03/2012 IC0590730-385 099-COMM SPL 
07/03/2012 IC0590751-385 100-CR INM CMM 
07/03/2012 IC0590760-384 100-CR INM CMM 
07/03/2012 IC0590813-358 099-COMM SPL 
07/06/2012 HQ0591075-016 011-RCPT MO/CC 
07/10/2012 IC0591536-487 099-COMM SPL 
07/11/2012 HQ0591751-027 022-PHONE TIME 
07/12/2012 HQ0591970-003 061-CK INMATE 
07/17/2012 IC0592404-433 099-COMM SPL 
07/24/2012 IC0593103-425 099-COMM SPL 
07/24/2012 IC0593105-049 100-CR INM CMM 
07/31/2012 IC0593824-376 099-COMM SPL 
07/31/2012 HQ0593838-025 011-RCPT MO/CC 




































































































= IDOC TRUST OFFENDER BANK BALANCES 
Doc No: 72953 Name: FORTIN, CODY JAMES 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
Transaction Dates: 05/03/2012-05/03/2013 
05/03/2013 = 
ICC/UNIT H PRES FACIL 
TIER-2 CELL-16 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
24.53 3902.03 4038.09 160.59 
================================TRANSACTIONS=============================== 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
08/08/2012 HQ0594872-023 022-PHONE TIME 
08/16/2012 HQ0595887-023 061-CK INMATE 
08/16/2012 HQ0595922-008 061-CK INMATE 
08/21/2012 IC0596180-409 099-COMM SPL 
08/21/2012 HQ0596300-002 022-PHONE TIME 
08/28/2012 IC0596848-428 099-COMM SPL 
08/31/2012 IC0597375-427 099-COMM SPL 
08/31/2012 IC0597411-427 099-COMM SPL 
09/04/2012 IC0597527-425 099-COMM SPL 
09/04/2012 IC0597540-424 099-COMM SPL 
09/11/2012 IC0598721-520 099-COMM SPL 
09/18/2012 IC0599753-510 099-COMM SPL 
09/19/2012 HQ0599936-0ll 022-PHONE TIME 
09/21/2012 IC0600305-346 099-COMM SPL 
09/26/2012 HQ0600863-020 011-RCPT MO/CC 
10/02/2012 IC0601354-482 099-COMM SPL 
10/08/2012 IC0602219-456 099-COMM SPL 
10/10/2012 HQ0602509-020 022-PHONE TIME 
10/19/2012 IC0603717-007 045-PIOZZA 
10/23/2012 IC0604026-470 099-COMM SPL 
10/30/2012 IC0604729-432 099-COMM SPL 
11/06/2012 IC0605602-396 099-COMM SPL 
11/13/2012 IC0606418-508 099-COMM SPL 
11/13/2012 IC0606485-016 071-MED CO-PAY 
11/16/2012 IC0606927-329 099-COMM SPL 
11/27/2012 IC0607788-550 099-COMM SPL 
12/11/2012 HQ0609673-007 011-RCPT MO/CC 
12/18/2012 IC0610400-508 099-COMM SPL 
12/19/2012 HQ0610609-019 022-PHONE TIME 
12/21/2012 IC0610945-374 099-COMM SPL 
12/21/2012 IC0610970-004 078-MET MAIL 
12/21/2012 IC0610970-008 078-MET MAIL 
12/24/2012 HQ0611063-024 011-RCPT MO/CC 
12/28/2012 IC0611538-439 099-COMM SPL 
01/08/2013 IC0612630-519 099-COMM SPL 
01/11/2013 HQ0613233-021 011-RCPT MO/CC 
01/15/2013 IC0613706-576 099-COMM SPL 
01/18/2013 IC0613936-009 045-CHICKEN 


































































































= IDOC TRUST OFFENDER BANK BALANCES 
Doc No: 72953 Name: FORTIN, CODY JAMES 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
Transaction Dates: 05/03/2012-05/03/2013 
05/03/2013 = 
ICC/UNIT H PRES FACIL 
TIER-2 CELL-16 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
24.53 3902.03 4038.09 160.59 
================================TRANSACTIONS================================ 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
01/23/2013 HQ0614444-023 011-RCPT MO/CC 
01/29/2013 IC0614892-414 099-COMM SPL 
01/30/2013 HQ0615047-017 022-PHONE TIME 
01/31/2013 HQ0615253-002 061-CK INMATE 
02/05/2013 IC0615653-377 099-COMM SPL 
02/12/2013 IC0616663-546 099-COMM SPL 
02/13/2013 HQ0616814-028 022-PHONE TIME 
02/15/2013 HQ0617093-008 011-RCPT MO/CC 
02/19/2013 IC0617210-486 099-COMM SPL 
02/22/2013 IC0617777-018 078-MET MAIL 
02/26/2013 IC0617992-436 099-COMM SPL 
03/01/2013 HQ0618498-012 Oll-55PT MO/CC 
03/05/2013 IC0618825-427 099-COMM SPL 
03/05/2013 HQ0618850-005 Oll-55PT MO/CC 
03/05/2013 HQ0619008-003 022-PHONE TIME 
03/06/2013 HQ0619133-022 011-RCPT MO/CC 
03/12/2013 IC0619687-547 099-COMM SPL 
03/13/2013 HQ0619931-027 022-PHONE TIME 
03/13/2013 HQ0619987-010 011-RCPT MO/CC 
03/15/2013 IC0620226-006 045-SUBWAY 
03/19/2013 IC0620427-469 099-COMM SPL 
03/20/2013 HQ0620585-022 022-PHONE TIME 
03/20/2013 IC0620655-021 078-MET MAIL 
03/22/2013 HQ0620893-010 011-RCPT MO/CC 
03/25/2013 HQ0621046-008 011-RCPT MO/CC 
03/25/2013 HQ0621093-004 011-RCPT MO/CC 
03/26/2013 IC0621177-457 099-COMM SPL 
03/27/2013 HQ0621382-007 022-PHONE TIME 
03/27/2013 HQ0621426-012 011-RCPT MO/CC 
04/02/2013 HQ0622115-012 011-RCPT MO/CC 
04/02/2013 IC0622140-443 099-COMM SPL 
04/02/2013 IC0622174-015 078-MET MAIL 
04/03/2013 HQ0622301-008 022-PHONE TIME 
04/08/2013 HQ0622719-023 011-RCPT MO/CC 
04/09/2013 IC0622916-479 099-COMM SPL 
04/10/2013 HQ0623057-020 022-PHONE TIME 
04/10/2013 HQ0623090-005 011-RCPT MO/CC 
04/11/2013 IC0623273-022 078-MET MAIL 












































































































= IDOC TRUST OFFENDER BANK BALANCES 05/03/2013 = 
Doc No: 72953 Name: FORTIN, CODY JAMES 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
ICC/UNIT H PRES FACIL 
TIER-2 CELL-16 
Transaction Dates: 05/03/2012-05/03/2013 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
24.53 3902.03 4038.09 160.59 
================================TRANSACTIONS================================ 










099-COMM SPL 41. 58DB 
011-RCPT MO/CC 13605 10.00 
099-COMM SPL 48.24DB 
022-PHONE TIME 253049 34.00DB 
061-CK INMATE 251945 320.00DB 
099-COMM SPL 48.40DB 
022-PHONE TIME 251041 44.20DB 
STATE OF IDAHO . 
Idaho Department of correction nd 
t hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true, ~ 
correct copy of an instrument ~ the same no~ rema(J' 
on file and of record in my office. . 3 6"'£7{, 
WITNESS my hand ereto affixed th,s_.;::::;.. ........... 










CODY J. FORTIN # 72953 
I.C.C. K POD 216-B 
Post Office Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Petitioner pro se 
N~ ...., 
A.~. };j L p Flltt .. ___ _ 
MAY O 7 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, C1etrk 
Dy f"IIC NELSON 
OOl'l.HY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY J. FORTIN, ) GI/ PC l 318iJ11 Jj 
) Civil Case No. - ~ ,-;;, 
Petitioner, ) District Court N~~l-< E-1009-19383 
) 
-vs- ) 
) MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) COUNSEL IN AN APPLICATION 
) FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
Respondent. ) _______________ ) 
COMES NOW, CODY J. FORTIN, petitioner prose, in the above encaptioned cause of 
action; and, who, respectfully moves this Honorable Court, pursuant to Idaho Code 119-
4903, for the appointment of counsel to represent the applicant in these proceedings for 
collateral relief. 
Petitioner's motion is predicated upon the statute, the material facts found within the 
application for post conviction relief included herewith, the affidavit in support thereof; the 
accompanying verified motion for waiver of costs and request for in form.a pauperis status, 
as well as the entire underlying record(s) in criminal case number CR-FE- 2009-19383 and 
Court of Appeals Docket No. 38069. 
DATED this 3 day of MAY 2013 
Respectfully submitted by: 
Petitioner-Movant prose 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN POST CONVICTION PROCEEDING - 1 of 1. 
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CBR.TIFICATE OF FILING BY MAILING 
I, DO HER.EBY CERTIFY and AFFIRM that the original and a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Petition for Post Conviction Relief, with accompanying documentation were 
served upon Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of Four~h Judicial District Court for filing, by 
placing the same in the U.S. Mail, this 3rd day of MAY 2013, addressed as follows: 
MR. CHR.ISTOPHER. D. R.ICH 
Clerk of District Court 
Fourth Judicial District 
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
200 Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
CERTIFICATE OF FILING BY MAILING - Page 1 of 1. 
Petitioner-Affiant prose 
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CODY J. FORTIN # 72953 
I.C.C. K POD 216-B 
Post Office Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Petitioner pro se 
-NO. 
A.14): [ifi('~,;;=-Jri:ii~:rm~i-. --
MAYO 7 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Cl 
Dy rue NELSON ' erk 
Ol!!PlfTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ruDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY J. FORTIN, 
Petitioner, 
-vs-










) _______________ ) 
C~vil ~ase No.~y e, J ~I§ 2 8 i-; 
D1stnct Court~ C ~ -2 9 . \.,.. l -~ l.i ' i .• J .. 
MOTION Fd'R THE RELEASE OF THE 
UNDERLYING P.S.I., PURSUANT TO 
I.C.R. 32 AND THE SUBSTANTIAL 
RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER 
COMES NOW, CODY J. FORTIN, petitioner pro se, in the above entitled cause of 
action; and, who, respectfully moves this Honorable Court to direct the Clerk of the Court to 
release and deliver to the petitioner or his court appointed counsel a full and complete copy 
of the presentence investigative report in the underlying criminal action, including any 
attachments thereto and exhibits thereof. 
Petitioner's motion is predicated upon the record to date; the affidavit in support of 
the initial application for post conviction relief; the Idaho Criminal and Civil Rules; the fact 
that said report contains evidence of material facts regarding matters of sentencing that 
impact the substantial rights of the petitioner; and, that the absence of its integration into 
this record will impede the petitioner's right to provide proof of the issues. 
DATED this "3 day of MAY 2013. 
Respectfully submitted by: 
~. io;;,N - Movant 
MOTION FOR RELEASE OF THE UNDERLYING P.S.I. RECORDS - 1 of 1. 
000026
CODY J. FORTIN # 72953 
1.C.C. K POD 216-B 
Post Office Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
NO._,;:-~,Fii~----
AJA l t D Filf:J) P.M .. ___ _ 
Petitioner pro se 
MAYO 7 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CJ('jrk 
Dy P,fC Nl!LSON 
De!'UTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY J. FORTIN, 
Petitioner, 
-vs-










) _______________ ) 
Civil Case ~v P C 1 3 18? 
District Court No. CR-FE-2009-19383 
MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
OF THE UNDERLYING CRIMINAL 
CASE AND APPELLATE RECORDS, 
PURSUANT TO THE IDAHO RULES 
OF EVIDENCE, RULE 201 
COMES NOW, CODY J. FORTIN, petitioner prose, in the above encaptioned cause of 
action; and, who, respectfully moves this Honorable Court, pursuant to Rule 201 of the 
Idaho Rules of Evidence, to take judicial notice of the entire underlying district court and 
appellate records in District Court Criminal Case No. CR-FE-2009-19383 and Idaho Court of 
Appeals Docket No. 38069, as well as the companion case CR-2009-0019475, including all 
appendices, exhibits, and attachments thereto for the purpose of these proceedings. 
This motion is based upon the filings and record to date, the Rule, the protection of 
the petitioner's substantial rights, and the affidavit in support of post conviction relief; said 
affidavit being filed contemperaneously with this motion, and by this reference incorporated 
herein as though set out in verbatim. 
DATED this 3. day of MAY 2013. 
J. FORTIN 
Petitioner-Movant prose 
MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE UNDERLYING RECORDS - 1 of 1. 
r··~ 
' ·"1 
_ .. ,~ 
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• FILED Tuesday. May 07, 2013 at 11 :55 AM 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CL K OF THE COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY J FORTIN, PLAINTIFF 
Plaintiff(s) 
vs 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEFENDANT 
Defendant(s) 
CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-08285 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I 
have mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the: PETITION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF as notice pursuant to Rule 77 (d) I.R.C.P. to each of the 
parties or attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows: 
CODY J FORTIN 
#72953 PO BOX 70010 
BOISE ID 83707 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
(INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL) 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
(COPY IN FILE) 
Dated:Tuesday, May 07, 2013 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
~urt Reference 
1/1 
CHRISTOPHER o: flICH . 
Clerk of the Court 
5/7/2013 
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jonathan M. Medema 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
ISB No.: 5623 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
e 
!'~------,,!iteo-r-r-----·~---"'-'~i~.d ~it)= 
MAY 2 4 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Cler 
By STEPHANIE VIDAK k 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY JAMES FORTIN 
Petitioner, 
vs. 











CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-08285 
ANSWER 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Jonathan Medema, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney, and does hereby answer Petitioner Fortin's petition for post-conviction 
relief in the above-entitled action as follows: 
I. 
GENERAL RESPONSES TO MR. FOR TIN'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS 
All allegations made by Petitioner are denied by the State unless specifically admitted 
herein. 
ANSWER (FORTIN)- I 
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II. 
SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO MR. FORTIN'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS 
1. Mr. Fortin's petition contains an introductory paragraph and a three paragraph 
Section entitled "Preliminary Statement". These paragraphs do not contain factual assertions and 
therefore are not capable of being admitted or denied. 
2. Answering paragraph A under "Section II Jurisdiction", respondent admits Mr. 
Fortin is currently in the custody of the Idaho Department of Corrections. Respondent admits that 
in criminal case CR-FE-2009-19383, Mr. Fortin was sentenced to a term of twenty-five years in 
the custody of the Department of Corrections consisting of twelve years determinate and thirteen 
years indeterminate. The State denies that the sentence in CR-FE-2009-19383 was ordered to be 
served consecutively to any other sentence. The court in CR-FE-2009-0019475 ordered the 
sentences in that case to run consecutively to the sentence imposed in the CR-FE-2009-19383 
case, from which Mr. Fortin now seeks post conviction relief. 
3. Answering paragraphs Band C under "Section II Jurisdiction," respondent asserts 
that these paragraphs do not contain factual allegations that can be admitted or denied. 
4. Answering the allegations in Section III "Statement of the Case and Prior 
Proceedings," respondent admits that on October 15, 2009 Mr. Fortin was before the Magistrate 
Division of the District Court in CR-FE-2009-0019383 for his initial appearance, what petitioner 
calls his video arraignment. Respondent admits that the court set bond and scheduled a 
preliminary hearing for October 29, 2009. Respondent admits that the court appointed the Ada 
County Public Defender to represent Mr. Fortin initially. Respondent admits· that Charles Crafts 
substituted as counsel for Mr. Fortin in CR-FE-2009-0019383 on or before October 29, 2009. 
Respondent admits Mr. Fortin went to trial in CR-FE-2009-0019383 beginning May 17, 2010. 
Respondent admits the trial was only on the charges in CR-FE-2009-0019383. Respondent 
admits Mr. Fortin appealed from the conviction in this case and the conviction was affirmed on 
appeal. 
Mr. Fortin states that the "charges and trials for the events of October 13th and 14th 
separated at the request of Mr. Fortin's new counsel and against his express wishes." (pet. P.3). 
ANSWER (FORTIN) - 2 
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Respondent assumes Mr. Fortin is referring to the charges in CR-FE-2009-0019475 when he 
references the events of October 14th. With this assumption, the State admits that initially the 
charges in both the 193 83 and 194 7 5 cases were set for trial on the same date, although it does 
not appear the court ever ordered such trials to be consolidated pursuant to I.C.R. 13. The State 
further admits that the charges in these two cases were eventually tried separately. The State 
denies that the cases were tried separately at the request of Mr. Fortin's counsel. Mr. Fortin 
asserts he was initially offered a plea bargain where the State would recommend the sentences in 
the 19383 case and the 19475 run concurrently to each other. The State denies this assertion. The 
State denies all of the other factual assertions in Section III "Statement of the Case and Prior 
Proceedings." 
5. Answering paragraphs A and A( 1) under section heading IV "Initial Causes of 
Action," the State asserts that these paragraphs do not contain factual allegations and, therefore, 
need not be admitted or denied. 
6. Answering paragraph A(2) under Section IV, petitioner asserts that, at the time he 
hired private counsel, a plea bargain was on the table which would have resulted in a maximum 
term of imprisonment of fifteen years on two felony convictions with concurrently imposed 
sentences in consideration of pleas of guilty. As to the assertion that the State extended a plea 
offer to Mr. Fortin before he hired private counseJl, the State is without sufficient information to 
form a belief as to the truth of such assertion and, therefore, denies the same. There is a written 
offer in the State's file for CR-FE-2009-0019893 that is dated 10-28-09, the day before the 
initially scheduled preliminary hearing. However, the State is not aware of whether the offer was 
communicated to counsel that day or at the preliminary hearing on the next day, 10-29-09. As to 
the assertion that the State extended Mr. Fortin a plea offer that would result in Mr. Fortin 
pleading to only two felonies and would have resulted in a recommendation for concurrent 
1 Mr. Fortin fails to allege a date when he hired private counsel. The substitution of counsel was filed with 
the court 10-29-09. The State will use that date. 
ANSWER (FORTIN) - 3 
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fifteen-year sentences, the State admits that such an offer was made in the CR-FE-2009-0019383 
case. That offer did not make any mention of the charges in CR-FE-2009-0019475. The State 
made a simultaneous offer of settlement in the 19475 case that contemplated Mr. Fortin pleading 
guilty to an additional felony in that case with the State recommending the sentence in that case 
run consecutively to the sentence in the 19383 case. Mr. Fortin asserts that his trial counsel 
failed to inform him "the separation of the charges"2 would "subject him to a sentencing where 
any argument for concurrent terms under the doctrine of a common course of conduct and 
scheme would be strictly discretionary on the part of the court." (Pet. P 5). The State does not 
know what this means. Further, the State is without information as to conversations Mr. Fortin 
did or did not have with his trial counsel. Therefore, the State denies this assertion. 
7. In paragraph 3(a) under section IV, Mr. Fortin makes the following statement: 
"Counsel's failure to file a motion in limine regarding Fortin's alleged gang affiliation, or in the 
alternative to move for an immediate mistrial, resulted in the jury hearing the petitioner was a 
gang member and having to depend upon a judicial instruction to unring that bell." (Pet. P. 5). 
This sentence is both logically and grammatically confusing. The State assumes Mr. Fortin 
means to assert that his trial counsel failed to file a motion in limine prior to trial to exclude the 
introduction of evidence that Mr. Fortin was a member of a gang. Respondent admits that 
assertion. The State assumes Mr. Fortin means to also assert that his trial counsel failed to move 
for an immediate mistrial after some evidence of Mr. Fortin's involvement in a gang was 
introduced at trial. The State denies this assertion and it is disproved by the record at trial. 
8. In paragraph 3(b) under section IV, Mr. Fortin states, "Trial counsel's failure to 
conduct a pre-trial interview and to subpoena as a witness, Casey Smith, resulted in the trial 
judge's refusal to allow counsel to recall this witness ... " (Pet. P. 5). This sentence is a conclusion 
about what formed the basis of the trial court's ruling and it carries an implication that the trial 
court refused to allow counsel to recall the witness. Answering the implication that the trial court 
2 By this the State assumes Mr. Fortin means the decision to have separate trials in the 19383 and 19475 
cases, which is what occurred. 
ANSWER (FORTIN) - 4 
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refused to allow Mr. Fortin to recall Casey Smith, the State admits in part and denies in part. The 
State admits that the Court refused to allow counsel to recall Casey Smith to offer certain 
testimony that counsel proffered to the Court. The Court found that testimony would be 
cumulative. The State denies that the Court put a blanket bar on counsel recalling Casey Smith 
for any other procedural or substantive reason. Broadly read, Mr. Fortin's conclusory sentence 
assumes facts as being true - that his trial counsel failed to conduct a pre-trial interview of Casey 
Smith and that his trial counsel failed to subpoena Casey Smith. If Mr. Fortin means to allege 
these facts as being true, the State denies his trial counsel failed to interview Casey Smith. As to 
the allegation that he failed to interview her pre-trial, the State is without sufficient information 
to form a belief as to that assertions and, therefore, denies the same. The record indicates trial 
counsel for Mr. Fortin spoke with Ms. Smith while the trial was on going about the possibility of 
recalling her. As to the allegation that trial counsel failed to subpoena her, the State is without 
sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of such assertion and, therefore, denies that 
claim. 
9. In paragraph 3(c) of Section IV, petitioner states that "[w]hen counsel failed to 
object to the admission of flight evidence during trial predicated on relevance as criticized by the 
Unpublished Opinion of the Idaho Court of Appeals." (Pet. p. 5). This is a sentence fragment. It 
contains no assertions or conclusions. It is not capable of being answered. The sentence fragment 
assumes a fact. It assumes that counsel failed to object to the admission of flight evidence during 
trial predicated on relevance. If Mr. Fortin intended this as an assertion of fact, the State denies it. 
That assertion is disproved by the record in the 19383 case. 
10. In paragraph 3(d) of section IV, Mr. Fortin makes conclusions about whether the 
jury instructions destroyed his presumption of innocence. This is a conclusion and need not be 
answered. To the implied assertion that his counsel failed to object to the wording of the verdict 
form, the state admits this assertion. To the applied assertion that the verdict form listed "seven 
possibilities of guilt before the entitled first consideration of not guilty," (Pet. p. 6), respondent 
objects. This assertion is vague and confusing. With that objection, respondent denies that 
assertion. 
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11. In paragraph 3(e) of section IV of the petition, Mr. Fortin asserts that he asked his 
counsel to file a rule 35 motion, counsel failed to file such motion, and counsel failed to inform 
Mr. Fortin of the fact no motion was filed. Respondent admits that neither Mr. Fortin nor his 
counsel filed a motion pursuant to I.C.R. 35 in CR-FE-2009-0019383. As to the remaining 
allegations, respondent is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the 
assertions and, therefore, denies them. 
12. In paragraph 4 of section IV, Mr. Fortin asserts his appellate counsel failed to 
"federalize any issues raised on direct appeal". Respondent has no idea what Mr. Fortin means to 
assert by this statement and, therefore, denies it. Mr. Fortin asserts that his appellate counsel 
failed to object to an appellate record that contains alleged errors in the transcript of the 
restitution hearing conducted on February 4, 2011. The State admits appellate counsel did not 
seek to correct alleged errors in the transcript of the restitution hearing. 
13. The remainder of the petition contains conclusions of law and requests for relief. 
These are not capable of being answered. 
DATED this ~y of May 2013. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
e ema 
eputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-08285 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
MOTION TO TAKE 
JUDICIAL NOTICE 
__________ ) 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Jonathan M. Medema, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby moves this Court for an Order taking judicial notice of the 
below-listed documents: 
1. Transcript of Arraignment on 12/04/09 in case number CR-FE-2009-0019383 
2. Transcript of Jury Trial in case number CR-FE-2009-0019383 
3. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing on 8/06/10 in case number CR-FE-2009-0019383 
4. Transcript of Restitution Hearing on 2/04/11 in case number CR-FE-2009-0019383 
5. Appellant's Brief, State v. Fortin, Docket Number 38069 
6. Decision on Appeal, State v. Fortin, D9cket Number 38069, dated April 30, 2012 
7. Register of Actions for case number CR-FE-2009-0019383 
8. Register of Actions for case number CR-FE-2009-0019475 
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9. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Fortin v. State, CV-PC-2011-19323 
10. Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Fortin v. State, CV-PC-2011-19323 
DATED this v'U~ay of May 2013 
GREG H. BOWER 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this :2.3 day of May 2013, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to: 
Cody J. Fortin, Inmate #72953 
I.C.C. K Pod 216-B 
PO Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
Legal A'§sistant 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Appellant Cody Fortin (hereinafter Mr. Fortin and/or Appellant) appeals from 
convictions following a jury trial for the offenses of aggravated battery and use of a 
deadly weapon in the commission of a crime. 
Course of Proceedings 
After having been charged via complaint and amended complaint with 
aggravated battery and use of a deadly weapon in commission of a crime, Mr. Fortin 
waived his preliminary hearing and was bound over to the district court on those 
charges and a criminal information was filed. (R. p. 8-9, 13-14, 21, 22-23.) 
The matter proceeded to jury trial where Mr. Fortin was found guilty as charged. 
(R. p. 69.) Mr. Fortin was sentenced to 25 years with the first 12 years fixed. (R. p. 
80.) Mr. Fortin timely appeals. (R. p. 83.) 
Statement of the Facts 
This case was the subject of a jury trial. As explained by the victim, Darryl 
Shaylor, he was at a house party where people were drinking and using marijuana. (Tr. 
5/17/2010, p. 2.) Mr. Shaylor testified that he only had one beer and was not using 
drugs.1 (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 5.) 
1 This was a common theme of the state's witnesses, to wit, that there was alcohol, 
marijuana and according to one witness, methamphetamine, being used; but the 
particular witness testifying at the time insisted that he or she had not used the drugs 




Mr. Fortin and his friend Derrick came to the house and at some point, Mr. Fortin 
began arguing with one of the people there (Aaron Moore). (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 6, 8.) 
When Mr. Fortin challenged the other people there as well, Darryl Shaylor told him "I'm 
not the person to be messing with tonight. I am in a bad mood." (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 9, Ins. 
14-15.) According to Mr. Shaylor, about 5 or 10 minutes later Mr. Fortin came at him 
across the living room and so he stood up and Mr. Fortin swung at Mr. Shaylor (who 
said he usually waits for the first swing) and the fight happened from there. (Tr. 
5/17/2010, p. 10.) 
Mr. Shaylor testified that they went to the ground and were rolling around, and 
Mr. Fortin was trying to shove his fingers in his eyes and bite him and choke him. (Tr. 
5/17/2010, p. 11.) Mr. Shaylor was able to take control and got on top and hit him and 
then hit him three more times in the forehead and it stopped things for a little bit and he 
was able to go out to the front of the house because he was feeling dizzy and had been 
losing blood. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 12.) He laid down outside and first he did not know he 
had been stabbed, he thought the blood was Mr. Fortin's but then realized it was his 
own (he had a stab injury to his neck/shoulder). (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 12-13.) 
Mr. Fortin then came outside and came up to Mr. Shaylor who saw a flash of 
something shiny by his pocket, and while he couldn't really see it, he assumed it was a 
knife. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 14, 18.) Mr. Shaylor said that Mr. Fortin hesitated but then his 
friend stepped up an encouraged him. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 16.) Mr. Shaylor asked him 
'What are you going to do with that?" (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 18.) Mr. Fortin swung the knife 
and cut Mr. Shaylor across the face and then took off running. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 18.) 




again and laid down to try to cool down and looked around but Mr. Fortin was already 
gone. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 19.) Mr. Shaylor denied bringing or using a weapon that night. 
(Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 20.) 
The state called many witnesses who were at the party, but none of them saw 
Mr. Shaylor get stabbed in the house. Kasey Smith, a close friend of Mr. Shaylor's, was 
at the party (where she only had one beer). (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 51.) She testified she 
saw the slashing motion toward Mr. Shaylor while they were outside, although she did 
not put that in her statement to the police. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 59, 73, 74.) She never 
saw a knife but saw something shiny outside. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 83.) She also said that 
Mr. Fortin tried to get in Candice's car. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 60.) 
Aaron Moore, who actually admitted to drinking 10 or 12 beers. and a couple of 
shots of rum, did not see any of the fight because he was in the kitchen when it started 
and he ran away because he was a felon on probation. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 10, 16.) 
James Bungard (who claimed he wasn't drinking or using drugs at all) testified 
that after the fight in the house, Mr. Fortin picked a knife up off the floor and folded it up 
and pretended to put it in his pocket. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 31, 43.) He said Mr. Fortin took 
the knife and went outside, and he peeked out the door and saw him quickly slash 
across Mr. Shaylor's face. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 44-45.) Interestingly, he denied that 
anyone was using marijuana (which almost all the other witnesses admitted), but 
testified that Kasey, Candice and John were smoking methamphetamine (which all the 
other witnesses denied) and that he had told the police that. (Tr. 5/18/201 O, p. 52-53.) 




slashing, and had lied in the statement when he had said he saw Mr. Fortin brandishing 
a knife outside. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 60-61.) 
John Vida, whose residence this occurred at (and who claimed he had like one or 
two beers but no drugs), didn't see the whole fight (or any knife). (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 67, 
70, 77.) At the first part of it he was in his backyard trying to keep his dog out of it and 
after the people went outside the house he saw nothing because he shut the door and 
locked it. Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 73, 79.) 
Dawn Cliff, who had just started dating Mr. Shaylor (and claimed she wasn't 
drinking that night), saw Mr. Fortin outside holding what she believed to be a knife, 
because she saw a silver point, but she didn't see the full knife, and she didn't see what 
then happened between them. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 109-110, 112.) 
Mr. Fortin did not testify at trial, however, he advised the PSI writer that while he 
engaged in a physical fight with the victim, he didn't stab him and never had a knife. 
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THE COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF MR. FORTIN'S FLIGHT 
A. Standard of review. 
The Idaho Supreme Court explained the standard of review for this issue in State 
v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 965 P.2d 174 (1998): 
Admission of evidence which is probative on the issue of flight to avoid 
prosecution requires the trial judge to conduct a two-part analysis. First, 
the judge must determine that the evidence is relevant under I.R.E. 401, 
and second, the judge must determine that the probative value of the 
evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
This Court reviews the question of relevancy in the admission of evidence 
de novo. A court's decision that evidence is more probative than 
prejudicial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
Id., p. 819 (internal citations omitted). 
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225 (2008), detailed 
the abuse of discretion standard: 
When determining whether the district court abused its discretion, we 
consider: 
(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; 
(2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; 
and 
(3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 




B. The arguments and rulings on flight. 
The state filed a Notice of Intent to Use I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence, which provided 
as follows in full (R. p. 30.): 
COMES NOW, Christopher Atwood, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
for the County of Ada, and notifies the Court and Counsel of the 
State's intent to use facts as described below as evidence during 
the jury trial in this case. The State does not believe that the 
evidence falls under Idaho Criminal Rule 404(b) but out of caution 
the State provides this notice in the event the Court finds otherwise. 
If the Court finds the evidence is 404(b) evidence then the State 
believes the evidence of the defendant's crimes, wrongs, or acts is 
admissible to prove the defendant's identity. 
The state intends to introduce evidence of the Defendant's conduct 
when he was approached by law enforcement officers the day after 
the aggravated battery occurred. When the officers approached the 
Defendant and informed him he was under arrest, the Defendant 
fled from the officers indicating consciousness of guilt from the 
aggravated battery he had committed one day earlier. This 
evidence was disclosed to Defendant in the police reports in the 
State's Discovery Response in CRFE2009-0019475. 
Notice of Intent to Use I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence, p. 1-2. (R. p. 30-31.) 
The defense objected to the I.R.E. 404(b) (hereinafter 404(b)) evidence and the 
matter was taken up at trial outside the presence of the jury. Defense counsel had 
attempted to obtain a pre-trial ruling, but the court would not take it up earlier. (Tr. 
5/18/2010, p. 214, 217.) 
The offer of proof by the prosecutor was that the day following the stabbing, a 
number of law enforcement officers approached the defendant to arrest him while he 
was in his vehicle. A number of officers tried to use their cars to surround the defendant 
while he was in his car. They had their lights on and approached the car with guns 
drawn and police badges visible. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 208.) 
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When the officers approached, the defendant fled from them in his car. They 
pursued him approximately 8-10 miles when he crashed his car and ran on foot into a 
field and then into a wooded area and into a ditch. The officers had called for backup 
and a number of officers pursued him and surrounded the ditch and called for him to 
come out with his hands up. Eventually they called in a K-9 who went in and bit the 
defendant. The defendant eventually did come out and was arrested. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 
208-209.) 
The prosecutor stated he did not intend to introduce the fact that the defendant 
struck a police officer during his flight because that is the subject of a different charged 
case, aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer. Further, the prosecutor stated 
that he didn't intend to introduce all of the evidence of the eluding because that is 
largely the other case as well, and so he did not intend to get into how fast he was going 
and whether or not he put other people at risk and the fact that he side-swiped another 
vehicle. But the prosecutor stated that he does intend to introduce the distance of the 
flight and that he continued his flight on foot. The prosecutor explained that he filed the 
404(b) notice out of an abundance of caution, he does not believe it is 404(b) evidence, 
but rather, is evidence of flight. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 209-210.) 
In response, defense counsel confirmed that there are two criminal cases 
pending against the defendant in this jurisdiction, the instant aggravated battery and the 
other one charging eluding. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 210.) The state did not consolidate the 
cases. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 216.) 
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Defense counsel argued that the prosecutor's recitation of what happened was· 
not complete. The officers were actually plain clothes officers and were driving 
undercover (as opposed to simply unmarked) cars, to wit, a PT Cruiser.2 
Thus, according to defense counsel, where undercover officers approach in plain 
clothes and unmarked cars, it is not even evidence of flight to avoid prosecution. (Tr. 
5/18/2010, p. 215.) Defense counsel explained that Mr. Fortin's position was that the 
alleged victim had actually brought the knife to the fight the night before, and now 
someone was approaching him with a gun. (Id.) 
The court clarified that the state does not believe that the evidence falls under 
404(b) because it is not evidence of prior bad acts, but is evidence of flight from this 
act. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 212.) The court's ruling was as follows: 
The law for years has been that flight can be argued-a flight to avoid 
arrest can be argued by the prosecutor as indicia of guilt. At one time, in 
fact, there was a pattern jury instruction where the jury was instructed that 
if an accused defendant fled, that the jury could construe the fact that a 
defendant was fleeing to avoid arrest to be an indication of guilt. 
Modern instruction practice says you don't instruct juries that way 
anymore, but I think that the law in Idaho clearly is that counsel are 
entitled to argue the facts. The rational basis of that is that the 
circumstances, a defendant's conduct, a defendants' demonstrated 
conduct from the time of the event giving rise to the criminal charge to at 
least a reasonable time thereafter is relevant for examination to see not 
just what did the defendant do at the time of the crime, but what did he do 
after the crime was-after the alleged crime was committed. How did he 
2 Actually, the detective testified at trial they were driving a Nissan Altima, a Honda 
Accord, and a GMC SUV of some kind. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 57, 60.) Also, while their 
lights were on as the prosecutor stated, they were not traditional light bars, for instance, 
one car had wig wag lights (the headlights alternatively flashing) and also had rapid 
motion LED lights on the passenger side visor, and another car had the rapid motion 
LED lights on its grill. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 42-43.) As to their dress and identification, the 
detective testified that he was wearing civilian clothing (T-shirt) with his badge hanging 
around his neck and another officer was wearing a black windbreaker with a flip down 




comport himself? Where did he go? What did he do? How did he respond 
when approached by officers? That is all within the -the old-fashioned 
word is "res gestae." I don't know what the modern term is but there is a 
more modern term for that. But that is all in the gambit of relevant 
circumstances and it is fair game for both sides to investigate and 
examine. 
It is equally appropriate, for example, if a defendant's conduct is 
completely the other way from any indication of guilt, that the defense may 
bring forward that it shows that his comportment and activities and 
conduct after the allegation are totally inconsistent with the prosecutor's 
allegation of the occurrence of a crime. So it cuts both ways. What did the 
defendant do? How did he act? How did he respond? What was his 
conduct at least to the extent that you have a reasonable time after, and I 
think here we are talking about one day and think that is certainly within 
reach. 
I indicated that I didn't think it was a 404(b) problem because I think 
404{b) discusses prior bad acts or unrelated bad acts. And if you are 
examining a defendant's conduct after a circumstance with relation to the 
circumstance itself it is not a 404(b). it is an extension of the defendant's 
conduct in connection with the circumstance. 
Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 220, In. 24-p. 222, In. 22 (emphasis added). 
A colloquy then occurred about the evidence of the police dog which went in and 
bit Mr. Fortin, after which the court continued: 
I am not sure where that goes. My struggle on this is an extraneous issue 
that we are going to explore at some length that doesn't have anything to 
do with any of the elements of the crime. And once you get the dog 
involved in this thing, I think fear of the dog-that doesn't have any 
necessary connection to flight to avoid arrest. 
[PROSECUTOR] No, it is just how the officers found him. 
THE COURT: But that is not relevant. The fact that they -I can understand 
the argument that he in his flight is evidence. The officers' response is 
not necessarily indicative of anything. 
His flight, okay. Officers gave chase. Well, because A follows B, I'll say 
okay, they gave chase because that leads to the chase on foot. But I don't 
think you need to add-you don't need to embellish the chase with the 
fact that it was 990 miles-an-hour though downtown Boise, you have 
already indicated that you are not going there, anyway. 
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Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 225, Ins. 2-24 (emphasis added). 
stated: 
A colloquy then occurred about the details of the chase, after which the court 
... I will let you put in evidence of flight but without emphasizing the police 
officers' response to that other than the fact that they did pursue, they did 
pursue him, they did add officers as needed until they finally had enough 
officers and had him surrounded and accomplished the arrest. Will that 
satisfy that State? 
[PROSECUTOR] It will. 
THE COURT: With that caveat I will allow the testimony, and with the 
representation that you are not going to go into the high speed, the crash, 
and the crashing into the police car, and crashing into the civilian car. 
[PROSECUTOR]: That is fine. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I think I should put out for the record I do 
just want to renew my objection to any of this evidence coming in. 
THE COURT: I didn't think you were very happy about this. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I just wanted to make sure there is a record. 
Tr. 5/18/2011, p. 228, In. 16-p. 229, In. 14. 
C. The court erred by admitting the evidence of flight. 
First of all, the district court erred by not understanding that the evidence of flight 
is other bad acts evidence. Then, since it did not understand the type of evidence at 
issue, it failed to use the proper two step test to determine the evidence's admissibility. 
The court at one point stated that the flight evidence did not fall under I.R.E. 
404(b) (hereinafter 404(b)) because was not prior bad acts evidence, and later, stated 




The district court was wrong, flight is other bad acts evidence. As explained by 
the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818 (Ct.App. 2009): 
Escape or flight is one of the exceptions to the general rule prohibiting 
evidence of prior bad acts or crimes. State v. Gootz, 110 Idaho 807, 814, 
718 P.2d 1245, 1252 (Ct. App. 1986). Evidence of escape or flight may be 
admissible because it may indicate a consciousness of guilt. Id. However, 
the inference of guilt may be weakened when a defendant harbors 
motives for escape other than guilt of the charged offense. Id. 
Admission of evidence which is probative on the issue of flight to avoid 
prosecution requires the trial court to conduct a two-part analysis. State v. 
Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 819, 965 P.2d 174, 179 (1998). First, the trial court 
must determine that the evidence is relevant under I.R.E. 401; and, 
second, the court must determine that the probative value of the evidence 
is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. This 
Court reviews the question of relevancy in the admission of evidence de 
novo. Id. A trial court's decision that evidence is more probative than 
prejudicial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. 
Id. p. 821-822. 
In other words, even though there is an established exception by which flight 
evidence may be admissible, it is still other bad acts evidence. Thus, the proper other 
bad acts test must be used.3 
So in our case, the district court was required to perform a two step analysis. 
First, the court had to find that evidence of flight was relevant. It then needed to 
determine that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice. 
In addition to the law specific to evidence of flight which requires the two step 
analysis, such as Rossignol, supra, as well as State v. Moore, supra, since the 
evidence that the state desired to introduce was also an uncharged crime, the district 
3 Incidentally, while 404(b) evidence is commonly referred to as prior bad acts evidence, 
there is no requirement that it be prior (and flight of course would not be), the rule 




court should have also known to perform the two step test under 404(b) itself. Here, 
the other bad acts evidence constituted the crime of eluding police, which was not 
charged in this case, but in a separate case. 
This situation is similar to that in State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225 (2008), where 
the Idaho Supreme Court had to determine whether the defendant's admission that he 
had earlier dealt methamphetamine fell under 404(b). 
The initial question is whether Sheldon's statements were admissions of a 
past crime, wrong, or act. Since methamphetamine dealing is prohibited 
under I.C. § 37-2732B(a) (also I.C. § 37-2732(a)), his admission would be 
categorized as 404(b) evidence. Thus, the trial court was required to make 
a two-tiered analysis to determine whether the evidence was inadmissible 
propensity evidence under 404(b) or whether the evidence. could be 
admitted for some other purpose. First, the court considers whether the 
evidence is relevant to a material disputed issue concerning the crime 
charged. Second, the court considers whether the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to 
the defendant. This Court exercises free review over the first inquiry -
relevance - but reviews the second inquiry - risk of unfair prejudice - under 
an abuse of discretion standard. Unfortunately, the district court appears 
not to have recognized the statements as 404(b) evidence and, thus, 
failed to perform the two-tiered analysis. 
Id., p. 229 (emphasis added, internal citations and footnote omitted). 
Our case is the same, since eluding police is a crime it would be categorized as 
404(b) evidence and the two-tiered analysis required. 
So in our case, whether analyzed under the established law regarding flight 
evidence or the more general law regarding other bad acts, the district court was clearly 




relevance, although it made some contrary comments, it does appear that the court did 
rule that the flight evidence was relevant.4 
However, the court clearly never made any ruling about probative value or 
prejudice, presumably because it did not believe that the flight evidence was other bad 
acts evidence for which that second step was required. However characterized, this 
failure by the court was error. At the very least, the court abused its discretion since it 
admitted evidence without reference to the legal standards regarding such evidence. 
In State v. Perry, 245 P.3d 961 (Idaho 2010), the Idaho Supreme Court 
explained: 
Idaho shall from this point forward employ the Chapman harmless error 
test to all objected-to error. A defendant appealing from an objected-to, 
non-constitutionally-based error shall have the duty to establish that such 
an error occurred, at which point the State shall have the burden of 
demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id., 974. 
In this case, the defense objected below and has established on appeal that an 
error occurred. Accordingly, unless the State meets its burden, the convictions must be 
reversed.5 
4 The court mentioned at one point that the flight issue has nothing to do with any of the 
elements of the charged crime. It also holds that the use of the dog is not relevant, 
however, the court never reconciles just why if the dog is not relevant, anything else 
about the chase would be. 
Also, it is interesting to note that the State's notice of intent to use 404(b) evidence said 
that the evidence of flight was relevant to show identity, which was never mentioned by 
the court as a reason the evidence was relevant. 





THE COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING A DEFENSE WITNESS 
A. Standard of review. 
A lower court's determination under I.R.E. 403 will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless it is shown to be an abuse of discretion. State v. Birk/a, 126 Idaho 498 (Ct.App. 
1994). 
B. The background and court's rulings. 
After the state rested, defense counsel stated that he had spoken with a witness, 
Candice Waters, during the break and she said that she overheard Darryl Shaylor (the 
victim) discussing his testimony with another witness (Kasey Smith) and that Candice 
knew specific questions that counsel had asked Darryl Shaylor. 6 (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 101-
104.) 
Apparently, both Kasey Smith and Darryl Shaylor had already testified when they 
had their discussion. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 105.) Candice Waters had been listed as a 
witness by the state, but had not been called. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 102-103.) Defense 
counsel indicated that he might call her. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 102.) 
As to the relevance of her testimony, defense counsel explained that a primary 
issue of the defense was that Darryl Shaylor and other witnesses had all been talking 
about their stories and their stories had changed. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 110-111.) 
Despite the fact that the witnesses were violating the court's order to not discuss 
the case, the court stated there was no proof that any testimony was tainted since the 
6 Earlier in the trial there had been another instance where Darryl Shaylor had been 
discussing the case with another witness. Dawn Cliff overheard them and testified 




two witnesses discussing their testimony had already testified and while Candice may 
have overheard, she was not going to be called as a witness. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 107.) 
Thus, the court ruled that it was not going to allow the defense to call Candice Waters 
to testify about overhearing Darryl Shaylor discussing his testimony with another 
witness. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p.108, 116-117.) 
Further, the court would not allow the defense to call Candice Waters as an 
eyewitness to the crime. As defense counsel explained, she was an eyewitness who 
filled out a police statement form. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 114.) Defense counsel made an 
offer of proof, and related that during the break, she told him that she did not see Mr. 
Fortin throw a punch, it may have happened, but she didn't see it. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 
114-115.) The court asked whether she was in a position to observe, and defense 
counsel said he didn't know, that is what this trial is for. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 115.) 
Defense counsel also explained that she would also testify that Mr. Fortin came to her 
car accidentally, and she had to tell him it was her car, not his. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 115.) 
The court ruled that there was nothing relevant that was not cumulative of what 
the State had already presented and there is nothing exculpatory because counsel was 
not saying that she would testify that it did not happen, the most she can say is she 
didn't see it happen and that's already been the testimony of a handful of witnesses. 
(Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 115.) Counsel responded that those witnesses had changed their 
stories from their written statements to now saying they did see something outside, to 
which the court responded that was not accurate. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 115-116.) 
Counsel clarified that the court was ruling that he could not call Candice Waters 




cumulative or was exculpatory. Defense counsel stated that she did not see Mr. Fortin 
throw a punch or make a slapping motion outside. Second, she had testimony 
regarding the credibility of the witnesses, having been present on two occasions where 
Darryl Shaylor was discussing the case with other witnesses (the other one which Dawn 
Cliff testified about). (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 116.) 
The court ruled as follows: 
Which I would not permit you to go into [Shaylor talking to other 
witnesses], in-in that aspect, because it doesn't impact-if-from that 
testimony only, because that's already been inquired into, unless she 
was a witness. 
And unless you can represent that she was a -that she saw it, --that it 
didn't happen, not that she didn't see it happen, because that's not 
necessarily exculpative, unless you can prove-unless you can establish 
that she was in a position to see, and was looking, and it didn't happen, 
didn't-by--by saying she didn't see it happen that it didn't happen. 
If she wasn't looking, and what I'm understanding you to say is she didn't 
see it happen, but it could have happened, which kind of says to me she 
was not in a position to observe, which is not exculpatory. 
I would otherwise rule that-on-on the State's case, it's--that--that 
anything else she adds is cumulative to what the State's already added. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The only thing-the only information I can give the 
Court, as an offer of proof of what Candice Waters is going to say, is her 
statement and the--what she just told me in the hall. So other than that , I 
request that we be allowed to call her as witness. 
THE COURT: On the--offer of proof, I would find that the evidence--the 
constructive evidence of what she did observe is cumulative to what the 
State has already offered and not exculpatory. And Counsel has not 
offered anything in the offer of proof that is exculpative. And therefore, the 
test-the testimony would be cumulative to the State's offer and 
otherwise irrelevant. 
Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 116, In. 25-p. 118, In. 6. 
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Not being allowed to call the witness, the defense rested without calling any 
witnesses. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 119.) 
C. The court erred by excluding the defense witness. 
While the district court did not cite any authority for its ruling excluding the 
witness, presumably it was pursuant to I.R.E. 403, which provides as follows: 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
I.R.E. Rule 403 (emphasis added). 
While the court claimed that Candice Water's testimony was inadmissible 
because it was cumulative to what the State had already presented, just because other 
witnesses had testified to the subject matter does not make it needlessly cumulative 
and therefore inadmissible. 
As explained in State v. 8/ackstead, 126 Idaho 22 (Ct.App. 1994): 
Statements by witnesses which corroborate the facts to which another has 
already testified are not necessarily inadmissible because they are 
"cumulative." Rule of Evidence 403 prohibits the introduction of needlessly 
cumulative evidence. There is no merit in the argument that this evidence 
was needless. The entire tenor of Blackstead's defense was that the victim 
had recently fabricated the allegations against him for the purpose of 
staying at the treatment facility or being placed with her stepmother rather 
than returning to her natural mother. Such an implication of recent 
fabrication gives importance to evidence corroborating the victim's 
testimony that she had mentioned the defendant's misconduct to someone 
within days of the occurrence. 




Like in the case above, in our case, the proposed testimony was corrobative, not 
cumulative, or if it was, it was not needlessly so. The evidence regarding Mr. Fortin 
cutting Mr. Shaylor's face while outside was extremely inconsistent. Only one witness 
(John Bungard) actually testified that he had saw both the knife and the slashing, but he 
also admitted he lied in his police statement about Mr. Fortin brandishing the knife 
outside and that he didn't mention the slashing in his statement to police.7 
Kasey Smith, Mr. Shaylor's very close friend, testified she saw the slashing 
motion toward Mr. Shaylor while they were outside, although she did not put that in her 
statement to the police, and she never saw a knife but saw something shiny outside. 
Dawn Cliff, who had just started dating Mr. Shaylor, saw what she believed to be 
a knife, because she saw a silver point, but she didn't see the full knife, and she didn't 
see what then happened between them. 
While two other witnesses did not see what happened outside, it was because 
they were not outside when it happened. Aaron Moore had run away and John Vida had 
shut the door and locked it. 
Given this testimony, the testimony of Candice Waters, to wit, that she did not 
see Mr. Fortin punch or slash Mr. Shaylor while they were outside, is not cumulative. 
While her testimony may have been the same as what all the other witnesses (who 
were outside at the time) told the police, for two of the three witnesses, their stories 
changed by the time of trial and they had now seen the slashing motion. Therefore, 
instead of being needlessly cumulative because it was the same as the other witnesses, 
7 Significantly, his testimony about the drug use in the house was completely different 
from everyone else's, he denied anyone was using marijuana but stated that other 
witnesses were using methamphetamine. 
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the testimony of Candice Waters actually corroborated the defense theory of recent 
fabrication and impeached the two witnesses who did change their story. In short, 
where the state's witnesses are changing their story, the defense should be allowed to 
put on the witness who didn't. 
Also, by the time of trial, only Dawn Cliff testified that she did not see the 
slashing motion so Candice Water's similar testimony should have been considered to 
be corroborative of that, not needlessly cumulative. The district court was simply 
wrong when it stated that a handful of witnesses had already testified this way. 
Further, this was evidence favorable to the defense and was the only witness the 
defense would be calling. The court was incorrect in requiring defense counsel to 
establish prior to testifying that the witness had the opportunity to observe since as he 
stated, that is what the trial is for. More to the point, that was the prosecutor's job, if she 
didn't have the opportunity to observe then her testimony would be impeached, not 
disallowed in its entirety. 
Finally, Candice Waters also had evidence that no one else did, to wit, that Mr. 
Fortin accidentally went to her car and she had to tell him to go to his. While Kasey 
Smith testified that he went to Candice's car, she did not include the part that it was by 
accident, and so the jury could have been left with the impression that Mr. Fortin was 
trying to attack Candice as well, and her testimony would clarify that he was not. 
To summarize, a witness who says she did not see a disputed event happen is 
providing exculpatory evidence, and her ability to see is a matter for cross examination. 
Further, her evidence was not needlessly cumulative; it corroborated the other witness 
who did not see the slash and also impeached the witnesses who only recently said 
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they saw it. Finally, Candice Waters had the clarifying testimony about the car that no 
one else did. 
While the district court's rush to conclude what it obviously considered to be a 
slow trial may well be understandable, it should not have come at the expense of 
excluding the one and only defense witness. For all the reasons above, the district 
court erred by excluding the witness. 
111. 
THE COURT ERRED DENYING THE MOTION FOR MISTRIAL 
A. Standard of review. 
The standard of review was explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. 
Field, 144 Idaho 559 (2007): 
When there is a motion for mistrial based upon prosecutorial error 
supported by a contemporaneous objection to the underlying procedural 
or evidentiary error we review the denial of a motion for mistrial for 
reversible error. 
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably 
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the 
mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether 
the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented 
reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, 
where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the 
"abuse of discretion" standard is a misnomer. The standard, more 
accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our focus is upon the 
continuing impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the 
mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to declare a mistrial will be 
disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted 
reversible error. 




B. The motion and the court's ruling. 
On cross examination, defense counsel was asking Mr. Shaylor whether he ever 
got a clear look at the knife because he had just said it was a shiny object. The following 
exchange took place: 
A. Not a clear look, but I believe getting cut across the face and 





So it's just your opinion that this was a knife? 
I knew it was a knife. I couldn't determine which kind. 
How do you know it was a knife? 
Because it punctured me in the neck and cut me across the face, 
and I know most gang members carry those. 
Tr. 5/17/2011, p. 30, Ins. 15-24 (emphasis added). 
Defense counsel started to object and the court ruled that volunteered answer 
about the gang member be redacted and the jury to disregard it. However, the court 
stated that was all it would do since it was an open ended question, but that it would 
take up counsel's motion at the break. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 31.) 
At the break, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that his question in 
no way, shape or form invited a response regarding gang members. Defense counsel 
argued that given the current prejudice against gangs, it is one of the most prejudicial 
things that could have been said, and it is too inflammatory to be cured by a curative 
instruction. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 41-44.) 
The prosecutor stated that he had not intended to bring up the fact that he was a 
gang member. 
And I've advised them, and I'm pretty sure I advised the victim the same 
thing, Mr. Shaylor, that it is not to be mentioned unless you're asked a 
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question that calls for it, and that you cannot lie if asked a question. You 
must tell the truth, but not to volunteer that information unless it's asked of 
you. 
Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 45 Ins. 13-18. 
The court again ruled that defense counsel invited the error because he asked 
"how do you know," which allowed him to say everything that was going on in his mind, 
which included that gang members carry knives. If defense counsel wanted to avoid a 
particular answer, he should have asked precise questions or brought a motion in 
limine. Thus, while the court struck the answer and instructed the jury to disregard it, 
the court ruled that it is not a mistrial issue and denied the motion for mistrial. (Tr. 
5/17/2010, p. 47-48.) 
C. The court erred by denying the motion for mistrial. 
Appellant disagrees with the court that the question invited the answer. The 
witness was simply taking advantage of the open ended question to inject prejudicial 
information to the jury, rather than it being some valid answer based on stream of 
consciousness thinking as apparently held by the court. 
We know this because of the prosecutor's comments, which the court ignores. 
The prosecutor's admonishment was that gang information was not to be mentioned 
unless a question calls for it and it was not to be volunteered. In other words, even if in 
the victim's mind a reason he knew it was a knife was because gang members carry 
knives, he had been admonished to not mention gangs unless a question called for it, 
and it cannot seriously be argued that the question called for that answer even if he was 
thinking it. Even the court referred to it as a volunteered answer, showing that the 




Therefore, this is not a matter of a two word blurt out answer which was not 
mistrial material as held by the court. Rather, it was a victim in a case intentionally 
prejudicing the defendant by providing inflammatory information despite the fact that he 
had been told not to. 
As further evidence that this was not just some inadvertent mistake, it must be 
remembered that this same witness also violated the court's order to not discuss his 
testimony with other witnesses on two different occasions. While defense counsel may 
have not been able to establish that this affected other testimony, it nevertheless shows 
that this witness was intentionally violating admonishments, and in this instance at least, 
did so in an obvious attempt to unfairly prejudice the defendant. This is mistrial material, 
and the court erred in denying it. 
IV. 
THE DOCTRINE OF CUMULATIVE ERROR REQUIRES REVERSAL 
Appellant asserts that the errors discussed above combine to constitute 
cumulative error. In State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 171 P.3d 1282 (Ct.App. 2007), the 
Court of Appeals explained: 
Having identified multiple errors, we would normally address whether, 
pursuant to I.C.R. 52, each of these errors was harmless. However the 
cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when there is 
an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself may be harmless, 
but when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of 
the defendant's constitutional right to due process. In order to find 
cumulative error, this Court must conclude there is merit to more than one 
of the alleged errors and then conclude that these errors, when 
aggregated, denied the defendant a fair trial. 




The multiple errors in this trial have all been discussed at length above. 
Therefore, they will not be unnecessarily repeated in this section, but Appellant will 
simply request that his convictions be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial 
because of the cumulative error. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Fortin respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for 
aggravated battery with deadly weapon enhancement. 
DATED this __ day of November, 2011. 
Greg S. Silvey 
Attorney for Appellant 
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MELANSON, Judge 
Cody James Fortin appeals from his judgment of conviction for aggravated battery and 
use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime. For the reasons set forth below, we 
affirm. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
In 2009, the state charged Fortin with aggravated battery, I.C. §§ I8-903(a), I8-907(a), 
and I8-907(b); and use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime, LC. § 19-2520. The 
information alleged that Fortin willfully and unlawfully stabbed the victim in the face and 
shoulder with a knife, causing the man great bodily harm or permanent disfigurement. The state 
filed a notice of intent to use evidence at trial that Fortin fled when approached by police officers 
the day after the alleged battery occurred. The state asserted that, while the evidence was not 
believed to fall under I.R.E. 404(b ), the notice was provided out of caution in the event the 
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district court found otherwise. Fortin objected to the admission of such evidence at trial. A jury 
found Fortin guilty of aggravated battery and use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a 
crime. Fortin was sentenced to a unified term of twenty-five years, with a minimum period of 
confinement of twelve years. Fortin appeals. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Evidence of Flight 
Fortin argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to recognize that 
evidence of his flight was I.R.E. 404(b) evidence and by failing to conduct an appropriate 
balancing analysis of the probative value of such evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident, provided that the prosecution in a criminal case shall file and 
serve notice reasonably in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it 
intends to introduce at trial. 
This rule prohibits introduction of evidence of acts other than the crime for which a defendant is 
charged if its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the 
defendant's propensity to engage in such behavior. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 54, 205 P.3d 
1185, 1190 (2009). Of course, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may implicate a 
person's character while also being relevant and admissible for some permissible purpose, such 
as those listed in the rule. When determining the admissibility of evidence to which a Rule 
404(b) objection has been made, the trial court must first determine whether there is sufficient 
evidence of the other acts that a reasonable jury could believe the conduct actually occurred. If 
so, then the court must consider: (1) whether the other acts are relevant to a material and 
disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity; and (2) whether the 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Grist, 14 7 Idaho 
at 52,205 P.3d at 1188; State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210,214,207 P.3d 186, 190 (Ct. App. 2009). 
Rule 404(b) allows evidence of other acts if admitted for the purpose of showing 
knowledge or consciousness of guilt. State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 463, 235 P.3d 409, 413 
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(Ct. App. 2010). Consciousness of guilt has been found in a variety of circumstances. Evidence 
of flight, escape, or failure to appear on the part of a defendant is often identified as relevant to 
demonstrate consciousness of guilt. State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 819-20, 965 P.2d 174, 179-
80 (1998) (admitted evidence that defendant left Idaho for his home in Oregon to avoid a 
scheduled interview from an officer investigating lewd conduct); State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 
818, 821-22, 215 P.3d 538, 541-42 (Ct. App. 2009) (allowed evidence that defendant failed to 
appear at a hearing to increase bond and left the jurisdiction); State v. Friedley, 122 Idaho 321, 
322-23, 834 P.2d 323, 324-25 (Ct. App. 1992) (allowed stipulation that defendant failed to 
appear at arraignment and at the initially scheduled trial on drug charges). 
The inference of guilt may be weakened when a defendant harbors motives for escape 
other than guilt of the charged offense. Rossignol, 14 7 Idaho at 821, 215 P .3d at 541. The 
existence of alternative reasons for the escape goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its 
admissibility. Id. at 822, 215 P.3d at 542. Admission of evidence which is probative on the 
issue of flight to avoid prosecution requires the trial court to conduct a two-part analysis. Id. 
First, the trial court must determine that the evidence is relevant under I.R.E. 401; and, second, 
the court must determine that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. This Court reviews the question of relevancy in the 
admission of evidence de novo. Id. A trial court's decision that evidence is more probative than 
prejudicial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. 
We first address Fortin's assertion that the district court erred by failing to recognize that 
evidence of his flight was I.RE. 404(b) evidence. Indeed, the district court did not view 
evidence of Fortin's flight as implicating I.R.E. 404(b). However, the only adverse consequence 
of this identified by Fortin is that the district court did not, on the record, balance the probative 
value of this evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice. 1 We, therefore, address that omission. 
In determining that evidence of Fortin's flight would be admitted, the district court 
stated: 
We visited at some length and talked about this in chambers before trial 
began, and I indicated that at that time how I was inclined to read this and how I 
as was inclined to rule. 





The law for years has been that flight can be argued--a flight to avoid 
arrest can be argued by the prosecutor as indicia of guilt. 
Accordingly, the district court referred to the probative value of the evidence of Fortin's flight. 
However, as Fortin asserts, the district court did not make any comments on the record regarding 
the danger of unfair prejudice posed by such evidence. 2 
In State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, 869-70, 264 P.3d 975, 976-77 (Ct. App. 2011), this 
Court addressed an argument that the district court in that case abused its discretion by failing to 
conduct a balancing analysis of the probative value of challenged evidence against the danger of 
unfair prejudice on the record. We held that, because Fordyce failed to identify any unfair 
prejudice from admission of the challenged evidence, the district court did not err by failing to 
conduct a balancing analysis on the record. Id. at 870-71, 264 P .3d at 977-78. 
Here, with respect to identifying unfair prejudice from the flight evidence, Fortin's 
counsel stated at trial: 
Two weeks ago ... I actually tried to get a pretrial ruling on this and [the 
judge] wouldn't allow us to do it because he said he wanted the trial judge to 
make the determination. 
The reality of it is, if I file a motion, it is my obligation to set it for notice 
of hearing. And the reality here is that this evidence coming in now, without any 
prior notice from the prosecutor, is extremely prejudicial. Obviously, it is 
prejudicial. It is inflammatory. 
To the extent Fortin argued that evidence of his flight was unfairly prejudicial and should not 
have been admitted because he did not have prior notice from the prosecutor that such evidence 
2 The prosecutor made the following statements during trial regarding the danger of unfair 
prejudice posed by the evidence: 
As far was whether it is prejudicial, the Court pointed out, and I agree, it is 
prejudicial but it is not unfair prejudice. It is not that they are going to think he 
did it for the wrong--for some bad reason or something unrelated. It is prejudicial 
because he was running from officers and shows his consciousness of guilt. 
These statements, coupled with the district court's indication that the matter was discussed in 
chambers at some length before trial, indicate that the district court probably did consider the 
danger of unfair prejudice stemming from evidence ofFortin's flight. However, such discussion 
took place off the record, and we cannot assume that the district court conducted the proper 
analysis regarding unfair prejudice. 
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would be used, this assertion was without merit because it was belied by the record and Fortin's 
own statements. Specifically, prior to trial, the state filed a notice of intent to use evidence of 
Fortin's flight and, as just described, Fortin asserted that two weeks prior to trial he attempted to 
get a pretrial ruling on the state's notice of intent to use such evidence. 
While not specifically identified as unfair prejudice, Fortin also argued that the state's 
evidence did not implicate flight because there were potential motives for Fortin's escape other 
than guilt of the aggravated battery. Specifically, Fortin asserted: 
Now, what the prosecutor said is not a full representation of what 
happened. These officers approached in plain clothes in unmarked police cars, 
and so I don't know how you can possibly say it is even evidence of flight. 
Someone approaches [Fortin] with a gun. Obviously, [the victim] is the 
one who brought the knife to this fight, he attacks [Fortin] the night before, and 
now somebody approaches [Fortin] with a gun. 
We reiterate that the inference of guilt drawn from evidence of escape or flight may be weakened 
when a defendant harbors motives for escape other than guilt of the charged offense. Rossignol, 
147 Idaho at 821, 215 P.3d at 541. However, the existence of alternative reasons for the escape 
goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. Id. at 822, 215 P.3d at 542. 
Further, if Fortin fled from police the day after he committed the aggravated battery, it cannot be 
said that apprising the jury of this fact was necessarily unfair. Evidence is not unfairly 
prejudicial simply because it is damaging to a defendant's case. Fordyce, 151 Idaho at 870, 264 
P .3d at 977. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it suggests decision on an improper basis. 
Pokorney, 149 Idaho at 465, 235 P.3d at 415; State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 
908 (Ct. App. 1994). That Fortin's flight indicates his consciousness of guilt of the aggravated 
battery offense is not unfair prejudice that would justify withholding that fact from the jury. As 
in Fordyce, Fortin has not shown reversible error because Fortin has not identified any unfair 
prejudice to weigh. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by 
failing to conduct a balancing of the probative value of the evidence ofFortin's flight against the 
danger of unfair prejudice on the record. 
B. Witness Exclusion 
Fortin next argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony 
of a potential defense witness at trial pursuant to I.R.E. 403. Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 




outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or 
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. The trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of testimonial 
evidence. State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 225,232,786 P.2d 1127, 1134 (1990). A decision to admit 
or deny such evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of that 
discretion. Id. 
At trial, after the state rested, defense counsel informed the district court that Fortin 
would not be calling any witnesses. Before the defense formally rested, the district court took a 
break to settle the jury instructions. When the parties returned, Fortin's counsel informed the 
district court that, during the break, a woman, who was present when the stabbing occurred and 
listed as a potential witness for the state but not called, told Fortin that she had previously 
overheard two state witnesses discussing their trial testimony after they both had testified. 
Fortin' s counsel then asserted that, while the woman had been tainted as a potential witness, he 
felt compelled to call her. The state objected. 
The district court then asked Fortin's counsel to make an offer of proof regarding what 
the potential witness was expected to testify to that was probative to the defense in this case. 
Fortin's counsel asserted that the potential witness was expected to testify that she did not see 
Fortin throw a punch in the altercation with the victim outside the residence where the fight 
occurred, but that it could have happened. Fortin' s counsel also asserted that this woman would 
testify that Fortin accidentally came to get into her car when attempting to leave the residence 
after the altercation and that she had to inform Fortin that the car was hers, not his. The district 
court responded that there was nothing that was not cumulative to what the state had already 
presented and nothing exculpatory. The following exchange then took place between the district 
court and Fortin's counsel: 
[COUNSEL] So, is--is the--it's the ruling of the Court I cannot call [the 
woman] as a witness? 
[COURT] Unless you show me that there is something that is not 
cumulative to what the State's already shown or exculpative. 
[COUNSEL] Well, that was my conversation with [the woman]. Her--
what she told me was that she did not see [Fortin] throw a punch or make a 
slapping motion outside. I--I think that--she--the two things she does offer, is--in 
terms of--1 don't think it's necessarily impeachment, certainly, of her, but it goes 
to the credibility of the witnesses, and certainly my defense that she was present 




witnesses present today when [the victim] was--or yesterday when [the victim] 
was discussing the case and [ an officer] had to break that up. 
So, she's actually present for two situations where [the victim] has been 
discussing the facts of this case. 
[COURT] Which I would not permit you to go into ... unless she was 
a witness. 
And unless you can represent that she was a--that she saw it, that it didn't 
happen, not that she didn't see it happen, because that's not necessarily 
exculpative, unless you can prove--unless you can establish that she was in a 
position to see, and was looking, and it didn't happen, didn't--by--by saying she 
didn't see it happen that it didn't happen. 
If she wasn't looking, and what I'm understanding you to say is she didn't 
see it happen, but it could have happened, which kind of says to me she was not in 
a position to observe, which is not exculpatory. 
I would otherwise rule that--on--on the State's case, it's--that--that 
anything else she adds is cumulative to what the State's already added. 
[COUNSEL] The only thing--the only information I can give the Court, 
as an off er of proof of what [ the woman] is going to say, is her statement and the--
what she just told me in the hall. So, other than that, I request that we be allowed 
to call her as a witness. 
[COURT] On the--on the offer of proof, I would find that the 
evidence--the constructive evidence of what she did observe is cumulative to what 
the State has already offered and not exculpative. And Counsel has not offered 
anything in the offer of proof that is exculpative. And, therefore, the test--the 
testimony would be cumulative of the State's offer and otherwise irrelevant. 
Fortin argues that the district court erred by excluding the proposed testimony of the 
potential defense witness because such testimony was not needlessly cumulative. However, even 
if the district court erred by excluding such testimony, convictions will not be set aside for errors 
or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the results of the trial. State v. 
Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 196-97, 16 P.3d 288, 293-94 (Ct. App. 2000). Where an error concerns 
evidence omitted at trial, the test for harmless error is whether there is a reasonable possibility 
that the lack of excluded evidence contributed to the verdict. Id. 
Here, the evidence adduced at trial was overwhelming that Fortin used a knife in the 
commission of the aggravated battery and, as a result, the victim suffered significant injuries. 
Multiple witnesses described the altercation between Fortin and the victim in this case. None 
testified that anyone other than Fortin and the victim were involved in the physical fight. One 
witness testified that, during the altercation between Fortin and the victim, the witness saw Fortin 
with a knife in his hand and watched Fortin make a slashing motion and connect with the 
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victim's face. Another witness testified that she also saw Fortin holding something in his hand 
during the altercation that she believed was a knife. An additional witness testified that she saw 
Fortin make a slashing motion toward the victim and saw something in Fortin's hand. The 
attending trauma surgeon testified that the penetrating wound to the victim's chest was a stab 
wound, although he could not say with certainty what caused the wound. However, the surgeon 
also testified that the wound to the victim's face was consistent with a knife wound. Given the 
weight of the evidence against Fortin in this case, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
that there is no reasonable possibility that the lack of the excluded evidence contributed to the 
verdict obtained against Fortin. Therefore, even assuming the district court erred by excluding 
the testimony of the potential defense witness, such error was harmless. 
C. Motion for Mistrial 
Fortin additionally asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial 
after a state's witness, the victim in this case, referenced Fortin's gang affiliation during cross-
examination. In criminal cases, motions for mistrial are governed by I.C.R. 29.1. A "mistrial 
may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error or 
legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial 
to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial." I.C.R. 29.l(a). Our standard for 
reviewing a district court's denial of a motion for mistrial is well established: 
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his 
discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made. 
Rather, the question must be whether the event which precipitated the motion for 
mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record. 
Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse 
of discretion" standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is 
one of reversible error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the 
incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to declare a 
mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted 
reversible error. 
State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.3d 1102, 1105 (Ct. App. 1983). 
During cross-examination of the victim in this case, the following exchange occurred: 
Q. Now, at some point, I assume--did you ever get a clear look at this 
knife? It seems you like--you just say it was a shiny object. 
A. Not a clear look, but I believe getting cut across the face and 
stabbed in the neck and seeing a shine, you know it's a knife. 




A. I knew it was a knife. I couldn't determine which kind. 
Q. How do you know it was a knife? 
A. Because it punctured me in the neck and cut me across the face, 
and I know most gang members carry those. 
The district court immediately instructed the jury to disregard the victim's reference to gang 
members; the victim completed his testimony; and, at the next break in the trial proceedings, 
Fortin moved for a mistrial. Fortin argued that the victim's reference to gang members led the 
jury to believe that Fortin was potentially a member of a gang and was, therefore, extremely 
prejudicial and too inflammatory for a curative instruction. Fortin did not allege that the state 
planted or otherwise invited the comment from the victim. In denying Fortin's motion for a 
mistrial, the district court explained: 
In my view and my opinion, if you ask an open-ended question on cross-
examination such as how or why, the witness is entitled to tell you how, and if 
that's on his mind, why you've got it. If there's something in that explanation 
that you want to build a fence around it, then, either, A, ask precise questions, or, 
B, you have to alert in advance with a motion in limine. 
I will strike it. I've instructed the jury to disregard it, but I do not consider 
it to be a mistrial issue. Motion for mistrial is denied. 
We presume that the jury followed the district court's instructions. See State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 
747, 751, 947 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478, 481, 927 P.2d 
451,454 (Ct. App. 1996). 
We conclude that, given the open-ended nature of Fortin's question on cross-
examination, the lack of a motion in limine requesting a pretrial order instructing the state to 
admonish witnesses from referencing gang membership and the immediate instruction by the 
district court to the jury to disregard the victim's reference to gang members, Fortin has failed to 
show that the reference constituted reversible error. Therefore, the district court did not err by 
denying Fortin's motion for a mistrial. 
D. Cumulative Error 
Fortin argues that the doctrine of cumulative error requires reversal of his judgment of 
conviction and remand for a new trial. The cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation 
of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, show the 
absence of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant's right to due process. Moore, 131 Idaho 
at 823,965 P.2d at 183. The presence of errors alone, however, does not require the reversal of a 
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conviction because, under due process, a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not an error-free 
trial. Id In this case, there was no accumulation of irregularities. Accordingly, the cumulative 
error doctrine is inapplicable. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
Fortin did not identify any unfair prejudice resulting from the admission of evide~ce of 
his flight from police officers the day after the aggravated battery occurred. Accordingly, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to conduct a balancing of the probative value 
of the evidence of Fortin's flight against the danger of unfair prejudice on the record. 
Additionally, even assuming that the district court erred by excluding the testimony of the 
potential defense witness, such error was harmless because we are convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable possibility that the lack of such evidence contributed 
to the jury verdict. Further, the district court did not err by denying Fortin's motion for a mistrial 
because Fortin failed to show that the victim's reference to gang members constituted reversible 
error. Finally, because there was no accumulation of irregularities in this case, the cumulative 
error doctrine is inapplicable. Accordingly, Fortin's judgment of conviction for aggravated 
battery and use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime is affirmed. 
Chief Judge GRA TION and Judge LANSING, CONCUR. 
10 
000075
Date: 5/23/20,13 . 
Time: 12:54 PM 
Page 1 of 5 
F-Judicial District Court - Ada County • 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-FE-2009-0019383 Current Judge: Patrick H. Owen 
Defendant: Fortin, Cody James 
User: PRFISCKD 



























































New Case Filed - Felony 
Prosecutor assigned Ada County Prosecutor 
Warrant Issued - Arrest Bond amount: 
1000000.00 Defendant: Fortin, Cody J 
Case Sealed 
STATUS CHANGED: Inactive 
Warrant Returned Defendant: Fortin, Cody 
James 
Case Un-sealed 
STATUS CHANGED: Activate (previously 
inactive) 
Booked into Jail on: 
Hearing Scheduled (Video Arraignment 
10/15/2009 01 :30 PM) 
Judge 
Magistrate Court Clerk 
Magistrate Court Clerk 
Magistrate Court Clerk 
Magistrate Court Clerk 
Magistrate Court Clerk 
Magistrate Court Clerk 
Magistrate Court Clerk 
Magistrate Court Clerk 
Magistrate Court Clerk 
Theresa Gardunia 
Defendant: Fortin, Cody James Order Appointing Magistrate Court Clerk 
Public Defender Public defender Ada County 
Public Defender 
Hearing result for Video Arraignment held on Theresa Gardunia 
10/15/2009 01 :30 PM: Arraignment/ First 
Appearance 
Judge Change: Adminsitrative Theresa Gardunia 
Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 10/29/2009 Theresa Gardunia 
08:30AM) 
BOND SET: at 1000000.00 - (118-907 Theresa Gardunia 
Battery-Aggravated) 
No Contact Order: No contact order OR Civil Theresa Gardunia 
Protection Order Issued for- Comment: with 
James Chaylor, Kasey Smith, Jonathan Vida, 
Candice Waterd, James Bungard, Dawn Cliff, and 
Aaron Moore 
DR#09-927538 Expiration Days: 365 Expiration 
Date: 10/15/201 O 
Order Appointing Public Defender Theresa Gardunia 
Order Appointing Public Defender Theresa Gardunia 
Motion For Bond Reduction 
Notice Of Hearing 
Theresa Gardunia 
Theresa Gardunia 
Defendant's Request for Discovery Theresa Gardunia 
Amended Complaint Filed Theresa Gardunia 
Substitution Of Counsel Charles Crafts Theresa Gardunia 
Hearing result for Preliminary held on 10/29/2009 Theresa Gardunia 
08:30 AM: Continued 
CCEDWARM Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 11/23/2009 
08:30 AM) 
Theresa Gardunia 
CCEDWARM Order For Delivery of Medical Records John Hawley Jr. 
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11/23/2009 PHWV CCEDWARM Hearing result for Preliminary held on 11/23/2009 Richard Grant 
08:30 AM: Preliminary Hearing Waived (bound 
Over) 
HRSC CCEDWARM Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 12/04/2009 Richard Grant 
01:30 PM) 
COMT CCEDWARM Commitment Richard Grant 
11/24/2009 INFO TCBULCEM Information Patrick H. Owen 
11/25/2009 PROS PRBRIGCA Prosecutor assigned Christopher S. Atwood Patrick H. Owen 
12/4/2009 DCAR CCHUNTAM Hearing result for Arraignment held on Patrick H. Owen 
12/04/2009 01:30 PM: District Court 
Arraignment- Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich 
Number of Pages: Less than 100 pages 
HRSC CCHUNTAM Hearing Scheduled (Entry of Plea 12/18/2009 Patrick H. Owen 
01:30 PM) 
12/18/2009 DCHH CCHUNTAM Hearing result for Entry of Plea held on Patrick H. Owen 
12/18/2009 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
12/29/2009 HRSC CCHUNTAM Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/22/201 O 08:30 Patrick H. Owen 
AM) 
HRSC CCHUNTAM Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Patrick H. Owen 
02/05/2010 11 :00 AM) 
PLEA CCHUNTAM A Plea is entered for charge: - NG (118-907 Patrick H. Owen 
Battery-Aggravated) 
PLEA CCHUNTAM A Plea is entered for charge: - NG (119-2520 Patrick H. Owen 
Enhancement-Use of a Deadly Weapon in 
Commission of a Felony) 
1/29/2010 RQDS TCPETEJS State/City Request for Discovery Patrick H. Owen 
RSDS TCPETEJS State/City Response to Discovery Patrick H. Owen 
2/5/2010 CONT CCHUNTAM Continued (Jury Trial 05/17/2010 08:30 AM) Patrick H. Owen 
CONT CCHUNTAM Continued (Pretrial Conference 05/07/201 O Patrick H. Owen 
11:00 AM) 
4/16/2010 NOTC TCRAMISA Notice of Intent to Use IRE 404(b) Evidence Patrick H. Owen 
RSDS TCRAMISA State/City Response to Discovery/Addendum Patrick H. Owen 
5/7/2010 DCHH CCHUNTAM Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Patrick H. Owen 
05/07/201011:00AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
HRSC CCHUNTAM Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Patrick H. Owen 
05/14/2010 11 :00 AM) 
MISC TCRAMISA State's List of Potential Trial Witnesses Patrick H. Owen 
MISC TCRAMISA State's Amended List of Potential Trial Exhibits Patrick H. Owen 
5/14/2010 RSDS TCRAMISA State/City Response to Discovery/Supplemental Patrick H. Owen 
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5/14/2010 DCHH CCHUNTAM Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Patrick H. Owen 
05/14/2010 11:00AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
5/17/2010 DCHH CCNELSRF Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 05/17/2010 D. Duff McKee 
08:30AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 500 
HRSC CCNELSRF Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/18/201 O 09:00 D. Duff McKee 
AM) 2nd Day 
5/18/20~0 DCHH CCNELSRF Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 05/18/2010 D. Duff McKee 
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Vanessa Gosney 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 1000 pages ... 2nd Day 
5/19/2010 HRSC CCNELSRF Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/19/2010 09:00 D. Duff McKee 
AM) 3rd Day 
DCHH CCNELSRF Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 05/19/2010 D. Duff McKee 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Sue Wolf 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 2000 pages 3rd Day 
JUIN CCNELSRF Jury Instructions Filed D. Duff McKee 
PS101 CCNELSRF Pre-Sentence Investigation Evaluation Ordered D. Duff McKee 
VERD CCNELSRF Special Verdict Form (Guilty) D. Duff McKee 
FIGT CCNELSRF Finding of Guilty (118-907 Battery-Aggravated) D. Duff McKee 
HRSC CCNELSRF Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 07/02/2010 D. Duff McKee 
09:00 AM) 
FIGT CCHUNTAM Finding of Guilty (119-2520 Enhancement-Use of Patrick H. Owen 
a Deadly Weapon in Commission of a Felony) 
STAT CCHUNTAM STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action Patrick H. Owen 
6/4/2010 MOTN TCRAMISA Motion to Continue Sentencing Patrick H. Owen 
NOHG TCRAMISA Notice Of Hearing Patrick H. Owen 
HRSC TCRAMISA Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Patrick H. Owen 
06/11/2010 01 :30 PM) Continue Sentencing 
6/10/2010 STIP CCHUNTAM Stipulation to Continue Patrick H. Owen 
6/11/2010 CONT CCHUNTAM Continued (Hearing Scheduled 06/18/2010 Patrick H. Owen 
01 :30 PM) Continue Sentencing 
6/18/2010 CONT CCHUNTAM Continued (Sentencing 08/06/2010 09:00 AM) Patrick H. Owen 
DCHH CCHUNTAM Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Patrick H. Owen 
06/18/2010 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 199 pages 
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7/12/2010 MOTN TCRAMISA Motion for Transcripts and Action of Records 
8/5/2010 MOTN CCHUNTAM Motion to Transport Witness 
ORDR CCHUNTAM Order to Transport Witness from the Ada County 
Jail 
8/6/2010 DCHH CCHUNTAM Hearing result for Sentencing held on 08/06/201 O 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
JAIL CCHUNTAM Sentenced to Jail or Detention (118-907 
Battery-Aggravated) Confinement terms: 
Penitentiary determinate: 12 years. Penitentiary 
indeterminate: 13 years. 
SNPF CCHUNTAM Sentenced To Pay Fine 125.50 charge: 118-907 
Battery-Aggravated 
8/10/2010 JCOC DCLYKEMA Judgment of Conviction and Commitment 
9/17/2010 APSC TCRAMISA Appealed To The Supreme Court 
MOTN TCRAMISA Motion for Appt of State Appellate PD 
10/4/2010 ORDR CCHUNTAM Order for Appointment of State Appellate Public 
Defender 
12/7/2010 HRSC CCHUNTAM Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 
12/10/201 O 03:00 PM) restitution hearing 
12/10/2010 DCHH CCHUNTAM Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on 
12/10/2010 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
HRSC CCHUNTAM Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 
01/21/2011 03:00 PM) Restitution hearing 
1/6/2011 NOTC CCTHIEBJ (4) Notice Of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court 
Docket No. 38069 
1/21/2011 CONT CCHUNTAM Continued (Hearing Scheduled 02/04/2011 
03:00 PM) Restitution hearing 
2/4/2011 DCHH CCHUNTAM Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on 
02/04/2011 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
2/8/2011 RESR CCHUNTAM Restitution Recommended by the Prosecutor's 
office. 518.14 victim # 4 
RESR CCHUNTAM Restitution Recommended by the Prosecutor's 
office. 1742.70 victim# 5 
RESR CCHUNTAM Restitution Recommended by the Prosecutor's 
office. 24447.99 victim# 6 
RESR CCHUNTAM Restitution Recommended by the Prosecutor's 
office. 16398.84 victim# 7 
ORDR CCHUNTAM Order for Restitution and Judgment 
User: PRFISCKD 
Judge 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
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10/15/2009 NCRF PRNYEJED New Case Filed - Felony Magistrate Court Clerk 
PROS PRNYEJED Prosecutor assigned Ada County Prosecutor Magistrate Court Clerk 
HRSC TCMCCOSL Hearing Scheduled (Video Arraignment Theresa Gardunia 
10/15/2009 01 :30 PM) 
ARRN CCMANLHR Hearing result for Video Arraignment held on Theresa Gardunia 
10/15/2009 01 :30 PM: Arraignment/ First 
Appearance 
CHGA CCMANLHR Judge Change: Adminsitrative Theresa Gardunia 
HRSC CCMANLHR Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 10/29/2009 Theresa Gardunia 
08:30 AM) 
BSET CCMANLHR BOND SET: at 1000000.00 - (118-915 {F} Assault Theresa Gardunia 
or Battery Upon Certain Personnel) 
ORPD MADEFRJM Order Appointing Public Defender Theresa Gardunia 
[file stamped 10/16/2009] 
10/16/2009 MFBR TCBULCEM Motion For Bond Reduction Theresa Gardunia 
NOHG TCBULCEM Notice Of Hearing Theresa Gardunia 
RQDD TCBULCEM Defendant's Request for Discovery Theresa Gardunia 
NOPE TCWEGEKE Notification of Penalties for Escape Patrick H. Owen 
10/29/2009 SUBC CCEDWARM Substitution Of Counsel Charles Crafts Theresa Gardunia 
AMCO CCEDWARM Amended Complaint Filed Theresa Gardunia 
CONT CCEDWARM Hearing result for Preliminary held on 10/29/2009 Theresa Gardunia 
08:30 AM: Continued 
HRSC CCEDWARM Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 11/23/2009 Theresa Gardunia 
08:30 AM) 
11/23/2009 PHWV CCEDWARM Hearing result for Preliminary held on 11/23/2009 Richard Grant 
08:30 AM: Preliminary Hearing Waived (bound 
Over) 
HRSC CCEDWARM Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 12/04/2009 Richard Grant 
01:30 PM) 
AMCO CCEDWARM Amended Complaint Filed 2nd Richard Grant 
COMT CCEDWARM Commitment Richard Grant 
11/24/2009 INFO TCBULCEM Information Patrick H. Owen 
11/25/2009 PROS PRBRIGCA Prosecutor assigned Christopher S. Atwood Patrick H. Owen 
12/4/2009 DCHH CCHUNTAM Hearing result for Arraignment held on Patrick H. Owen 
12/04/2009 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
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12/18/2009 DCHH CCHUNTAM Hearing result for Entry of Plea held on 
12/18/2009 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
12/29/2009 HRSC CCHUNTAM Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/22/2010 08:30 
AM) 
HRSC CCHUNTAM Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 
02/05/2010 11 :00 AM) 
1/29/2010 RQDS TCPETEJS State/City Request for Discovery 
RSDS TCPETEJS State/City Response to Discovery 
2/5/2010 HRVC CCHUNTAM Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 02/22/2010 
08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
2/10/2010 SCHE TCWEGEKE Second Scheduling Order 
4/14/2010 PROS PRHEBELE Prosecutor assigned Gabriel Haws 
4/15/2010 RSDS TCBULCEM State/City Response to Discovery/Addendum 
4/19/2010 HRSC CCHUNTAM Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/17/2010 08:30 
AM) 
4/20/2010 MOTN TCRAMISA Motion for PT Ruling on the Admissibility of 
Evidence 
4/22/2010 RSDS TCRAMISA State/City Response to Discovery/Second 
Addendum 
4/29/2010 MISC TCPETEJS State's List of Potential Trial Exhibits 
MISC TCPETEJS State's List of Potential Trial Witnesses 
5/7/2010 DCHH CCHUNTAM Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on 
05/07/2010 11:00AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
HRSC CCHUNTAM Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 
05/14/2010 11 :00 AM) 
5/14/2010 DCHH CCHUNTAM Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on 
05/14/201011:00AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
5/17/2010 HRVC CCHUNTAM Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 05/17/201 O 
/ 08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
5/18/2010 RSDS TCRAMISA State/City Response to Discovery/Third 
Addendum 
5/21/2010 HRSC CCHUNTAM Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 
05/21/2010 11 :00 AM) 
DCHH CCHUNTAM Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on 
05/21/201011:00AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
User: PRFISCKD 
Judge 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
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Hearing Scheduled (Change of Plea 06/11/2010 Patrick H. Owen 
01:30 PM) 
CCHUNTAM Stipulation to Continue Patrick H. Owen 
CCHUNTAM Continued (Change of Plea 06/18/2010 01:30 Patrick H. Owen 
PM) 
CCHUNTAM Continued (Change of Plea 07/09/2010 01:30 Patrick H. Owen 
PM) 
CCHUNTAM Continued (Change of Plea 07/16/2010 01 :30 Patrick H. Owen 
PM) 











Prosecutor assigned Christopher S. Atwood Patrick H. Owen 
Hearing result for Change of Plea held on Patrick H. Owen 
07/16/2010 11:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: k redlich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated:50 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 08/30/2010 08:30 Patrick H. Owen 
AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 
08/20/2010 11 :00 AM) 
Prosecutor assigned Gabriel Haws 
Third Scheduling Order 
Order to Transport 
Continued (Pretrial Conference 08/27/2010 
11:00 AM) 
Order to Transport 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
Patrick H. Owen 
CCHUNTAM Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Patrick H. Owen 
08/27/201 O 11 :00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
CCNELSRF A Plea is entered for charge: - GT (118-915 {F} Patrick H. Owen 
Assault or Battery Upon Certain Personnel) 
CCNELSRF A Plea is entered for charge: - GT (149-1404 {F} Patrick H. Owen 




A Plea is entered for charge: - GT (119-2520 Patrick H. Owen 
Enhancement-Use of a Deadly Weapon in 
Commission of a Felony) 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 08/30/2010 Patrick H. Owen 
08:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
oHearing Scheduled (Sentencing 10/08/2010 Patrick H. Owen 
09:00 AM) 
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Date Code User Judge 
8/30/2010 GPA TCWEGEKE Guilty Plea Advisory Patrick H. Owen 
9/24/2010 ORDR DCJOHNSI Order to Transport Patrick H. Owen 
10/8/2010 DCHH CCHUNTAM Hearing result for Sentencing held on 10/08/2010 Patrick H. Owen 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
FIGT CCHUNTAM Finding of Guilty (118-915 {F} Assault or Battery Patrick H. Owen 
Upon Certain Personnel) 
JAIL CCHUNTAM Sentenced to Jail or Detention (118-915 {F} Patrick H. Owen 
Assault or Battery Upon Certain Personnel) 
Confinement terms: Penitentiary determinate: 5 
years. Penitentiary indeterminate: 15 years. 
FIGT CCHUNTAM Finding of Guilty (149-1404 {F} Officer-Flee or Patrick H. Owen 
Attempt to Elude a Police Officer) 
JAIL CCHUNTAM Sentenced to Jail or Detention (149-1404 {F} Patrick H. Owen 
Officer-Flee or Attempt to Elude a Police Officer) 
Confinement terms: Jail: 360 days. Credited 
time: 360 days. 
FIGT CCHUNTAM Finding of Guilty (119-2520 Enhancement-Use of Patrick H. Owen 
a Deadly Weapon in Commission of a Felony) 
STAT CCHUNTAM STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action Patrick H. Owen 
ORDR TCWEGEKE Order for DNA Sample and Thumbprint Patrick H. Owen 
Impression 
10/14/2010 STAT CCTOMPMA STATUS CHANGED (batch process) 
10/15/2010 JCOC DCTYLENI Judgment Of Conviction & Commitment Patrick H. Owen 
1/14/2011 MOTN TCFARANM Motion for Restitution Patrick H. Owen 
1/19/2011 NOHG TCBROXLV Notice Of Hearing Patrick H. Owen 
HRSC TCBROXLV Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Patrick H. Owen 
02/04/2011 11 :00 AM) Motion for Restitution 
1/21/2011 CONT CCHUNTAM Continued (Hearing Scheduled 02/04/2011 Patrick H. Owen 
03:00 PM) Motion for Restitution 
2/4/2011 DCHH CCHUNTAM Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Patrick H. Owen 
02/04/2011 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
2/8/2011 RESR CCHUNTAM Restitution Recommended by the Prosecutor's Patrick H. Owen 
office. 500.00 victim # 1 
RESR CCHUNTAM Restitution Recommended by the Prosecutor's ·Patrick H. Owen 
office. 3578.25 victim # 2 
RESR CCHUNTAM Restitution Recommended by the Prosecutor's Patrick H. Owen 
office. 1014.00 victim# 3 
ORDR CCHUNTAM Order for Restitution and Judgment Patrick H. Owen 
12/7/2012 APSC TCOLSOMC Appealed To The Supreme Court Patrick H. Owen 
NOTA TCOLSOMC NOTICE OF APPEAL Patrick H. Owen 
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Order re: Time for Filing of Appeal Patrick H. Owen 
Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender Patrick H. Owen 
on Direct Appeal 
Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court 
Docket No. 40602 
Patrick H. Owen 
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CODY J. FORTIN # 72953 
I.C.C. K Pod 211-A 
Post Office Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Petitioner pro se 
PAmct< H. OWEN 
OCT O 6 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By SAYTHAAA KHAM-ONE 
Ol!PUTV 
~ ·' "· IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY J. FORTIN, 
Petitioner, 
-vs-











"V PC l l 193l3,,;;;, 
Civil Case Nlf. --------
District Court No. CR-2009-0019475 
PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF 
______________ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
The County of ADA ) 
COMES NOW, CODY J. FORTIN, petitioner prose, in the above entitled cause; and, 
who, respectfully presents this application for post conviction relief, based upon the law and 
facts of the case, those grounds and causes more fully explained herein and after, as well as 
the petitioner's affidavit in support hereof; said affidavit being attached hereto, and by this 
reference, incorporated herein as though quoted in its respective entirety: 
I. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
A. This matter brings before the Court a collateral attack upon the applicant's entry of a 
plea(s) of guilty and subsequent sentencing; alleging, inter alia, that they are the wrongful 
resti.lt of ineffective assistance of counsel which, along with other issues, would have been 
available for argument on direct appeal had the petitioner's notice of appeal been timely filed. 
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B. Moreover, Notice is hereby provided to the Court and opposing parties, pursuant to 
I.C. '19-4903, that the applicant lacks both the complete record and legal expertise needed 
to properly prepare and present all the applicable issues or to attach the relevant portions of 
the case record. 
For these reasons alone, notice is being given that further amendment and discovery 
will no doubt be required. 
II. 
JURISDICTION 
A. Petitioner is currently incarcerated within the Idaho Department of Corrections 
(IDOC), and housed at the Idaho Correctional Center (ICC), South of Boise, pursuant to pleas 
of guilty on charges of Assault and Battery on Certain Personnel, enhanced for Use of Deadly 
Weapon, where he is serving sentences of five (5) years fixed, with fifteen (15) years 
indeterminate, consecutive to a term of twelve (12) years fixed with a thirteen (13) years 
indeterminate handed down in a companion case. Those pleas and sentences complained of 
herein were imposed by the Honorable Patrick H. Owen, in criminal case CR-2009-0019475, 
on October gth 2010, with a Judgment of Conviction and Commitment filed on October 15th 
2010, in the Fourth Judicial District Court, County of Ada, State of Idaho. 
B. This petition challenges the constitutionality of those same pleas and sentences, 
charging that there exists evidence of material facts and law, not previously presented nor 
heard, which have abrogated the rights of the applicant guaranteed under the applicable 
portions of the United States and Idaho State Constitutions, and thus require the withdrawal 
of the petitioner's pleas of guilty or, at the very least, resentencing. 
C. Accordingly, jurisdiction is proper in this matter pursuant to Idaho Code 19-4901 et 
seq., and Rule 57 of the Idaho Criminal Rules. Furthermore, venue in these proceedings is 
appropriately before this Court, since the crime( s) alleged occurred within Ada County. 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
A. On October 14th 2011 the petitioner entered and stopped his car in the driveway of 
his girlfriend's home, where upon his vehicle was blocked in and Fortin was accosted by 
Boise police officers and detectives, pursuant to an arrest warrant, for an incident allegedly 
occurring the previous day. 
Reports of the exact events that transpired before the petitioner was subsequently 
taken into custody vary depending upon the teller of the tale. For the moment it is sufficient 
to say that an information was eventually handed down charging Fortin with assault with a 
dangerous weapon (a knife) on the prior day, and, assault on a police officer, with a 
dangerous weapon (the vehicle) on October 14th 2011. 
B. At his video arraignment, bond and a date for the preliminary hearing were set, and, 
the office of the Ada County Public Def ender was appointed to represent the petitioner. 
Within days, appointed counsel approached Fortin with a deal offered by the 
prosecutor, the terms of which were as follows: In consideration for pleas of guilty to assault 
on the civilian and eluding a police officer, Fortin would be sentenced on those crimes to five 
(5) fixed, fifteen (15) indeterminate and zero (0) fixed, five (5) years indeterminate 
respectively; and, the state would drop both weapon enhancements and the assault on the 
police officer. 
C. Fortin's parents retained a private attorney on his behalf and matters changed: An 
amended complaint was filed, further amended and the charges and trials of October 13th and 
14th separated at the request of Fortin's new counsel and against his expressed wishes. 
While a series of motions and hearing were held on these matters, Fortin proceeded 
to trial in the separated charges and was found guilty by jury in what was now being 
designated as CR-FE-09-19383. A timely appeal was filed in that matter and is presently 
being pursued by conflict counsel, Greg Silvey, under Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 
38069-2010. 
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D. On October 30th 2010, the petitioner entered pleas, upon the advice of private 
counsel, to three (3) separate charges resulting in those convictions and sentences complained 
of herein and above, plus an eluding charge. 
E. Immediately following his sentencing Fortin spoke with his counsel, as did a member 
of the petitioner's family requesting that a direct appeal be filed, as well as a motion for 
reduction of sentence, pursuant to ICR Rule 35. Both the petitioner and the family member 
were assured that each of those filings would occur. 
Neither a Notice of Appeal, nor a motion for reduction of sentence were filed. Nor 
was any explanation for not doing so provided either the petitioner or his family. 
Here, ends the initial statement of the case and the course of the prior proceedings. 
IV. 
INITIAL CAUSES OF ACTION 
A. WHETHER nns AITORNEY'S FAILURE TO FILE A TIMELY AND REQUESTED 
APPEAL ABROGATES THE PETITIONER'S RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH, SIXTH AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AS WELL AS 
mosE SAME GUARANTEES UNDER THE APPLICABLE PORTIONS OF IDAHO'S STATE 
CONSTITUTION, CONSTITUTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL PER SE? 
1. Simply said: The fact that the petitioner asked for and was told that a timely direct 
appeal as well as a ICR Rule 35 motion for reduction would be filed by counsel, 1 who than 
failed to do so, creates a presumptive case of ineffective assistance of counsel under both 
state and federal law .. 
Unless the respondent can legitimately rebut this allegation, Fortin is entitled to a 
resentencing, nunc pro tune, thus retriggering the time frames to file his notice of appeal. 
B. DID THE PETITIONER'S AITORNEY'S FAILURE TO ADVISE ms CLffiNT THAT 
THE PLEAS BEING ENTERED ALLOWED FORTIN TO BE SUBJECTED TO CONSECUTIVE 
SENTENCES RESULT IN THE ACCEPTANCE OF PLEAS MADE UNKNOWINGLY, 
UNWILLINGLY AND/OR UNINTELLIGENTLY; THUS ENTITLING THE PETITIONER, 
UNDER THE PROTECTIONS OF THE STH, 6TH, AND 14TH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. 
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CONSTITUTION, AND THOSE SAME COMPARABLE RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE 
IDAHO STATE CONSTITUTION, TO WITHDRAW ms PLEA OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
TO HA VE ms SENTENCES RUN CONCURRENTLY ? 
Trial counsel failed to inform his client that the separation of the charges and his 
subsequent entries of pleas would subject him to a sentencing where any argument for 
concurrent terms under the doctrine of a common course of conduct and scheme would be 
strictly discretionary on the part of the court, and were not a part of any plea bargain. 
The foregoing conduct is unquestionably substandard performance on its face, as well 
as preponderately prejudicial. Further, the choice not to inform his client of this material 
fact was neither a strategic nor a tactical decision on the part of counsel. 
The result was that the petitioner pied guilty to a sentencing scheme which almost 
doubled the term he believed could be imposed and far exceeded the state's original offer to 
plead. 
1 See: Fortin's Affidavit in. Support of Post Conviction Relief, 1 7-8, included herewith 
and incorporated hereby, in this regard. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
A. The foregoing material facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant appointment 
of counsel, judicial notice of the entire underlying record, and an evidentiary hearing on the 
these and any additional issues brought to light following the court's appointed counsel or the 
petitioner being granted possession of the record. Specific relief is sought as follows: 
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the petitioner respectfully moves this Court to enter an Order 
providing the following: 
1. ACCEPTANCE OF JURISDICTION and VENUE in these proceedings, with normal 
advancement upon the Court's calendar: 
2. THAT JUDICIAL NOTICE is to be taken of the entire underlying record, pursuant to 
I.R.E. 201, in district court number CR-2009-0019475, and: 
3. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, pursuant to I.C. 19-4904 and 19-852; 
4. THAT DIRECTS the Clerk to serve the respondent a conformed copy of this filing, 
pursuant to I. C. 19-4902; thus REQUIRING the respondent to provide an Answer, as well as 
those relevant portions of the record within thirty (30) days of receipt thereof, pursuant to 
I.e. 19-4906(a). 
5. THAT, following the passing of an adequate amount of time for the parties to 
prepare, an evidentiary hearing occur; and, 
6. THAT, in the event, that the preponderance of evidence submitted should eventually 
demonstrate that the petitioner has suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel under the 
law and in view of the facts submitted, that petitioner's plea of guilty be withdrawn and/or 
the subsequent sentences be modified and/or set aside: and/or, 
7. THAT the petitioner be granted a resentencing, nunc pro tune, and allowed to file a 
notice of appeal on any and all of those issues legally available had his counsel done so as 
promised, with the balance of these proceedings stayed pending the outcome of that appeal: 
8. AND, for any additional relief the Court may deem necessary or proper under these 
INITIAL APPLICATION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 6 of 7. 
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circumstances. 





Petitioner pro se 
I, DO HEREBY CERTIFY and AFFIRM that I am the petitioner in the foregoing 
application for post conviction relief, and; that I have read the contents thereof in their 
entirety, and, that the facts contained therein are true and correct to the best of my 
knowledge and belief in all regards. 
DATED this 4th day of OCTOBER 2011. 
CODYe/l;;TIN 
Petitioner-Affiant pro se 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me, a Notary Public, this 4th day of OCTOBER 2011. 
*** SEAL *** 
KATHY K. RADFORD 
N01)\RY PUBLIC 
STATE Of' IDAHO 
Commission Expires: 9 //~ Jtl,dfl 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorney for Petitioner 
MICHAEL W. LOJEK, ISB #5611 
Deputy Public Defender 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
e 
DEC D '7 20ti 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY J. FORTIN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-PC-2011-0019323 
AMENDED PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
COMES NOW the petitioner, CODY J. FORTIN, by and through his attorney ofrecord, 
MICHAEL W. LOJEK, Ada County Public Defender's Office, and brings before this Court, 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-4901, the following Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
THE PETITIONER ALLEGES 
1) The petitioner is currently housed at the Idaho Correctional Center in Ada 
County, Idaho. 
2) A judgment of conviction was entered against the petitioner after a conviction in 
Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2009-0019475 on or about October 15, 2010, for: 
COUNT I: ASSAULT AND BATTERY ON CERTAIN PERSONNEL, FELONY, 
Idaho Code§ 18-915; 
' COUNT II: FLEEING OR ATTEMPTING TO ELUDE A PEACE OFFICER, 
FELONY, Idaho Code § 49-1404; . 
COUNT III: USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON IN THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME, 
FELONY, Idaho Code§ 19-2520. 
3) The petitioner was represented by attorney Charles C. Crafts. 
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIBF 1 
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4) The petitioner was sentenced on October 8, 2010, to a twenty-year term in the 
custody of the State Board of Correction, with a minimum period of confinement of five (5) 
years for COUNTS I and III, and to three hundred sixty (360) days in the Ada County Jail with 
credit for three hundred sixty (360) days served for COUNT IL This sentence was ordered to run 
consecutively to a twenty-five (25) year sentence, with twelve (12) years fixed, which was 
imposed on August 10, 2010, in connection with Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2009-0019383. 
PROCEEDINGS 
5) The petitioner timely filed a pro se Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction 
Relief on October 6, 2011. 
6) The Court appointed the Ada County Public Defender's Office on October 17, 
2011. 
7) The petitioner, through appointed counsel, hereby supplements his Verified 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with this Amended Petition as contained herein. 
8) In support of his Verified Petition and Amended Petition, the petitioner hereby 
submits the attached email correspondence between defense counsel and the petitioner's mother, 
dated April 24-25, 2011. 
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 
9) That, pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4901(a)(l), the petitioner was denied effective 
assistance of counsel required by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article I, section 13, of the Idaho Constitution, alleging the following: 
a) Defense counsel failed to file a Notice of Appeal within forty-two ( 42) 
days of the Court's order imposing sentence, as requested by the 
defendant. 
b) Defense counsel failed to file a Motion for Reduction/Reconsideration of 
Sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 within one hundred twenty 
(120) days of the Court's order imposing sentence, as requested by the 
defendant. 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
10) The petitioner requests the Court for an order vacating the judgment of conviction 
and re-entering the judgment so as to allow the petitioner time to perfect a timely appeal, or; 
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11) The petitioner requests the Court for an order nunc pro tune extending the 
deadlines by which an appeal and Rule 35 Motion may be filed. 
r-]~9 
DATED, this _f:::_ day ofOecember 2011. l"'-/idi 
MICHAEL W. LOJEK 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF VERIFICATION 
I, CODY J. FORTIN, the petitioner named in the above-entitled action, first being duly 
sworn upon my oath, depose and say that I have read the foregoing amended petition and the 
documents, affidavits, and exhibits attached to this amended petition are hereby sworn to be true 
and correct to the best of my information, knowledge, and belief. 
DATED, this _k_ day of December 2011. 




County of A~ ) 
I, ~ ~~ , a notary public, do hereby certify that on this L:,~ day of 
b3:£M~ 20_i_l_, personally appeared before me CODY J. FORTIN who, being by 
me first duly sworn, declared that he is the petitioner named in the above-entitled action, that he 
signed the fore,ggiJv;~: document as the petitioner in the above-entitled action, and that the 
~· i ·~, 
f" •"" •• --,.,...._v •• 'I,. •• ,..,_~ 
~,q· 0 ........ 
statemen~s'~~,~C.P.~t~d are true. ~ · 
: ...... "' .~, :o: I"-.~ I Z \O: 
: > : .... • 0 : ~ : ___a,....:::,OQll,""tt",.....==------------
\ i;g \ n I 4."Y i ~ § Notary Pu h~· ~ 
\ ·.... ~ ~ .. ·~""- i Residing at ~ ~ 
-... ill..._ •• '\_ " .... -Ii: ....... ..a o- ...... My Commission Expires ~ 
...... ,,, ~3:Y{'\ ,........ -"-+-" ....... --"-'------,,,,. ...... ,,, . 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this..]__ day of December 2011, I mailed (served) a 
true and correct copy of the within instrument to: 
CHRISTOPHER S. ATWOOD 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
Interdepartmental Mail 
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From: ann fortin (fortinanny@gmail.com) 
Sent: Fri 11/11/11 2:20 PM 
To: LouAnn Cooper (louanncooper@hotmail.com) 
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Charles Crafts <idaholitigator@gmail.com> 
Date: Mon, Apr 25, 2011 at 1:45 PM 
Subject Re: 
To: ann fortin <fortinanny@gmail.com> 
Ann, 
• 
There may have been some miscommunication between Cody and I. We did file the appeal on the most 
significant case. The one where he received 12 years. On the second case - where he received 5 years, 
nothing was filed because he pied guilty and I did not believe there were any genuine issues on that 
case. Also, we discussed the fact that on the 12 year case he has a very good chance of having his case 
overturned. So, if that happens, I was hoping to re-negotiate both cases again with the prosecutor and 
try to have him out in five, which is the amount he has to serve on the second case. I thought I made 
this clear to Cody, and I can assure you I do not believe an appeal or a Rule 35 on the second case would 
get much traction. So, strategically, I felt like we were making the best decision. 
On Apr 24, 20114:42 AM, "ann fortinif <fortinanny@gmail.com> wrote: 
> Charles, 
> 
> I received a letter from Cody today and was informed that the rule 35 and 
> appeal paperwork were never filed. I am at a loss for words. So that means 
> that the harsh sentence stands? I really thought that was you last part of 
> the job that you would have to do. I emailed you quite sometime ago and 
> never got a reply, but assumed you were busy with other cases so didn't give 






GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jonathan M. Medema 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
ISB No.: 5623 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
~o·---mn-4--~ 
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MAY 2 4 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By STEPHANIE VIDAK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY JAMES FORTIN 
Petitioner, 
vs. 











CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-08285 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Jonathan M. Medema, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County, and does hereby move for summary disposition of Cody 
James Fortin's petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(c) on the 
general basis that, in light of the pleadings, answers, admissions, and the record of the underlying 
criminal case, the petition fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact. 
The specific grounds for dismissal of each of Mr. Fortin's allegations are as set forth in 
the Brief in Support of the State's Motion for Summary Disposition. The Brief in Support is 
incorporated herein. 
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DATED this ~Jtfay of May 2013. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23 day of May 2013, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION to be placed in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Cody J. Fortin, Inmate #72953 
I.C.C. K Pod 216-B 
PO Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jonathan M. Medema 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
ISB No.: 5623 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
• NO·----,,~~-A.M _____ :_~,~.:2 ~ Ttc 
MAY 2 4 2013 
CHRISTOPHeA 0. RICH Cl 
By STEPHANIE VIDAK erk 
DEPUTY ' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY JAMES FORTIN 
Petitioner, 
vs. 











CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-08285 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Jonathan M. Medema, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney, and does hereby provide this brief in support of the state's motion for 
summary disposition of Cody James Fortin's petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 19-4906(c). 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On October 13, 2009 Mr. Fortin was at a home in Ada County. While at the home, Mr. 
Fortin stabbed James Shayler in the neck and shoulder area with a knife. Mr. Fortin also slashed 
Mr. Shayler's face with the knife. The wounds to Mr. Shayler's torso were life threatening. (Trns. 
8-6-10 SH, p. 50, lns 7-8). The next morning, October 14, 2009, the State of Idaho charged Mr. 
Fortin by complaint with committing the crimes of Aggravated Battery and alleged the sentence 
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enhancement that Mr. Fortin had used a deadly weapon in the commission of that aggravated 
battery. The court assigned that case the moniker CR-FE-2009-0019383 and issued a warrant for 
Mr. Fortin' s arrest. 
Later in the day of October 14, 2009, police located Mr. Fortin. Mr. Fortin fled from 
police in a vehicle and on foot. Mr. Fortin was eventually apprehended. 
On October 15, 2009, the State filed a separate complaint charging Mr. Fortin with the 
crimes of Aggravated Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer, Eluding a Peace Officer, and 
Leaving the Scene of an Accident Involving Property Damage. The State also alleged that Mr. 
Fortin had used a deadly weapon in his commission of the Aggravated Battery on the Law 
Enforcement Officer. The court assigned this case the number CR-FE-2009-0019475. 
Mr. Fortin appeared before a magistrate in both cases on October 15, 2009 for his initial 
appearance pursuant to I.C.R. 5. The magistrate scheduled the preliminary hearing in both cases 
for October 29, 20091 and appointed counsel to represent Mr. Fortin in both cases. 
On October 29, 2009, private counsel substituted as counsel of record in both cases and 
requested that the preliminary hearing in both cases be continued. The court reset the preliminary 
hearing in both cases for November 23, 2009. The State filed an amended complaint in the 19383 
case changing the language, but not the nature, of the aggravated battery charge involving Mr. 
Shayler. 
On November 23, 2009 Mr. Fortin waived his preliminary hearing in each case. In 
exchange for the waiver, the State made the following plea offers to Mr. Fortin. In the 19383 
case, the State would require Mr. Fortin to plead guilty to both the Aggravated Battery and the 
sentence enhancement. The State would limit its recommendation to a unified sentence of fifteen 
years consisting of five determinate and ten indeterminate. The State extended a separate plea 
bargain in the 19475 case. That offer required Mr. Fortin to plead guilty to the Eluding a Police 
Officer charge. The State would dismiss the remaining charges. The State agreed to recommend a 
I This appears to have been done for convenience or simply because I 0-29 was the next day available for 
preliminary hearings. There was no motion to consolidate the charging documents for trial pursuant to I.C.R 13. 
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sentence on the Eluding charge of five years consisting of two years determinate and three years 
indeterminate. The State would recommend the sentence in the 19475 case run consecutively to 
the 19383 case. 
Both cases were assigned to the same District Court and the State filed Informations 
charging Mr. Fortin with crimes and enhancements identical to those in the complaints. 
Mr. Fortin appeared before the District Court in both cases for arraignment on December 
4, 2009 and again for entry of plea on December 18, 2009. At the entry of plea hearing, Mr. 
Fortin stood silent in each case and the District Court entered pleas of not guilty in each case. 
The District Court set each case for trial to begin February 24, 2010. It appears the Court 
intended to start the trial in one case immediately upon the conclusion of the other. The cases 
were never consolidated for a simultaneous trial pursuant to I.C.R. 13. 
After a continuance, Mr. Fortin proceeded to trial in the 19383 case in May of 2010. The 
jury found Mr. Fortin guilty of the Aggravated Battery as well as the sentence enhancement. The 
19475 case was reset for trial on August 30, 2010. 
On August 6, 2010, the Court sentenced Mr. Fortin in the 19383 case. The Court imposed 
a unified enhanced sentence on the Aggravated Battery of twenty-five years with twelve years 
fixed. 
On August 30, 2010, the date of trial in the 19475 case, Mr. Fortin pleaded guilty to 
Aggravated Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer, Eluding a Police Officer and the sentence 
enhancement of Using a Deadly Weapon in the Commission of the Aggravated Battery. The 
State dismissed the charge regarding leaving the scene of a vehicle collision. There was no 
further plea agreement. 
On October 8, 2010, the Court sentenced Mr. Fortin in the 19475 case. The Court 
imposed an enhanced sentence of fifteen years with five years determinate on the Aggravated 
Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer charge. The Court ordered that this sentence run 
consecutively to the sentence in the 19383 case that was earlier imposed. The Court imposed and 
commuted a sentence on the Eluding crime. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION - 3 
000102
• • 
Mr. Fortin timely appealed from the conviction in the CR-FE-2009-0019383 case. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion - Docket No. 38069 (Ct. 
App. April 30, 2012). Mr. Fortin's petition for review was denied and the remittitur issued May 
22, 2012. 
Mr. Fortin did not appeal from the CR-FE-2009-0019475 conviction and sentence. 
However, in October of 2011, Mr. Fortin filed an application seeking post conviction relief from 
the judgment and sentence in the 19475 case. The Court assigned that case the number CV-PC-
2011-19323. Mr. Fortin's pro se petition alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective in three 
ways: failing to file a motion for sentence reduction pursuant to I.C.R. 35, failing to file a timely 
notice of appeal, and that trial counsel failed to inform his client that the separation of the 
charges and his subsequent entry of pleas would subject him to a sentencing where any argument 
for concurrent terms under the doctrine of a common course of conduct and scheme would be 
strictly discretionary on the part of the court. The Court appointed counsel to assist Mr. Fortin 
and with counsel's assistance, Mr. Fortin filed an amended application for post conviction relief. 
In his amended petition, Mr. Fortin abandoned the claim regarding advice about separation of the 
charges and alleged only the failure to file a motion for sentence reduction and failure to file a 
timely notice of appeal. 
The parties eventually stipulated that the Court grant Mr. Fortin limited post conviction 
relief by essentially "restarting" the time period under which Mr. Fortin could appeal his 
conviction in the 19475 case. The Court dismissed Mr. Fortin's other claim. Mr. Fortin has 
subsequently filed a notice of appeal in the 194 7 5 case which appeal is currently pending. 
On May 7, 2013, Mr. Fortin filed a prose application seeking post conviction relief from 
the conviction and sentence imposed in CR-FE-2009-0019383. Mr. Fortin has not filed a motion 
requesting appointment of counsel. Mr. Fortin's claims all involve ineffective assistance of his 
trial counsel. The State will address each claim individually below. Mr. Fortin has failed to 
support any of his claims with sufficient admissible evidence to warrant a trial. 




Mr. Fortin's first claim is that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because 
"at the time of trial counsel's paid retention a plea bargain was on the table which would have 
resulted in a maximum term of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years on two felony convictions with 
concurrently imposed sentences in consideration for pleas of guilty. Counsel's advice to separate 
the charges and proceed to trial on each, instead, was clearly a matter of substandard 
performance." The State reads Mr. Fortin's claim to allege his trial counsel was deficient in two 
respects - advising Mr. Fortin to reject the plea bargain Mr. Fortin alleges was 'on the table' and 
somehow causing separate trials in the 193 83 and 194 7 5 cases. 
The State will first address Mr. Fortin's claim that his counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective for advising Mr. Fortin to have his fair trial. 
An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure 
Act (UPCPA) is civil in nature. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865,869,801, P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990). 
Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant for post-conviction relief must prove by a 
preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the application for post-conviction relief 
is based. Grube v. State, 135 Idaho 24, 995 P.2d 794 (2000). Unlike the complaint in an ordinary 
civil action, however, an application for post-conviction relief must contain more than "a short 
and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). 
Rather, an application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the 
personal knowledge of the applicant. LC. §19-4903. The application must include affidavits, 
records, or other evidence supporting its allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence 
is not included. Id. 
The post-conviction petitioner must make factual allegations establishing each essential 
element of the claim, and a showing of admissible evidence must support those factual 
allegations. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994); Drapeau v. 
State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 651 (Ct. App. 1982); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 
824, 702 P .2d 860, 862 (Ct. App. 1985). The district court may take judicial notice of the record 
of the underlying criminal case. Hays v. State, 113 Idaho 736, 739, 745 P.2d 758, 761 (Ct. App. 
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1987), aff'd 115 Idaho 315, 766 P.2d 785 (1988), overruled on other grounds State v. Guzman, 
122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992). 
A court is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but need not 
accept the petitioner's conclusions. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001). 
When the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the applicant to relief, the trial court may 
dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary hearing. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 
869, 801, P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990), citing Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 
1190 (1975). Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief 
when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify 
relief as a matter of law. Id. 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must demonstrate 
both that (a) his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
(b) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings 
would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); LaBelle v. 
State, 130 Idaho 115, 118, 937 P.2d 427, 430 (Ct. App. 1997). "Because of the distorting effects 
of hindsight in reconstructing the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, there is a strong 
presumption that counsel's performance was within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance -- that is, 'sound trial strategy."' Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 
1248 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 
760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). A petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that counsel 
"rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable 
professional judgment" to establish that counsel's performance was "outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance." Claibourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir.1995) 
(quoting, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 
Until about one year ago, a petitioner who had a fair trial and was sentenced in 
accordance with the law would not be heard to complain about his regret for having rejected a 
plea bargain, even if he alleged that decision was based on counsel's advice. Then, the United 
States Supreme Court decided Missouri v. Frye,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d. 379 
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(2012) and Lafler v. Cooper,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012). In Frye, the 
Supreme Court decided that the constitutional right to a fair trial includes a right to effective 
assistance of counsel during plea bargains. In Lafler, the Supreme Court dictated that in order to 
establish prejudice when a petitioner alleges counsel was ineffective for advising a petitioner to 
assert his right to trial, "a defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there 
is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the 
defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light 
of intervening circumstances), that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the 
conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer's terms would have been less severe than under 
the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed." Lafler, 132 S.Ct. at 1385. 
Neither Em nor Lafler contain much guidance about exactly what constitutes ineffective 
assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining process. In f:m, counsel failed to communicate 
a plea bargain to Frye and Frye later pleaded guilty without a plea agreement2• f:m, 132 S.Ct. at 
1404. In Lafler, Missouri conceded ineffective assistance of counsel. The opinion contains no 
details about what Lafler' s attorney did or did not do. 
A petitioner seeking post conviction relief has the burden of alleging facts in his petition 
that would establish the elements of his claim and to support those allegations with admissible 
evidence. LC. § 19-4903. In his petition, Mr. Fortin says only that his counsel advised him to 
proceed to trial. Mr. Fortin fails to say what his counsel told him about why counsel felt Mr. 
Fortin should refuse to waive his constitutional right to a trial. Mr. Fortin seems to take the 
position that the mere fact that counsel advised him to go to trial and he lost at trial is per se 
ineffective assistance. The United States Supreme Court has yet to go that far. If this Court 
accepts Mr. Fortin's position, every criminal defendant would simply go to trial and see if they 
win confident in the knowledge that they could always come back and take advantage of any plea 
bargain through the post conviction process if they lose at trial. Mr. Fortin has failed to allege any 
2 Although the prosecutor at sentencing recommended a sentence identical to one alternative set forth in the 
plea agreement. 
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facts to support his conclusion that his lawyer's advice to demand that which the constitution 
guarantees - a full and fair trial-was in any way objectively unreasonable. 
Similarly, Mr. Fortin's petition has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish prejudice 
from his decision to go to trial under the test articulated in Lafler. Mr. Fortin has to show that, 
absent his counsel's advice, the plea agreement 1) would have been presented to the court, 2) the 
court would have accepted its terms,3 and 3) that the conviction or sentence under the plea 
agreement would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence. in fact imposed. 
Mr. Fortin alleges that he rejected a plea agreement by the prosecutor where "Mr. Fortin 
would be sentenced on those crimes to five (5) fixed, fifteen (15) indeterminate and zero (0) 
fixed, five (5) years indeterminate" (Pet. p. 3) on the charge of Aggravated Battery in the 19383 
case and Eluding a Police Officer in the 19475 case·. Mr. Fortin later alleges that the plea bargain 
"would have resulted in maximum term of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years on two felony 
convictions with concurrently imposed sentences." (Pet. p. 4). While Mr. Fortin claims that this 
was the plea agreement, Mr. Fortin has offered no evidence that the Court would have followed 
such agreement and imposed the recommended sentences. Mr. Fortin has not alleged that the 
plea agreement was contemplated to be binding on the Court pursuant to I.C.R. 1 l(t)(l)(C). Even 
if it were, Mr. Fortin has presented no evidence that the court would have accepted such 
agreement. Similarly, Mr. Fortin has presented no evidence that the Court would have followed 
the recommendation of the State had Mr. Fortin accepted the plea agreement as he alleges it 
existed. Mr. Fortin has also failed to present any evidence that, had he chosen to plead guilty, the 
Court would have accepted his guilty plea. Mr. Fortin took the position in the trial court that he 
did not use a knife against Mr. Shayler. Mr. Fortin has failed to submit admissible evidence with 
his petition that would establish either ineffective assistance of counsel or resulting prejudice. 
This Court should dismiss this claim. 
3 In states like Idaho, where the majority of plea agreements are not binding on the court, it is hard to know 
what the Supreme Court means when it says that the trial court would have accepted the terms of the agreement. It 
clearly means something other than that the court would have imposed the sentence recommended in the plea bargain 
because that is the third prong of the Lafler test for prejudice. · 
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Mr. Fortin alleges that his counsel was ineffective for "separating the cases for trial". Mr. 
Fortin's claim is disproved by the record below. The trials in cases CR-FE:-2009-0019383 and 
CR-FE-2009-0019475, while set for trial to begin the same day, where never consolidated for 
trial pursuant to I.C.R. 13. The trials were separate because they were separate crimes resulting 
out of separate incidents. Mr. Fortin's attorney did not cause the cases to be tried separately as he 
alleges. Therefore, the Court must dismiss this claim. Further, Mr. Fortin's only allegation of 
prejudice is that he lost the opportunity to argue for concurrent sentences. This claim is disproven 
by the law and the record below. A sentencing court has broad discretion to make a sentence for 
one crime consecutive to crimes the defendant is already serving. State v. Lawrence, 98 Idaho 
399 (1977). Additionally, Mr. Fortin can assert no prejudice in this case from this alleged error. 
Mr. Fortin seeks post conviction relief only from the conviction and sentence in the CR-FE-
2009-0019383 case. The Court imposed sentence in this case before Mr. Fortin was ever 
convicted of the crimes in the CR-FE-2009-0019475 case. The Court's decision to run the 
sentences in the 19475 case consecutively to the sentences it imposed months earlier in the 19383 
case are what Mr. Fortin appears to complain about. However, he is not seeking relief from the 
194 7 5 convictions in this petition4• The Court must dismiss this claim. 
Mr. Fortin next alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion in 
limine regarding Mr. Fortin's alleged gang affiliation, or in the alternative to move for an 
immediate mistrial, "resulted in the jury hearing the petitioner was a gang member." (Pet. p. 5). 
Mr. Fortin refers to a comment by Mr. Shayler during cross-examination. The relevant testimony 
is as follows: 
Q. Now, at some point, I assume - did you ever get a clear look at 
this knife? It seems you like - you just say it was a shiny object. 
A. Not a clear look, but I believe getting cut across the face and 
stabbed in the neck and seeing a shine, you know it's a knife. 
Q. So it's just your opinion that this was a knife? 
A. I knew it was a knife. I couldn't determine which kind. 
4 Any attempt to do so would be barred by the statute of limitations and by operation of J.C. § 19-4908 as 
Mr. Fortin has already sought post conviction relief from the 19475 case. 
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Q. How do you know it was a knife? 
A. Because it punctured me in the neck and cut me across the face, 
and I know most gang members carry those. (Trial Tms. 5-17-09 
at 30). ' 
Counsel for Mr. Fortin objected and the Court instructed the jury to disregard the 
statement regarding the gang member. (Trial tms. 5-17-09 at 31). Mr. Fortin claims counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a motion in limine, presumably to prevent the State from introducing 
evidence of Mr. Fortin's alleged gang membership. However, Mr. Fortin has failed to show how 
the filing of a motion in limine would have prevented what occurred. The witness' answer came 
on cross-examination5• It was not introduced by the State. It was volunteered by the witness, even 
though the State apparently advised its witnesses, including Mr. Shaylor, not to mention any 
allegations of Mr. Fortin's gang membership. (Trial Tms. 5-17-09 at 45). Mr. Fortin fails to 
establish how the filing of a motion in limine would have prevented the witness from making this 
two-word blurb. Mr. Fortin has failed to show why his counsel should have anticipated this two-
word blurb by the witness and, therefore, filed a motion to prevent it. Mr. Fortin has failed to 
establish ineffective assistance or any resulting prejudice. The Court must dismiss this claim. 
Mr. Fortin also alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move for an 
immediate mistrial after the witness' statement about gang membership. This claim is disproved 
by the record. Counsel for Mr. Fortin immediately objected. Counsel also told the Court he 
wanted to make a motion outside the presence of the jury. (Trial Tms. 5-17-09 at 31 ). The Court 
told counsel it would take up his motion later on. At the end of Mr. Shayler's testimony, Mr. 
Fortin's counsel did in fact move for a mistrial which was denied by the trial court. (Trial Tms. 
5-17-09 at 41-48). Mr. Fortin's claim is disproved by the record below and must be dismissed. 
Mr. Fortin alleges his attorney failed to conduct a pre-trial interview and to subpoena 
defense witness Casey Smith which resulted in the trial judge's refusal to allow counsel to recall 
5 Mr. Fortin has not alleged any error by his attorney for asking the question that elicited the witness' 
answer. 
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that witness. However, Casey Smith testified at trial and was subject to questioning by counsel 
for Mr. Fortin. There is nothing in the record to establish that counsel for Mr. Fortin attempted to 
recall Ms. Smith and the Court refused because Ms. Smith was not under subpoena. Mr. Fortin 
fails to allege exactly what his counsel should have discovered in a pre-trial interview and asked 
Ms. Smith at trial. Mr. Fortin claims counsel could have impeached her with her statements to 
police, but counsel did so. (See Trial Trns. 5-17-09 at 71-74). Mr. Fortin's claims are conclusory 
and disproven by the record below. Mr. Fortin has failed to allege any facts to establish either 
deficient performance or resulting prejudice. The Court must dismiss this claim. 
Mr. Fortin alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
admission of evidence of Mr. Fortin's flight from police during trial on the basis of relevance. 
Evidence of flight can be relevant to show consciousness of guilt. See State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 
814, 819-20, 965 P.2d 174, 179-80 (1998); State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818, 821-11 
(Ct.App.2009); State v. Friedley, 122 Idhao 321 (Ct.App.1992). The inference of consciousness 
of guilt may be weakened when the defendant harbors an ulterior motive to flee. Rossignol, 14 7 
Idaho at 821. However, existence of alternative reasons for the escape goes to the weight of the 
evidence and not to its admissibility. Rossignol, at 822. The trial court explicitly determined that 
evidence of Mr. Fortin's flight from police was relevant, but limited the details the State could 
introduce. (See Trial Trns. at 220-229). Mr. Fortin has not shown any evidence of an alternative 
motive other than that argued by his counsel at trial. (Trial Trns. at 214-215). Mr. Fortin has not 
shown any reason to believe the Court's ruling would have been different had counsel 
specifically objected on the basis of relevance. Counsel did lodge a general objection. (Trial 
Trns. at 229). The Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by failing to balance the unfair prejudice of the flight evidence against its probative 
value. State v. Mr. Fortin, Docket No. 38069 (Ct. App. 4-30-12). Mr. Fortin has failed to 
establish deficient performance or resulting prejudice. The Court must dismiss this claim. 
Mr. Fortin alleges that his trial counsel should have objected to the wording of the verdict 
form. Mr. Fortin alleges the verdict form "destroyed his presumption of innocence by listing 
seven possibilities of guilt before the entitled first consideration of not guilty." (Pet. p. 6). Mr. 
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Fortin's complaint is without merit. The jury verdict form was in a format approved by the Idaho 
Supreme Court. It required the jury to decide whether Mr. Fortin was guilty or not guilty of 
Aggravated Battery. It then required the jury to consider the weapon enhancement if it convicted 
Mr. Fortin of Aggravated Battery and to consider lesser offenses if the jury acquitted Mr. Fortin 
of Aggravated Battery. Mr. Fortin cites to no authority that this was improper. Mr. Fortin fails to 
state any legal basis upon which his attorney should have objected. Mr. Fortin has failed to 
establish his counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable. Mr. Fortin has also failed to 
establish any prejudice as a result of the error he alleges. The jury convicted Mr. Fortin of the 
first offense that it was required to consider under the verdict form. Mr. Fortin fails to say how 
the inclusion of the other crimes and offenses on the verdict form prejudiced Mr. Fortin in any 
way. The Court must dismiss this claim. 
Mr. Fortin next alleges that his attorney failed to file a motion to reduce sentence 
pursuant to I.C.R. 35. Mr. Fortin fails to set forth any facts to show how Mr. Fortin was 
prejudiced by this failure. Mr. Fortin has presented no evidence about any change in 
circumstances between his sentencing and the expiration of the timeframe for the filing of the 
Rule 35 motion. Mr. Fortin has shown no evidence of why the Court would have chosen to grant 
him mercy had his attorney filed the motion as requested. Mr. Fortin has failed to establish any 
prejudice and the Court must dismiss this claim. 
Lastly, Mr. Fortin alleges that his appellate attorney was ineffective for two reasons. First, 
Mr. Fortin claims his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing "to federalize any issues raised 
on direct appeal." (Pet. p. 6). The State has no idea what Mr. Fortin intends to allege. Mr. Fortin 
has failed to cite to any specific action he alleges his appellate counsel failed to take, any specific 
legal authority regarding why such action is necessary, or any prejudice as a result of such alleged 
inaction on the part of his appellate counsel. Mr. Fortin's claim, whatever it is, is conclusory. The 
Court must dismiss this claim. Second, Mr. Fortin alleges his appellate counsel failed to object to 
a record that contains an erroneous transcript of the hearing to determine a restitution amount. It 
is clear that the transcript of the February 4, 2010 hearing transposes the name of the prosecutor 
with the name of Mr. Fortin's counsel in the labeling of the speaker. Mr. Fortin has made no 
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claim of prejudice as a result of this error by the transcriptionist. The transcript remains clear 
who is speaking when and Mr. Fortin raised no issues regarding restitution on appeal. Mr. Fortin 
has failed to show any prejudice from his appellate counsel's alleged failure to object to the 
transcript. The Court must dismiss Mr. Fortin's claims regarding his appellate counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Fortin's ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. The State is therefore 
entitled to summary disposition pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906( c ). 
The State requests that this Court grant the State's Motion for Summary Disposition. 
DATED this ~y of May 2013. 
GREG H. BOWER 
ey 
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Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO: Cody James Fortin, Pro Se Petitioner: Please take notice that on the 18th day of 
June 2013 at the hour of 3:30 p.m. of said day, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Jonathan M. Medema, will move this Honorable Court regarding 
the State's Motion for Summary Disposition in the above-entitled action. 
DATED this .£day of May 2013. 
GREG H. BOWER 
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Civil Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285 
District Court No. CR-2009-0019383 
MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF 
TIME TO RESPOND TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND TO VACATE THE 
JUNE 1sm 2013 HEARING ON THE 
SAME STATE'S MOTION 
COMES NOW, CODY J. FORTIN, petitioner prose, in the above encaptioned cause of 
action; and, who, respectfully moves this Honorable Court, pursuant to Rule 6(b) and Rule 
56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, for a forty-five (45) day enlargement of time in 
which to file a response and objection to the respondent's May 23rd 2013 motion for 
summary disposition and to vacate the forthcoming June 18, 2013 hearing; thereby causing 
said response to be filed on or before July 25th 2013. 
Petitioner's motion is predicated upon the Rules, the record to date, the included 
affidavit and memorandum of points and authorities in support hereof; and, by this reference 
incorporated herein as though quoted in their respective entireties 
DATED this 4th day of JUNE 2013. 
Respectfully submitted by: 
C Y J. FORTIN 
etitioner-Movant prose 
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CODY J. FORTIN# 72953 
I.C.C. K Pod 216-B 
Post Office Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Petitioner pro se 
NO.--,t)~~::;r.:-;~----
A.M ::i _:::::=ii1k ___ _ 
JUNO 6 2013 
CHfUS10PHEFI D. RICH, Cterk 
ly "IC N!!LSON 
l!ll!PlnY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY J. FORTIN, 
Petitioner, 
-vs-










) _______________ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
The County of ADA ) 
Civil Case No. CV-PC-1308285 
District Court No. CR-2009-0019383 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF A 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF 
TIME TO RESPOND TO MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION & 
TO VACATE THE HEARING 
CODY J. FORTIN, after first being duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says: 
1. AFFIANT is the petitioner pro se in the above encaptioned matter, and brings this 
motion for enlargement of time and to vacate the June 18, 2013 hearing in good faith, absent 
any purpose to delay or annoy: 
2. AFFIANT has only a limited education and has no knowledge of case law and legal 
procedure; as a point of fact, all of these filings have been prepared by a former inmate law 
clerk, who may or may not be able to continue to aide YOUR AFFIANT since the rules that 
govern such assistance are growing increasingly more restrictive: 
3. AFFIANT has never seen nor possessed the entire case file or fully examined a 
complete copy of the underlying record and discovery in these matters: 
4. THAT the Idaho Correctional Center's legal resource office, where the petitioner is 
housed, has no state or federal reporter series, and contains only the most basic of pre-
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printed forms, some of which including those for post conviction relief are legally inadequate: 
5. YOUR AFFIANT has not been advised by either the court, or the Ada County Public 
Defender's Office that counsel has been appointed or denied in these matters. 
6. AFFIANT is of the reasonable belief that absent this enlargement of time he will be 
unable to protect his substantial rights. 
7. YOUR AFFIANT has not sought any previous extensions of time in these regards, 
nor has he discussed this request with opposing counsel; however, contemperaneously with 
this filing a true and correct copy of each of the included documents has been provided the 
respondent by mail. 
FURTHER sayeth YOUR AFFIANT naught. 
DATED this 4th day of JUNE 2013. 
Petitioner-Affiant pro se 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me, a Notary Pubic{~ 4: :1 LP_::_ 
~--rAwPuBLIC - IDAHO 
*** SEAL *** 
JAMES G. OU:NN 
NOTAflY PUBUC 
STATE OF JDAHO 
Commission Expires: 1; 1.12.l 13 
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CODY J. FORTIN # 72953 
I.C.C. K Pod 216-B 
Post Office Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Petitioner pro se 
~~: H.7< ,_. :+- F~1----
JUN O 6 2013 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY J. FORTIN, 
Petitioner, 
-vs-











Civil Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285 
District Court No. CR-2009-0019383 
_______________ ) 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIBS IN SUPPORT OF A 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF 
TIME TO RESPOND AND OBJECT 
TO SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
COMES NOW, CODY J. FORTIN, petitioner prose, in the above cause of action; and 
presents the following points of fact and legal authority in support of an extension of time to 
respond and object to the respondent's May 23rd 2013 motion for summary judgment. 
I. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This matter brings before the Court a request for enlargement of time and the 
vacation of the forthcoming June 18th 2013 hearing, pursuant to the Rules and based upon 
the fact that the state's filings are both premature and outside the parameter of the governing 
rules of civil procedure. 
II. 
STANDARD OF LAW 
Motions filed under I.C. 19-4906{c) are the functional equivalent of those sought 
under Rule 56{c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 95 
P.3d 642 (2004). Moreover, it is - with few exceptions - the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
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that govern the proceedural rules for post conviction relief. See: I.C.R. 57(b); and, Ferrier v 
State of Idaho, 135 Idaho 797, 25 P.3d 110 (2001, respectively, in this regard. 
m. 
MATERIAL FACTS AND LEGAL ARGUENDO 
Simply said the respondent's motion for summary disposition and notice of hearing do 
not comport with the procedural rules governing these types of filings. 
I.R.C.P. 56(c) requires that motions for summary judgment and their supporting 
documentation "shall be served at least twenty eight (28) days before the time fixed for the 
hearing." Rule 56(c). Further, where as in the instant matter, service is being accomplished 
by mail, these same documents must be mailed no less than thirty-one (31) days in advance 
of the hearing. Ponderosa Paint Mfg. Inc. v. Yack, 125 Idaho 310, 870 P.2d 663 (C.O.A. 
1994). The mailing certificate on the respondent's filings are dated May 23rd 2013 and the 
hearing set for June 18th 2013: Clearly outside the rules. 
Finally, it warrants judicial notice that the petition provides notice that the pro se 
petitioner lacks the complete record and discovery is likely to be required to protect his 
substantial rights See: P.C.R. p.2 12; as well as the fact that the petitioner has yet to receive 
any notice on his motion for appointment of counsel, nor any contact by the office of the 
public defender in this same regard. 
Accordingly, and with all due respect to opposing counsel, the state's motion for 
summary disposition is premature and violates the rules; thus, at the very least, the 
petitioner is entitled to a requested enlargement of time to respond to the state's filings and 
vacation of the present hearing date. 
DATED this 4th day of JUNE 2013. 
Respectfully submitted by: 
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• 
CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE BY MAILING 
I, DO HEREBY CERTIFY and AFFIRM that the original and a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, with accompanying documentation were served upon Christopher D. Rich, Clerk 
of Fourth Judicial District Court for filing, and the respondent by placing the same in the 
U.S. Mail, this 4th day of JUNE 2013, addressed as follows: 
MR. CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of District Court 
Fourth Judicial District 
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
200 Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
MR. JONATHAN M. MEDEMA 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Office of Ada County Prosecutor 
200 West Front Street, Rm. 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
J. FORTIN 
itioner-Affiant pro se 
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• NO.--;::;-:-:-~;,;----
A.M. JI), J ti FILED » P.M. ___ _ 
JUN 1 O 2013 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF A ~ 
CODY J FORTIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV PC 13 8285 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Motion for Appointment of Counsel is 
granted and Ada County Public Defender's office, or an attorney appointed by Ada County 
Public Defender's office, a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is hereby appointed to 
represent said Plaintiff in all proceedings involving this Petition for Post Conviction Relief. 
DATED this _1L_ day o~013. 
PAT 
District Judge 
c c = PA- PD Fov-hl'\ 




JUN 25 2013 ~ -
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jonathan M. Medema 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
ISB No.: 5623 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
~D.RICH Sy~ ..... Clerk 
~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY J. FORTIN 
Petitioner, 
vs. 











Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO: CODY J. FORTIN and the Ada County Public Defender, his Attorney of 
Record, please take notice that on the 30th day of July 2013, at the hour of 3:00 p.m. of said day, 
or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Jonathan M. 
Medema, will move this Honorable Court regarding the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal 
in the above-entitled action. 
DATED this _;dj.ay of June 2013. 
GREG H. BOWER 
By: an . Medema 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .2f_ day of June 2013, I caused to be served, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Hearing upon the individual(s) named below in the 
manner noted: 
Ada County Public Defender 
200 W. Front Street, Rm. 1107 
Boise, ID 83702 
o By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class. 
~y hand delivering said document to defense counsel. 
Co By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
o By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at 
the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor. 
o By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the fa · ile number: ___ _ 
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· JUL O 2 2013 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY J. FORTIN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Res ondent. 
Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER RE: APPOINTMENT 
OF COUNSEL, W AIYER OF FILING 
FEES, RELEASE OF THE PRE-
SENTENCE REPORT, AND JUDICIAL 
NOTICE OF UNDERLYING FILES 
Before the Court are Cody J. Fortin's ("Fortin") motions for appointment of counsel, waiver 
I of filing fees, release of the pre-sentence report, and judicial notice in connection with his petition 
I' for post-conviction relief. As stated below, the Court will appoint counsel, take judicial notice of 
I I underlying files, not waive fees, and will issue an order releasing the pre-sentence report to counsel. 
Background 
On May 19, 2010, in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2009-19383, Fortin was convicted by a 
jury of Aggravated Battery, Felony,§§ 18-903(a), 907(a) and Use of a Deadly Weapon in the 
Commission ofa Crime. Felony,§ 19-2520. On August 10, 2010, Fortin was sentenced to the 
custody of the State Board of Correction of the State of Idaho for an aggregate term of twenty-five 
(25) years, with the first twelve(] 2) years fixed and the remaining thirteen (13) years indeterminate. 
Fortin appealed his conviction and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished case. See 
State v. Fortin, Docket No. 38069 (Ct. App. April 30, 2012). 
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On August 30, 2010, in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2009-19475, Fortin pleaded guilty to 
Aggravated Battery on Law Enforcement, Felony, Idaho Code§§ 18-903(b), 907(b), 915(1); 
Eluding a Peace Officer, Felony, Idaho Code§ 4-1404(2)(c); and Use of a Deadly Weapon in the 
Commission of a Crime. Felony, § 19-2520. As to Eluding a Peace Officer, the Court commuted 
the sentence to time served. As to the Aggravated Battery and the enhancement, Fortin was 
sentenced to the custody of the State Board of Correction of the State of Idaho for an aggregate term 
of twenty (20) years, with the first five (5) years fixed and the remaining fifteen (15) years 
indeterminate. This sentence was imposed consecutively to the sentence in the case cited above. It 
appears that Fortin has filed an appeal as to this matter in addition to the previously adjudicated 
appeal. 
Fortin is currently serving his sentence in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction . 
On May 7, 2013, Fortin filed a prose Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. On the same day, Fortin 
filed, prose: a motion requesting that the Court to take judicial notice of the files and records in 
both underlying criminal cases, a motion to release the PSI, a motion to waive filing fees, and a 
motion for the appointment of counsel. The petition alleges numerous claims of ineffective 
I assistance of counsel. 
Discussion 
Fortin requests that counsel be appointed to assist him in this matter. "The Court of Appeals 
has ruled that when a district court is 'presented with a request for appointed counsel, the court must 
22 address this request before ruling on the substantive issues in the case."' Charboneau v. State, 140 

































The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act provides in part that "a court-appointed 
attorney may be made available to the applicant ... " in a post-conviction action. Idaho Code § 19-
4904. Thus, the decision of whether to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel is in the 
discretion of the trial court. Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 760-61, 152 P.3d 629, 631-32 (Ct. App. 
2006). In determining whether to appoint counsel, "the trial court should keep in mind that petitions 
and affidavits filed by a pro se petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete." Id ( quoting 
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792). The trial court must, therefore, "afford some leniency to prose 
petitioners whose petitions may be inartful or incomplete." Id. If an applicant alleges facts that 
raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court should appoint counsel in order to give the 
applicant an opportunity to work with counsel and properly allege the necessary supporting facts. 
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793. On the other hand, if claims are so patently frivolous that they could 
not be developed into viable claims even with the assistance of counsel, the court may decline to 
appoint counsel. Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491,493, 95 P.3d 642,644 (Ct. App. 2004). 
The Court finds that Fortin is indigent based upon the submitted prison account records and 
the Court's previous appointment of the State Appellate Public Defender. The Court also finds that 
at least one claim is not so patently frivolous as to preclude its development into a viable claim. 
Therefore, in an exercise of its discretion, the Court will appoint Fortin counsel to assist him in this 
matter. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Ada County Public Defender, or his designee is hereby 
appointed as Counsel for the petitioner. 
Additionally, the Court will deny the motion to take judicial notice of the entire files of both 
underlying cases, Case Nos. CR-FE-2009-193883 and CR-FE-2009-19475. In the Court's view, the 



























proper procedure is for the Court to take note of specific matters that are part of the files. These 
items must be made a part of the record in this case. The Court will take judicial matters of those 
items in the underlying files that are made a part of this file. 
As to the PSI, the Court may issue an appropriate order releasing the PSI to Fortin's counsel 
once designated. 
There are no filing fees associated with the filing of a post-conviction action. See Appendix 
A to the I.R.C.P. at H(IO). Accordingly, the Court rejects the motion to waive fees because there 
are no fees to waive. 
Conclusion 
As discussed above, the Court will grant Fortin's motion for appointment of counsel. The 
Court will deny the blanket request for judicial notice. The Court will deny the fee waiver. Finally, 
the Court may issue an order releasing the PSI to Fortin's counsel, if counsel demonstrates good 
cause. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this __ /_ day of July 2013. 
Patrick H. Owen 
District Judge 





























CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the-#=-" day of July 2013, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy 
of the within instrument to: 
CODY J. FORTIN 
ICC K POD 216-B 
PO BOX 70010 
BOISE ID 83707 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
By~ 
Deputy Clerk 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- PAGE 5 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorney for Petitioner 
D. David Lorello, Jr. 
Deputy Public Defender 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
:~.~ Utfl ~~~-·--
Jul 1 g 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cl2rl< 
By ELYSHIA HOLMES 
::>EPUT'I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY J. FORTIN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Res ondent. 
Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285 
MOTION FOR STAY OF 
PROCEEDINGS AND FOR LEAVE TO 
AMEND PETITION 
COMES NOW the petitioner, CODY J. FORTIN, by and through his attorney, D. David 
Lorello, Jr., Ada County Public Defender's Office, and moves this Court for an order staying 
proceedings and allowing the petitioner to amend his petition after a discussion of issues with 
appointed counsel. The petitioner requests a stay of sixty (60) days in order to review the file, 
receive and review a copy of the presentence investigation report, receive and review transcripts, 
and prepare an amended petition. 
Dated this 18th day of July 2013. 
U:<~·~ D. DA v~LORELLb, JR. 
Attorney for Defendant 
MOTION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS AND FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 18th day of July 2013, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Jonathan Medema 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
Interdepartmental Mail 
MOTION FOR ST A Y OF PROCEEDINGS AND FOR LEA VE TO AMEND PETITION 2 
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ALANE. TRIMMING 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
D. David Lorello, Jr. 
Deputy Public Defender 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
NO. • t[8'·F1~ .,,o ,_..P.M---
JUL 1 9 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KATRINA CHRISTENSEN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CODY J. FORTIN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-FE-2009-0019383 
(Civil Case Ref: CV-PC-2013-08285) 
MOTION TO RELEASE PSI 
COMES NOW, D. David Lorello, Jr. of the Ada County Public Defender's Office, court-
appointed counsel for Cody J. Fortin, and moves this Court, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 32, 
for an order releasing the presentence investigation report prepared in the above-entitled case 
number to undersigned counsel. 
The defendant recently filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in Case No. CV-PC-
2013-08285. Subsequent to his filing, the Ada County Public Defender's Office was appointed 
to represent the above-named defendant in post-conviction proceedings. To aid undersigned 
counsel in the post-conviction proceedings and familiar counsel with the defendant's case, 
counsel respectfully requests this Court release a copy of the presentence investigation report 
generated in the above-entitled case number. 
Dated this 18th day of July 2013. 
Attorney for Defendant 
~ MOTION TO RELEASE PSI 
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... 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 18th day of July 2013, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Jonathan Medema 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
Interdepartmental Mail 
MOTION TO RELEASE PSI 2 
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jonathan M. Medema 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
ISB No.: 5623 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
e 
:~.:;o: 12 ~·~ ----
JUL 2 9 2013 
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clork 
By STEPHANIE VIOAK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY J. FORTIN 
Petitioner, 
vs. 









) ________________ ) 
Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO: CODY J. FORTIN and David Lorello, his/her Attorney of Record, please take 
notice that on the 1 J1h day of September 2013, at the hour of 3:00 p.m. of said day, or as soon 
thereafter as counsel can be heard, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Jonathan M. Medema, will 
move this Honorable Court regarding the State's Motion of Summary Dismissal and Motion to 
Take Judicial Notice in the above-entitled action. 
DATED this '1.lf_day of July 2013. 
GREG H. BOWER 
NOTICE OF HEARING (FORTIN), Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2/-f' day of July 2013, I caused to be served, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Hearing upon the individual(s) named below in the 
manner noted: 
David Lorello 
Ada County Public Defender 
200 W. Front Street, Rm. 1107 
Boise, ID 83702 
o By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class. 
~y hand delivering said document to defense counsel. 
o By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
o By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at 
the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor. 
o By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the csimile number: ___ _ 
NOTICE OF HEARING (FORTIN), Page 2 
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ALANE. TRIMMING 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
D. David Lorello, Jr. 
Deputy Public Defender 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
NO·---~rr--:::::----A M FILED 2, 
. ·----P.M., 't'.C 
AUG 2 3 2013 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CODY J. FORTIN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-FE-2009-0019383 
(Civil Case Ref: CV-PC-2013-08285) 
ORDER RELEASING PSI 
This matter having come before the court upon court-appointed counsel's motion, and for 
good cause appearing, this Court hereby grants counsel's Motion to Release PSI. 
A copy of the presentence investigation report prepared on behalf of the defendant in the 
above-entitled case number shall be released to D. David Lorello, Jr., court-appointed counsel 
for the defendant in Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285, to aid counsel in preparation of the pending 
post-conviction proceedings. 
Counsel is to make no copies of the report, shall not disclose the report to any other 
person outside the office of the Ada County Public Defender, and shall surrender said copy to 
this Court upon completion of the defendant's post-conviction proceedings in Case No. CV-PC-
2013-08285. Failure to comply with any portion of Idaho Criminal Rule 32 may be deemed a 
contempt of court and may be subject to appropriate san1~~s. r 
SO ORDERED AND DATED this 4- day of~~13. 
I' 
p 
{ ORDER RELEASING PSI 
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• 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorney for Petitioner 
D. David Lorello, Jr. 
Deputy Public Defender 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
• 
NO.-----:::~----:---
FILED ;2.. . 'lt. C A.M. ____ ,P.M.---:~----.__ 
AUG 2 3 2013 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY J. FORTIN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Res ondent. 
Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285 
ORDER GRANTING STAY OF 
PROCEEDINGS AND FOR LEA VE TO 
AMEND PETITION 
For good cause appearing, this Court hereby grants the Petitioner's Motion for Stay of 
Proceedings and for Leave to Amend Petition. The petitioner shall be given sixty (60) days from 
the entry of this order to file an amended petition in this~ 
SO ORDERED AND DATED this 1::1_ day ol~e>13. 
~«~ 
ATRICK H. OWEN 
, istrict Judge 
ORDER GRANTING ST A Y OF PROCEEDINGS AND FOR LEA VE TO AMEND PETITION 
000137
NO. 
A.M.ll!.[oQrii"~FiF1Lu:iEo~------P.M. ___ _ 
DEC 1 7 2013 
( . 
By~· RICH: Clerk 
· ,UTY -
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY J FORTIN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV PC 13 8285 
NOTICE OF SCHEDULING 
CONFERENCE UNDER I.R.C.P. 16(a) 
and 16(b) 
The Court has determined that this matter is appropriate for a scheduling order under 
I.R.C.P. 16(b). 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED a telephonic scheduling conference is hereby set for 
January 13, 2014, at 3:30 p.m. before the Honorable Patrick H. Owen. A scheduling order 
under I.R.C.P. 16(b) may issue following this conference. The Court will initiate the call. 
All parties must appear at this time in person or by counsel. Counsel must be the 
handling attorney, or be fully familiar with the case, and have authority to bind his/her client and 
law firm on all matters set forth in I.R.C.P. 16(a) and 16(b). 
Dated this Il_day of December, 2013. 
Christopher D Rich 
Clerk of the Distri Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 17 day of December, 2013, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Ada County Public Defender 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
Christopher D Rich 
:~:rk~rr:1~Ql1,1,1U:t....------
Depu~ 




























FILED: (; / / r , 2014 at Cf/(!/) 
C~. ·, lerk 
By: ___ __,~------
lnga J son, Deputy 
/ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL ~TRICT OF 




STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CVPC 13-08285 
NOTICE OF STATUS CONFERENCE 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED That a Status Conference has been set on June 25, 
2014 at 3:00 PM in the Ada County Courthouse regarding the above entitled matter. 
Dated: ........,{t_!_/....._Yi_/1--"-'( __ 
77 
Christopher D. Rich 
,,,, ...... ,,, 
'' CT 111 ,,,, s1RI . co ,,, 
,,' <v\ ••••••• U,1; ,,, 
.. ' •• •• <1>. , • 0 •• .,,. -:. 
·ff;·· ,<'I •y-~t::,.. ,...,, ,-~,:. 
:..,, • - -;:t:. ~~: . . ~ -·'°· :c: : ,. • :r. • ,.._ -•o• o ;i... .~ .. 
- "Y • ., • ...... .. 
,:, •• n,•(°)~ .. <a • • •. ">., .. 
.... V. ••• •• ~ .. . .. , '4';, •••••• ~ .. . 
,,, r JJJ'M1S\ .... .. ,,,, ,,,, 
J:L '"h. ,,,,,,,,,,,, I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this .L...L_ day of v"' ~, 2014, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney, lnterdept Mail 
Ada Co. Public Defender, lnterdept Mail 
Christopher D. Rich 
Notice of Status Conference 
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• Owen !Johnson 070914 Redlich Courtroom504 
Time Speaker Note 
3:44:29 PM /. I 
3:44:32 PM ! !cody Fortin v. State CVPC13-08285 Status Conf. (Not 
/ /Trnsp) 
3:44:33 PM lcounsel lLorello/Medema 
3:44:46 PM !Lorello !Adv. of status. working with def. on affidavit to factually support 
/ /allegations in petition. 
3:45:45 PM ict io. on specifics 
3:48:49 PM 1ct fAllows 30d to supply affidavit. 
3:49:05 PM !ct !wm put on for scheduling conf. once received 
3:49:18 PM ! !End 
7/9/2014 1 of 1 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
D. DAVID LORELLO, JR., ISB #6232 
Deputy Public Defender 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
NO·------;;iis,'",t...,~-
A.M ___ FILED...JlP.;3/'0 :: 
NOVO 3 201~ 
eHAIS'teftHlfll 91 FtHilH t'll-.... -~--l~n,, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CODY J. FORTIN, 
Defendant. 
pc 
Case No. CV~2013-8285 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
(Status Conference) 
TO: THE STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff, and to Jonathan Medema, Ada County 
Prosecutor's Office: 
YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the above-named 
Defendant will call on for hearing Status Conference, now on file with the Court. Said hearing 
shall take place on November 19t\ 2014, at 3 :00 p.m., in the courtroom of the above-entitled 
court, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
DATED, Friday, October 31, 2014. fl 
D. David Lorello, Jr. 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on Friday, October 31, 2014, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Jonathan Medema 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
Interdepartmental Mail 
NOTICE OF HEARING (Status Conference) 
--
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Owen !Johnson 111914 Rlich • Courtroom504 
TirrlQ Speaker Note 
04:35:16 PM!. 
04:35:18-PMl° . - ! Cody Fortin v. State CVPC13-08285 Status Conf 
. 04:35: 19 .. PM.l.Counse1 ........... J. Lorello/. Medema·································-···························-············································-··························································· 
04:35:31 PM! Ct ! Calls case and reviews . ............................................... +., ....................................... .j. ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
04:35:35 PM! Lorello ! Responds- Clarifies status. Still intends on filing amended petition 
. ! ! or affidavit or respond to motion to dismiss . 
................................................ , ......................................... t ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ --.................... . 
04:36:46 PM I Ct ! Further Status Review- 1/21 at 3 
: : 
11/19/2014 1 of 1 
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Owen !Johnson 012115 R!ich • Courtroom504 
Time Speaker Note 
04:11:05 PM!. 
: I 
04:11 :12 PMJ J Cody Fortin v. State CVPC13-08285 Review{not tmsp) 
i i 
................................................ i ......................................... i ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
04: 11 : 14 PM! Counsel ! Lorello/ Medema 
HOHOOH .. OOoOOOooooOoOoooooooooooooOOOOOOOOOOO,i.OOOOOOOOOHOOOOHOOOOOoOOo-Ooooooooooo .. .;.OOOOOOOOO .. OoooOooooooo .. oOOOOHO•oooOOoooooooooooooooooOOOOH00000000oooHooooooooooooooooooHOOOOOoOoOooooooooooooooooOOOOOOOHOOHOOOOOooooooooOoooooooo .. OOOOOOH00HOOoOOOOOOOoooooooooooOOOOOOOOOOOHOOOOOooooooooooooooooo 
04: 11 :25 PM i Ct ! Calls case and reviews 
04: 11 :36 PM t Lorello t met with def twice, ·relying on· original petition, asks 'f week to ...................... . 
i ! respond to Motion for Dismissal 
04: 12:02 PM l Medema l Asks set for hearing . ................................................ + ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
04: 12:23 PM f Ct j Clerk will contact and set for hearing, order for time to respond to 
I ! state. 





.?\ 16/1-s uH 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jonathan M. Medema 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
ISB No.: 5623 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
e 
NO.·-----.;~----
FILED --, l'°f A 
A.M·----..JP.M~ 
FEB O 9 2015 
CHR!STOPHcR D. RICH, Clerk 
By TENILLE RAD 
DCP:JTV 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY JAMES FORTIN 
Petitioner, 
vs. 









) _______________ ) 
Case No. CV PC 2013 08285 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO: D. David Lorello: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above case has been set in 
the Courtroom at the Ada County Courthouse, 200 West Front Street, Boise, Idaho, in front of 
Judge Patrick Owen, on the 17th day of March, 2015, at 3 :00 p.m. for the Motion for Summary 
Dismissal. 
DATED this kpday of February 2015. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Attorney 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
NOTICE OF HEARING (FORTIN), Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Dt day of February 2015, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING to be placed in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid, addressed to: 
HAND DELIVERED 
MAILED POST AGE PREP AID 
___L"INTERDEP ARTMENT AL MAIL 
VIA FACSIMILE 
NOTICE OF HEARING (FORTIN), Page 2 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorney for Petitioner 
D. David Lorello, Jr. 
Deputy Public Defender 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
e 
NO·------=:-:-=~~ur-Jr.?f:---
A.M. ____ F_1L~·~· 1Lrt;-
FEB 1 0 2015 
CHR!STOPhEF: 0. HlCrl, C:e"K 
B'./ TSN:U.£ F,A'J 
!J'.:P:JT'/ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY JAMES FORTIN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO 
STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
COMES NOW the petitioner, CODY JAMES FORTIN, by and through his attorney, 
D. David Lorello, Jr., Ada County Public Defender's Office, and hereby submits to the 
Court this Memorandum in Response to State's Motion for Summary Disposition. This 
Memorandum is based upon the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and the court records, 
transcripts, and reports associated with the underlying criminal matter on file with the 
Court. 
FACTS 
• On October 14, 2009, Petitioner was charged with Aggravated Battery and the use of 
a deadly weapon in commission of a crime (Case No. CR-FE-2009-0019383) and 
issued a warrant for Petitioner's arrest. 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION I 
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• On October 15, 2009, Petitioner was charged with Aggravated Battery on a Law 
Enforcement Officer, Eluding a Police Officer, and Leaving the Scene of an Accident 
(Case No. CR-FE-2009-0019475). 
• On November 23, 2009, Petitioner waived his Preliminary Hearing in exchange for 
the following offer: 
• CR-FE-2009-0019383: Plead guilty to Aggravated Battery plus the Use 
of a Deadly Weapon Enhancement and the state would cap its 
recommendation at a 5 + 10 = 15; and 
• CR-FE-2009-0019475: Plead guilty to Eluding a Police Officer and the 
state would cap its recommendation at a 2 + 3 = 5 with said sentence 
to be consecutive to CR-FE-2009-0019383. 
• As of November 23, 2009, Petitioner's total exposure, pursuant to plea negotiations 
was 7 + 13 = 20. 
• On May 19, 2010, Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial of Aggravated Battery as 
well as the enhancement in CR-FE-2009-0019383. 
• On August 6, 2010, the Court sentenced the Petitioner to 12 + 13 = 25 in Case No. 
CR-FE-2009-0019383. 
• On August 30, 2010, Petitioner entered a guilty plea to Aggravated Battery on a Law 
Enforcement Officer, Eluding a Police Officer, and deadly weapons enhancement in 
Case No. CR-FE-2009-0019475. 
• Petitioner did not have any plea agreement at the time he entered his plea in Case 
No. CR-FE-2009-0019475. 
• On October 8, 2010, the Court sentenced Petitioner to 5 + 10 = 15 in Case No. CR-
FE-2009-0019475 with said sentence to be served consecutive to the 12 + 13 = 25 in 
Case No. CR-FE-2009-0019383. 
• Thus, upon the conclusion of both cases, Petitioner received a sentence of 17 + 23 = 
40. 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 2 
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SUMMARY DISMISSAL STANDARDS 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil proceeding and 
the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is 
entitled to relief. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678 (1983). The petitioner must submit 
verified facts within his personal knowledge and produce admissible evidence to support his 
allegations. Id. (citing Idaho Code§ 19-4903). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own initiative. "To 
withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence 
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the applicant 
bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 
134 Idaho 581, 583, (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary 
dismissal pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906 only "if the applicant's evidence raises no 
genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's claims. Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 522, (citing Idaho Code§ 19-4906(b), (c)). The facts set forth in the Petition 
must be construed in the light most favorable to the Petitioner. Id. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Petitioner Has Raised A Genuine Issue of Material Fact About Whether His Trial 
Counsel Was Deficient In Conveying Whether Or Not A Trial Was In The 
Petitioner's Best Interest 
The test for determining whether a defendant has received effective assistance of counsel 
1s the two-part test established by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, (1984); State v., Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 306, (1999). The 
first prong of the Strickland test requires the defendant to show that counsel's performance 
was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The second prong requires the defendant to "show 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. In determining whether a 
defendant was deprived of reasonably competent assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the 
Idaho Constitution, Article 1, Section 13, Idaho courts employ the same two-part test. 
Mathews, 133 Idaho at 306. Although Strickland concerned an allegation of ineffective 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 3 
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assistance in a sentencing proceeding, the same standard applies equally to claims arising 
from the plea process. Mathews, 133 Idaho at 306. 
Deficient performance by an attorney is performance that falls II outside the wide range of 
professional norms. 11 Mathews, 133 Idaho at 306, Petitioner argues his attorney's 
performance was deficient because his attorney failed to inform him that proceeding to trial 
might allow the court to run each case consecutively to each other and increase his exposure 
to a lengthy jail sentence. Petition at p. 5. 
The second prong of the Strickland test requires the petitioner to show he was prejudiced 
as a result of counsel's deficient conduct. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, Mathews, 133 Idaho at 
306. In this case, Petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's advice to take Case No. CR-FE-
2009-0019383 to trial and forego the plea agreement. Petitioner's resulting sentence was, for 
all practical purposes, more than twice the sentence he would have been recommended to 
receive had he accepted the plea agreement instead of proceeding to trial. Accordingly, the 
State's Motion for Summary Disposition should be denied. 
II. Petitioner Has Raised A Genuine Issue of Material Fact About Whether His Plea 
Was Knowing, Voluntary and Intelligent 
Trial counsel is under an obligation to advise a client and ensure any guilty plea is 
knowing and voluntary. "Where a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea 
process and enters a plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends 
on whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 
criminal cases." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 60. Further, "a guilty plea is only valid where 
the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action 
open to the defendant." Id. 
For a guilty plea to be valid, the entire record must demonstrate that the plea was 
entered into in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner. State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 
96, (2007) (emphasis added). Whether a plea is voluntary and understood entails inquiry 
into three areas: (1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he 
understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant 
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial; and (3) whether the defendant 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 4 
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understood the consequences of pleading guilty. State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34, (1976). It is 
the third prong that is at issue in this matter. 
Petitioner maintains that his guilty plea was not intelligent because he misunderstood 
and was not familiar with the terms of the agreement. Specifically, Petitioner states that trial 
counsel was ineffective in advising to proceed to trial and which increased Petitioner's 
exposure above and beyond the exposure in the initial plea agreement. Petition at pp. 4-5. 
Petitioner's Petition creates a genuine issue of material fact as to what the plea 
agreement actually was, what Petitioner's understanding of the plea agreement was, and 
whether or not Petitioner understood the plea agreement and the concordant risks of 
proceeding to trial. Petitioner's statement creates an issue as to whether his guilty plea and 
decisions were knowing and voluntary. Since trial counsel is under an obligation to ensure 
the Petitioner's plea is knowing and voluntary, Petitioner's statements create a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether trial counsel properly advised Petitioner prior to entry of his 
guilty plea and about whether or not to proceed to trial. Accordingly, when interpreting the 
facts in the light most favorable to the Petitioner, the Court must deny the State's Motion 
and allow this case to proceed to hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, the Petitioner respectfully requests that this 
Court deny the State's Motion for Summary Disposition. 
ft, A,.. 
DATED this _w_ day ofFebruary 2015. !u1, M 4,-, 
-D-. D-A-V-ID_L_O_RE_L_uA--, J-R-. ------
Attorney for Petitioner 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this JQ__ day of February 2015, I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to Jonathan Medema, Ada County Prosecutor's Office, by 
placing the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
Katie Van Vorhis 
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• 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jonathan M. Medema 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
ISB No. 5623 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
• 
FEB 2 6 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KATRINA HOLDEN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY JAMES FORTIN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 










) ________________ ) 
Case No. CV PC 2013 08285 
REPLY MEMORANDUM 
REGARDING MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Jonathan M. Medema, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County, and submits the following: 
The State has moved this Court for summary dismissal of Mr. Fortin's claims for post-
conviction relief. On February 10, petitioner filed a memorandum in response to that motion. The 
State hereby submits this reply. 
Prior to a decision in the year 2012 by five (5) Justices of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, the American criminal justice system had spent well over 200 years concerned 
primarily with ensuring that persons accused by the government of committing crimes receive a 
fair trial by a jury of their peers before the government may punish them for such allegations. The 
REPLY MEMORANDUM REGARDING MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
(FORTIN), Page I 
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cause, the placing of the burden of proof upon the government, the standard of proof required, 
the right to a public trial, the right to a trial by jury, limitations on how jurors are selected or 
excluded by the government, limitations on what types of evidence the government may show 
such jurors; the right to counsel to assist the accused; the protection against compulsory self-
incrimination; the ability to introduce evidence; the power to compel the production of evidence; 
the right to, in advance, discover what the government's evidence at trial will be; and the right to 
cross-examine witnesses presented by the government - to name but a few. We have developed a 
body of law designed to protect the accused not only from malfeasance or abuse of power by the 
accusatory body of the government, but also from errors by the Court and from incompetence on 
the part of the accused's attorney. 
In 2012, the five (5) Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States created a new 
system of resolving accusations by the government that an individual has committed a crime -
the plea bargain system. What protections the Court will decide that the Constitution demands 
defendants be afforded in the plea bargain system is still largely unknown. One can certainly not 
divine those protections from the language of the Constitution itself or frankly, from the two (2) 
opinions authored by those five (5) justices. So far, those Justices have only demanded that 
defendants involved in the plea bargain process be provided with effective assistance of counsel 
when deciding to reject a plea bargain. 
Mr. Fortin's brief opposing the State's motion is understandably long on law and short on 
facts. That is assuredly a direct consequence of Mr. Fortin's petition and affidavit being short on 
facts. Mr. Fortin alleges simply that counsel advised him to reject the plea bargain, so he did. Mr. 
Fortin offers no specifics about what counsel told him; no basis from which this Court might 
conclude that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of competence. He does 
not allege that his counsel failed to communicate the terms of the agreement, as in Missouri v. 
Frye; nor does he allege counsel advised him about some defense premised on misunderstanding 
of the law, as in Lafler v. Cooper. He appears simply to say that counsel advised him to avail 
himself of his constitution right to a fair trial and now he wishes he'd made a different choice. If 
that is a sufficient showing to justify post-conviction relief of some sort under this new 
constitutional right to plea bargain, then those five (5) justices of the Supreme Court of the 
United States will have ironically destroyed what they themselves say is the reality of the 
REPLY MEMORANDUM REGARDING MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
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e • 
criminal justice system - a system of pleas. If a defendant may reject a plea bargain and take his 
chances at trial safe and secure in the knowledge that if he is convicted and sentenced to some 
term greater than the plea bargain, he may always get back the benefit of the plea in post-
conviction relief simply by alleging that his lawyer was obviously incompetent in advising him to 
have a trial (after all he lost and got a greater sentence); then there will be no incentive for the 
State to offer plea bargains at all. And, in the irony of all ironies, it may be per se ineffective 
assistance for defense counsel to ever recommend his client plead guilty. Who wouldn't risk the 
trial if you can get the same sentence recommendation from the State in post-conviction relief? 
The State submits that not even the majority in Frye and Lafler are willing to go that far. Surely 
this Court should not be. 
DATED this ~ay of February 2015. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
REPLY MEMORANDUM REGARDING MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
(FORTIN), Page 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~\o day of February 2015, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Reply Memorandum Regarding Motion for Summary Disposition 
upon the individual(s) named below in the manner noted: 
D. David Lorello, Ada County Public Defender 
Q By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class. 
~By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
Q By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the 
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor. 
Q By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number: ____ _ 
REPLY MEMORANDUM REGARDING MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
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Owen !Johnson 031715 .lich e Courtroom502 
Tini_g Speaker Note 
1 :26:44 PM 1 1Cody Fortm v State CVPC13-08285 Motion to D1sm1ss 
i i Petitioner not transported. 
1 :26:44 PM Jcounsel 1Akamatsu (for Medema)/ Lorello ................................................ .;. ........................................................................................................................................................................................ ., ........................................................ .. 
3:05:03 PM !Ct !Calls case and reviews. 
3:07:58 PM fAkamatsu tArgues Motion to Dismiss. 
3:08:10 PM f Lorello fArgues against. 
3:09:04 PM f ct f Reviews history of 2 criminal cases. 
ooo,,oo,,oo,oooo,,a .. ,OHooooOoooooooo,oo,, .. , .. t,,• .. oooo,,oo,oooHooooooooHoooooooo"faoo .. ,o,o,oooooooo•oo••oo•oo•oooooaoooooooooooo .. ,-.,oooooooooHoOuoo .. ,,,oo,ooHoooooooooHooo,oooo• .... •oooooooooooooooo .. oo,,oo,,ooooaoHoooooo,,,, 00,,,,,,,,0000000000 .. 000,,0 .. ,,,o,ooooooooooooooooooo, 
3:10:36 PM !Akamatsu !Argues further. 
3:11 :38 PM let iTakes under advisment. 
' : 
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MAY 1 2 2015 
CHRISTOPHER . 
By INGA 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF AD 
CODY JAMES FORTIN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER RE: STATE'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Before the Court is the State's Motion for Summary Disposition Re: Cody James Fortin's 
("Fortin") Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. As discussed below, the Court will grant the 
motion. 
Background and Prior Proceedings 
On May 19, 2010, in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2009-19383 ("19383 case"), Fortin 
was convicted by a jury of Aggravated Battery, a felony, I.C. §§ 18-903(a), -907(a) and Use of a 
Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a Crime, an enhancement, I.C. § 19-2520. The Honorable 
Senior Judge McKee presided. The undersigned conducted a sentencing hearing on August 6, 
2010. Fortin was present with his trial counsel, Charles Crafts ("Crafts"). Christopher S. 
Atwood, Deputy County Prosecuting Attorney, appeared and argued for the State. The Court 
imposed an enhanced sentence consisting of an aggregate term of twenty-five (25) years, with the 
first twelve (12) years fixed, and the remaining thirteen (13) years to be indeterminate. The State 
recommended a sentence of thirty (30) years with twenty (20) years fixed. 
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Fortin did not file a motion for a reduction of sentence pursuant to LC.R. 35. Fortin 
timely appealed his conviction and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished 
opinion. See State v. Fortin, Docket No. 38069 (Ct. App. April 30, 2012). 
On August 30, 2010, in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2009-19475 ("19475 case"), Fortin 
pleaded guilty to Aggravated Battery on Law Enforcement, a felony, LC.§§ 18-903(b), -907(b), -
915(1); Eluding a Peace Officer, a felony, LC.§ 49-1404(2)(c); and Use of a Deadly Weapon 
During the Commission of a Crime, an enhancement, LC. § 19-2520. On October 8, 2010, the 
Court held a sentencing hearing. The Court imposed a consecutive enhanced sentence on the 
Aggravated Battery charge for an aggregate term of twenty (20) years, with the first five (5) 
years fixed, and the remaining fifteen (15) years to be indeterminate. The State recommended a 
consecutive enhanced sentence of twenty (20) years with eight (8) years fixed. As to the Eluding 
a Peace Officer, the Court commuted the sentence to time served. Fortin did not file a Rule 35 
motion for reduction in sentence or a notice of appeal. 
On October 6, 2011, Fortin filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the 19475 case. 
Ada County Case No. CV-PC-2011-19323. On November 2, 2012, the Court entered its 
Judgment Granting Post Conviction Relief Per Stipulation in which the Court restarted the time 
period to appeal the sentence. Fortin appealed his consecutive sentence of twenty (20) years and 
the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. See State v. Fortin, Docket No. 40602 
(Ct. App. November 8, 2013). 
Fortin is currently serving his sentences in the custody of the Idaho Department of 
Correction. On May 7, 2013, Fortin filed a prose Petition for Post-Conviction Relief of the 
19383 case, among other prose motions. As such, while the 19475 case is relevant to understand 
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the context of Fortin's petition, the Court will only consider the allegations in regards to the 
19383 case in which Fortin was convicted by a jury. Fortin's initial petition for post-conviction 
relief alleges that trial counsel and appeal counsel were ineffective as follows: 
a) Trial counsel's advice to not accept the state's plea bargain and inform Fortin of 
the consequences of his charges constitutes ineffective assistance; 
b) Trial counsel's advice to separate the two proceedings, i.e., the 19383 case and the 
19475 case, was against the express wishes of Fortin was ineffective assistance; 
c) Trial counsel failed to file a motion in limine regarding Fortin's alleged gang 
affiliation; 
d) Trial counsel failed to move for an immediate mistrial following a witnesses 
statement that Fortin was involved in gang activity; 
e) Trial counsel failed to recall as a defense witness, Casey Smith, who Fortin claims 
could have been impeached by the defense; 
f) Trial counsel failed to object to the admission of flight evidence during trial; 
g) Trial counsel failed to object to the wording of the verdict form, which destroyed 
Fortin's presumption of innocence; and 
h) Trial counsel failed to file a Rule 35 against the express wishes of Fortin 
i) Appellate counsel failed to "federalize" some of Fortin's issues on direct appeal 
and did not object to mistakes in the restitution hearing transcript 
The State filed its Answer on May 25, 2013. On the same day, the State filed its motion for 
summary disposition with a brief in support. 
On July 2, 2013, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: 
Appointment of Counsel, Waiver of Filing Fees, Release of the Pre-Sentence Report, and Judicial 
Notice of Underlying Files. In its Order, the Court appointed counsel, took judicial notice of the 
underlying files that were made a part of the record in this case, and released the pre-sentence 
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report to appointed counsel. On August 23, 2013, the Court entered its Order Granting Stay of 
Proceedings and For Leave to Amend Petition. However, Fortin did not file an amended petition. 
On February 10, 2015, Fortin filed his opposition in response to the State's motion for summary 
disposition. On February 26, 2015, the State replied. This matter came for hearing on March 17, 
2015. D. David Lorello, Jr., Deputy Ada County Public Defender, appeared on behalf of Fortin 
and presented argument. Fortin was not transported for the hearing. Deputy Ada County 
Prosecuting Attorney, Shelley W. Akamatsu, appeared and argued for the State. The Court took 
the matter under advisement and will address each claim in tum. 
Discussion 
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Idaho Code§ 19-4901 et seq. provides a 
mechanism by which a person convicted of a crime may challenge the validity of a sentence by 
showing, among other things, that the conviction is subject to collateral attack. See Idaho Code § 
19-4901(a).1 The remedy is not intended to be a substitute for a direct appeal from the sentence 
or conviction. Idaho Code§ 19-490l(b). However, a criminal defendant may raise a claim of 
1 "(a) Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime and who claims: 
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution of the United States or the constitution or 
laws of this state; 
(2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence; 
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law; 
(4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the 
conviction or sentence in the interest of justice; 
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, or conditional release was unlawfully revoked by the court in which 
he was convicted, or that he is otherwise unlawfuJly held in custody or other restraint; 
(6) Subject to the provisions of section 19-4902(b) through (g), Idaho Code, that the petitioner is innocent of the 
offense; or 
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error 
heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy: may 
institute, without paying a filing fee, a proceeding under this act to secure relief." Idaho Code§ 19-4901(a)." 
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ineffective assistance of counsel either on direct appeal or reserve the issue for post-conviction 
proceedings. Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426,430, 835 P.2d 661,665 (Ct. App. 1992). 
A petition for post-conviction relief is a special proceeding that is civil in nature and 
therefore is entirely new and independent from the underlying criminal action which led to the 
conviction. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 798-99, 25 P.3d 110, 111-12 (2001) (citing Peltier v. 
State, 119 Idaho 454,456,808 P.2d 373,375 (1991)). The petitioner seeking post-conviction 
relief has the burden of proving the allegations upon which the petition is based by a 
preponderance of the evidence. I.C.R. 57(c); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 27, 995 P.2d 794, 
797 (2000). 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure generally apply to post-conviction proceedings, but a 
petition in a post-conviction proceeding differs from that of an ordinary civil action because it 
must contain more than a "short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a 
complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). State v. Yakovic, 145 Idaho 437,444, 180 P.2d 476,482 
(2008). Instead, an application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts 
within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence 
supporting its application must be attached, or the application must state why such supporting 
evidence is not included within the application. I.C. § 19-4903; LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 
117-18, 937 P.2d 427, 429-30 (Ct. App. 1997). In other words, the application must present or 
be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations or the application will be 
subject to dismissal. Id. 
This evidence must be evidence that would be admissible at a hearing on the claims. 
Bergv. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518-19, 960 P.2d 738, 739-40 (1998);!.C. 19-4903. Bare or 
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conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to entitle an applicant to an 
evidentiary hearing. Id. at 121; Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494,497, 887 P.2d 39, 42 (Ct. App. 
1994). The petitioner must present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each of the 
elements that his claim rests upon. Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000) 
(citingBergv. State. 131 Idaho 517, 518-19, 960 P.2d 738, 739-40 (1998)). 
Each of Fortin's claims allege ineffective assistance of either trial counsel or appeal 
counsel. To prevail on a post-conviction relief claim based on ineffective assistance of counsel 
the applicant must establish the two prongs set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), to wit: (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) 
that deficiency prejudiced appellant's case. State v. Dunlap, 32773, 2013 WL 4539806 (Idaho 
Aug. 27, 2013). In order to survive a motion for summary dismissal, the applicant must show 
that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether counsel's performance was deficient, 
and whether that deficiency prejudiced appellant's case. Id (citing Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 
522,236 P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010). To be deficient, trial counsel's performance must have fallen 
below "an objective standard ofreasonableness." Id (quoting Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 59, 
106 P.3d 376,385 (2004). As for prejudice, the petitioner "must show a reasonable probability 
that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been 
different." Id 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction 
relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. Summary dismissal 
of a petition is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment. The Court of Appeals has 
explained: 
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Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for post-
conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own 
initiative. Summary dismissal of a petition is the procedural equivalent of 
summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56. A claim for post-
conviction relief will be subject to summary dismissal if the petitioner has not 
presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the 
claims upon which the petitioner bears the burden of proof. Thus, summary 
dismissal is permissible when the petitioner's evidence has raised no genuine 
issue of material fact that, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle the 
petitioner to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an 
evidentiary hearing must be conducted. 
Hoffman v. State, 153 Idaho 898,902,277 P.3d 1050, 1054 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted). 
Allegations contained in the petition are insufficient to prevent summary dismissal if they 
are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or do not justify relief as a matter 
oflaw. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567,569,225 P.3d 700, 702 (2010). Summary dismissal of 
an application for post-conviction relief may be appropriate even where the state does not 
controvert the petitioner's evidence because, as indicated above, the court is not required to 
accept a petitioner's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence. State v. 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 61, 90 P.3d 278,286 (2003). Bare assertions and speculation, 
unsupported by specific facts, do not suffice to show ineffectiveness of counsel. State v. Rendon, 
107 Idaho 425,427,690 P.2d 360,362 (Ct.App.1984). 
When considering a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, the court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the 
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file which, if true, would 
entitle the petitioner to relief. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247,250,220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2008). 
A. Plea Agreement 
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Fortin claims that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to inform Fortin that 
proceeding to trial might allow the court to run the sentences in the 193 83 and 194 7 5 case 
consecutively. Fortin maintains that he would have accepted the plea agreement offered by the 
state had counsel properly advised him of the possible punishment and consequences of 
proceeding to trial, i.e., the Court could run the sentences consecutively. In other words, Fortin 
argues that counsel failed to advise him of the best course of action. 
As evidence that his attorney did not adequately inform him of the consequences of not 
accepting the plea agreement, Fortin presents in his own affidavit that, but for Crafts 
misrepresentation that he could prevail at a trial by jury, Fortin would have accepted the state's 
plea agreement. Even if the Court is to accept Fortin's conclusory allegations about Crafts' 
erroneous advice as true, Fortin cannot demonstrate any prejudice. because Fortin cannot 
demonstrate that the Court would have accepted his plea as a binding plea agreement under 
I.C.R. 11. As a general practice, this Court does not accept binding plea agreements. As part of 
any plea colloquy, the Court routinely advise a defendant that the plea bargain is not binding on 
the Court. If there was a plea agreement in the 19475 case, there is no evidence that the Court 
would not have agreed to a binding plea agreement with a concurrent sentence recommendation. 
As a consequence, Fortin cannot demonstrate any prejudice, since the Court would not have been 
bound to follow the plea agreement. 
B. Consolidation 
Fortin argues that trial counsel Crafts' decision to not consolidate.the 19383 case and the 
194 7 5 case against the wishes of Fortin constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel because 
bifurcating the proceedings led to longer consecutive sentences. However, there is no evidence, 
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and Fortin cannot demonstrate, that he received a more lengthy sentence because the cases were 
not consolidated. 
C. Motion in Limine 
Fortin argues that Crafts' failure to file a motion in limine regarding Fortin's alleged gang 
affiliation, or in the alternative to move for an immediate mistrial after a state's witness 
referenced Fortin's gang affiliation constitutes deficient performance with a prejudicial result. 
On direct appeal in the 19383 case, Fortin challenged the trial court's denial ofFortin's motion 
for mistrial. The Court of Appeals held: 
During cross-examination of the victim in this case, the following exchange occurred: 
Q. Now, at some point, I assume-<lid you ever get a clear look at this 
knife? It seems you like-you just say it was a shiny object. 
A. Not a clear look, but I believe getting cut across the face and stabbed in 
the neck and seeing a shine, you know it's a knife. 
Q. So it's just your opinion that this was a knife? 
A. I knew it was a knife. I couldn't determine which kind. 
Q. How do you know it was a knife? 
A. Because it punctured me in the neck and cut me across the face, and I 
know most gang members carry those. 
The district court immediately instructed the jury to disregard the victim's 
reference to gang members; the victim completed his testimony; and, at the next 
break in the trial proceedings, Fortin moved for a mistrial. Fortin argued that the 
victim's reference to gang members led the jury to believe that Fortin was 
potentially a member of a gang and was, therefore, extremely prejudicial. and too 
inflammatory for a curative instruction. Fortin did not allege that the state planted 
or otherwise invited the comment from the victim. · 
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We conclude that, given the open-ended nature of Fortin's question on cross-
examination, the lack of a motion in limine requesting a pretrial order instructing 
the state to admonish witnesses from referencing gang membership and the 
immediate instruction by the district court to the jury to disregard the victim's 
reference to gang members, Fortin has failed to show that the reference 
constituted reversible error. Therefore, the district comi did not err by denying 
F01iin's motion for a mistrial. 
State v. Fortin, Docket No. 38069 (Ct. App. April 30, 2012). Fortin, relying on this passage, 
argues that Crafts' failure to file a motion in limine resulted in the jury hearing a reference to 
Fortin's alleged gang affiliation which was prejudicial. However, Fortin does not present 
evidence of how the above quoted gang reference prejudiced him. The trial court immediately 
instructed the jury to disregard the comment and the Court is to presume that the jury followed 
these instructions. See State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 751, 947 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct.App.1997); 
State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478,481, 927 P.2d 451,454 (Ct.App.1996). As such, Fortin has 
failed to make a showing how he was prejudiced. 
D. Mistrial 
As to the failure of Crafts to immediately file for a mistrial following the witness's 
reference to Fortin's gang affiliation, the record is clear that Crafts immediately objected and, at 
the next break in the trial proceedings, moved for a mistrial. As such, there is no material 
question of fact that Crafts' performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
E. Witness Exclusion 
On direct appeal in the 19383 case, Fortin argued that the trial court erred by excluding 
the testimony of Casey Smith as a potential defense witness. Here, Fortin argues that Crafts' 
failure to conduct a pretrial interview and subpoena Smith constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals held: 
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Here, the evidence adduced at trial was overwhelming that Fortin used a knife in 
the commission of the aggravated battery and, as a result, the victim suffered 
significant injuries. Multiple witnesses described the altercation between Fortin 
and the victim in this case. None testified that anyone other than Fortin and the 
victim were involved in the physical fight. One witness testified that, during the 
altercation between Fortin and the victim, the witness saw Fortin with a knife in 
his hand and watched Fortin make a slashing motion and connect with the 
victim's face. Another witness testified that she also saw Fortin holding something 
in his hand during the altercation that she believed was a knife. An additional 
witness testified that she saw Fortin make a slashing motion toward the victim and 
saw something in Fortin's hand. The attending trauma surgeon testified that the 
penetrating wound to the victim's chest was a stab wound, although he could not 
say with certainty what caused the wound. However, the surgeon also testified that 
the wound to the victim's face was consistent with a knife wound. Given the 
weight of the evidence against Fortin in this case, we are convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable possibility that the lack of the 
excluded evidence contributed to the verdict obtained against Fortin. Therefore, 
even assuming the district court erred by excluding the testimony of the potential 
defense witness, such error was harmless. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
Fortin has provided no evidence other than the bare assertion in his petition that 
introducing this witness testimony would have resulted in a different outcome at trial. This 
allegation is conclusory and not supported by the record. As such, Fortin has failed to 
demonstrate prejudice. 
F. Evidence of Flight 
On direct appeal in the 19383 case, Fortin argued that the trial court erred when it 
admitted evidence of his flight without conducting an appropriate balancing analysis under I.R.E. 
404(b). See State v. Fortin, Docket No. 38069 (Ct. App. April 30, 2012). In this petition, Fortin 
argues that Crafts' failure to object to Fortin's evidence of flight during trial constitutes 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Fortin's allegation is not supported by the record. In affirming 
the trial court's ruling to allow evidence of Fortin's flight, the Court of Appeals stated: 
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Here, with respect to identifying unfair prejudice. from the flight evidence, 
Fortin's counsel stated at trial: 
Two weeks ago ... I actually tried to get a pretrial ruling on this and 
[the judge] wouldn't allow us to do it because he said he wanted the 
trial judge to make the determination. 
The reality of it is, if I file a motion, it is my obligation to set it for 
notice of hearing. And the reality here is that this evidence coming in 
now, without any prior notice from the prosecutor, is extremely 
prejudicial. Obviously, it is prejudicial. It is inflammatory. 
Id. The record clearly indicates that Crafts was vehemently against any evidence of Fortin's 
flight being introduced at trial. Crafts attempted to receive a pretrial ruling and objected to its 
introduction during trial. As such, Fortin has failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether 
Crafts' performance fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness for a criminal defense 
attorney. 
G. Verdict Form 
Fortin argues that Crafts should have objected to the wording of the verdict form which 
directed the jury to consider lesser included offenses if it found Fortin not guilty of Aggravated 
Battery. Fortin asserts that including lesser offenses in the jury instructions destroyed his 
presumption of innocence. Fortin's conclusory allegations are not supported by the record. Jury 
Instruction No. C instructed the jury that Fortin is presumed innocent and the state has the burden 
of proving his guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury found Fortin guilty of Aggravated 
Battery and the we~pons enhancement. Fortin has provided no evidence that Crafts' failure to 
object to the inclusion of the lesser offenses fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness. 
Fortin has also failed to make a showing that inclusion oflesser offenses created a reasonable 
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probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. As such, this allegation must 
be dismissed. 
H. Rule 35 
Fortin alleges that trial counsel failed to file a Rule 35 motion2 on his behalf. It is 
undisputed that Crafts did not file a Rule 35 motion. Fortin argues that he requested counsel to 
file a Rule 35 motion and that counsel failed to do so. 
"[I]n a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to pursue a motion in 
the underlying criminal action, the court properly may consider the probability of success of the 
motion in question in determining whether the attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent 
performance." Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313,316,900 P.2d 221,225 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing 
Huckv. State, 124 Idaho 155,158,857 P.2d 634,637 (Ct. App. 1993)). 
As noted above, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
an applicant must meet a two-pronged test. The applicant must show both that 
counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the 
applicant. Where the alleged deficiency is counsel's failure to file a ... motion, a 
conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted, is generally 
detem1inative of both prongs of the test. If the motion lacked merit and would 
have been denied, counsel ordinarily would not be deficient for failing to pursue 
it, and, concomitantly, the petitioner could not have been prejudiced by the want 
of its pursuit. 
2 "The court may correct a sentence that has been imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided herein for 
the reduction of sentence. The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the ti ling of a judgment of 
conviction or within 120 days after the court releases retained jurisdiction. The court may also reduce a sentence 
upon revocation of probation or upon motion made within fourteen (14) days after the filing of the order revoking 
probation. Motions to correct or modify sentences under this rule must be filed within 120 days of the entry of the 
judgment imposing sentence or order releasing retained jurisdiction and shall be considered and determined by the 
court without the admission of additional testimony·and without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered by the 
court in its discretion; .provided, however that no defendant may file more than one motion seeking a reduction of 
sentence under this Rule." I.C.R. 35(b). · 
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Huck, 124 Idaho at 158-59, 857 P.2d at 637-38. 
In this case, while Fortin may have presented evidence in support of the allegation of 
deficient performance by not filing a Rule 35 motion, there is no evidence to show actual 
prejudice resulting from the alleged deficiency. A Rule 35 motion is essentially a plea for 
leniency and reconsideration. Fortin presents no additional facts which might have resulted in a 
reduction to his original sentence. The maximum penalty for Aggravated Battery, a felony, is 
fifteen (15) years in prison. Idaho Code§ 18-908. The penalty for Use of a Deadly Weapon 
During the Commission of a Crime, an enhancement, increases the maximum sentence 
authorized for the Aggravated Battery conviction by fifteen (15) years. LC. § 19-2520. 
Accordingly, the maximum penalty for Aggravated Battery with the enhancement is thirty (30) 
years. The sentence imposed is within the statutory bounds. 
At the time the Court imposed Fortin's sentence, it considered all relevant and required 
sentencing factors, see Toohill, 103 Idaho at 565; Reinke, .103 Idaho at 771, and imposed a 
reasonable and appropriate sentence for Fortin's crimes. The Court does not find that Fortin's 
sentence is excessive. After a careful and thorough review of the record in the 19383 case, the 
pre-sentence report, victim impacts and the criminal history of Fortin, the Court remains 
convinced that the sentence was appropriate when imposed and remains reasonable. Fortin was 
convicted of a very serious and violent crime. The Court has concerns regarding Fortin' s 
apparent lack of remorse for his crimes and has serious concerns over trusting Fortin in the 
community. As such, the Court would not have granted a reduction in the prisoner's sentence 
even if a timely Rule 35 motion had been filed. For that reason, Fortin cannot demonstrate 
prejudice. 
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Lastly, Fortin alleges that appeal counsel, Greg Silvey, failed to "federalize" any issued 
on direct appeal and did not object to errors in the transcript of the February 4, 2011 restitution 
hearing. Both of these allegations are conclusory and must be dismissed. 
Conclusion 
As explained above, the Court will grant summary dismissal of all claims that trial 
counsel was ineffective. Counsel for the State is directed to submit an appropriate form of 
judgment. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this_/_/_ day May, 2015. 
PatrikH. Owen 
District Judge 
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Interdepartmental Mail 
Date:~{g/_,__/ <i:.............,.p5 __ 
ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER ON DIRECT APPEAL 2 
000178
No._ 
A.M,------_:~ P.M.&: l.<,_,.. __  
AUG 11 2015 ---
TO: CLERK OF THE COURT IDAHO SUPREME 
CHRISTOPHfr:-. 
By KE n D. RICH C/ 
COURT . LLEWEGEN , e k 
DEPUry ER 
451 WEST STATE STREET, BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
CODY J. FORTIN, ) 
) 
) 
Petitioner-Appellant, ) Supreme Court 




) Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 




NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
Notice is her·eby given that on August 11th, 2015, I 
lodged transcript(s) of the following hearing(s): 
Evidentiary Hearing on March 17, 2015, of 12 pages; 
a total of 12 pages; for the above-referenced appeal with 
the District Court Clerk of the County of Ada in the Fourth 
Judicial District. 
Date 
Certified Court Reporter 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY JAMES FORTIN, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 43334 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
IN WI1NESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 12th day of August, 2015. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
,,, ...... ,,,, 
,,,,, ~t\ JUD1/'11,, 
CHRISTOPHER D. RJJt· ti;••••••••• '1.1.; ',, .... , .. ··""' ,:. Clerk of the D1stnct ~ .e STATE•.~,:, 
: CJ •• -t\\'r- ••• cf)_ : 
: ·c~ .~: \[ -L.· ·-· • • t"'"" • o-c - • ,.. • •U• - I" •n• 
Byl ,J_.e~,\\O /-, § 
Deputy Clerk ~I").•.. · ••• • 1: ! 
# V •e e• ~" I ,, l'lj, ...... C,~ .... 
,,,,, -1ND FOR ~~~ ,,,,, ,,, ,,, ......... , 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY JAMES FORTIN, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 43334 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
AUG 1 2 2015 
Date of Service: --------
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
,,, ....... ,, 
,,,,,, ~1!\ lU.D ,,,,,, 
CHRISTOPHE&,~~µ,J.•••• •• :o/.1 ', .. ,.. 
Clerk of the Dl~.eourt s r • •• < .,-1 \ 
: f.... : ~ 1\\E ATP.~~ ,:. 
: .o •C/l: 
\[ .u. ·~-~ - • - OF - • ;;:o : 
\ ~·--By • • : (":): 
~ • ."--1 ... 
Deputy Clerk -;.<:>~ •• • ~ ~ .. ~ ~ . ~ .. .... '.tJ, ••••••• .,~ .. . 
.... -1/V e,C)" .. . 
'~,, '/J FOR AD~ ,,,, ,,,,,, .... ,,,,, 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CODY JAMES FORTIN, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 43334 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho; in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the 
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
as well as those requested by Counsel. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
15th day of June, 2015. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
,, ......... ,, ,, ,, 
CHRISTOPHER D. ~rnt>.1\-\ 1UD1c/'1,, 
... =<:},,"5:., •••••• .(1 , 
Clerk of the District:-C'lW:o!-··· ···~ '< '-:. 
.. C) • • d .. 
: U : ,..\\E STATE•. ;;.-- °: 
\ 
.. • <.\ ecfJ• 
.. E-, • Q'\ • ,-4 -
- • • :;;,o -
B LW,eE~- :-: y - 0 .(""). 
Deputy Clerk ;~tt : "-"i: 
~ ~ .. . .. ".:... .: 
, V •• • ~" .. 
,,, 9/1 •••••••• r:::,.::S .... . II ,1Ar (; .. . 
''~ 'tD FOR t,.Ui:'> ,.,. .. ,,, ,,, .......... 
